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ABSTRACT
When L&zaro Cdrdenas became president of Mexico
in December 1934, a large part of Mexico's economy was
under the control of foreign investors who successfully
had fought off all attempts by previous Mexican govern
ments to apply the constitutional principles which had
come out of the Mexican Revolution and which would have
infringed on that control.

C&rdenas had joined the

Revolution at the age of eighteen, had been a revolu
tionary general at twenty-five, and temporary governor
of his home state of Michoacdn at the same age.

Only

thirty-nine when he was elected president, Cdrdenas was
ready to fight politically for the same ideals for
which he had fought militarily during the Revolution.
The Cdrdenas Doctrine, although formalized by
the Socialist Front of Lawyers of Mexico only after
Cdrdenas already had served four years of his term,
was from the beginning the central doctrine of the C&rdenas administration.

Based on precedents such as the

Calvo Clause, the C&rdenas Doctrine held that the terms
"citizenship" and "nationality" could be applied only
to specific territorial limits, and that no foreigner
in Mexico could use his citizenship of another nation
v

as justification for turning to his own government in
disputes with Mexico.

CArdenas insisted that all per

sons residing in Mexico consider themselves the same as
Mexican nationals, with no more nor fewer rights under
the law.
The application of the principles of the CArdenas
Doctrine was the cause for CArdenas and his government's
being labeled radical in many parts.

Some even accused

him and his government of being communist when as early
as 1936 Mexico began giving aid to the Spanish Republican
government.

The other major help given to the Spanish

Republicans came from the Soviet Union, thus making
Mexico guilty by association in the minds of many.

But

when Mexico started giving asylum to Spanish refugees,
no stipulation was made as to the political beliefs of
those seeking asylum.

Mexico only insisted on adher

ence to the principles of what was to become the CArdenas Doctrine.
If the case of Spain served to confuse the issue,
the grant of asylum to Leon Trotsky in 1937 should have
indicated that CArdenas was not under any kind of in
fluence from the Soviet Union.

Not only was his de

fiance of that nation in granting the asylum of tre
mendous importance, but his refusal to renew relations
with the U.S.S.R. during his term

wsb

further evidence

that he was pursuing an independent course.

vi

In international impact, however, these cases were
minor compared with the most outstanding example of the
application of the CArdenas Doctrine— the expropriation
of British and American-owned oil properties on March 18,
1938.

The United States recognized the right of Mexico

to expropriate the properties, hut demanded immediate
and adequate compensation.

Great Britain demanded the

return of the properties, and the dispute reached the
point where Mexico broke relations and did not renew
them until after CArdenas left office.
CArdenas remained a key figure in Mexican politics
after leaving office, and his outspoken attitude, es
pecially on economic independence, sometimes irritated
other powers such as the United States.

The Cuban-

United States' conflict of the 1960*3 provided CArde
nas with one more opportunity to attack economic im
perialism before he died on October 19, 1970.

vii

INTRODUCTION
Entire books have been written about MexicanUnited States foreign policy, or even one incident in
the relations between these two countries.

It is not,

therefore, the intention of this work to cover all of
Mexico's foreign policy in the 20th Century.

Neither

will an attempt be made to write a complete political
biography of the man who some feel was the most domi
nant individual in Mexican politics in this century up
to the present.

Rather, the acts and the wordB of the

man— L&zaro Cirdenas— will be used as a point of refer
ence to show the various courses taken by Mexico in its
relations with foreign governments in this century.

Of

primary interest must be the so-called Cdrdenas Doctrine,
discussed in detail in the second chapter.

The appli

cation of this doctrine in both domestic and foreign
policy under his administration made Cdrdenas wellknown in the field of international relations, if not
particularly well-liked by some of the powers which
felt their interests suffered because of his actions.
Mexico's proximity to the United States (one of
those countries which felt the effect of the C&rdenas
Doctrine) has both aided and hindered the progress of
Mexico throughout the two centuries of independent
viii

relations.

Nevertheless, one cannot dispute the tre-

mendous influence of the United States on Mexico, and
the propensity for more dialogue between Mexico and the
United States than between Mexico and other nations.
Because of this close relationship, and especial
ly because the CArdenas government was the first Mexi
can government in the 20th Century to begin attacking
some of the commercial privileges enjoyed by U.S. com
mercial interests under previous Mexican governments,
two full chapters have been devoted to Mexican rela
tions with the United States.

In addition, in some of

the other chapters, reference of necessity has been madfe
to Mexican-United States' relations as they affected
Mexico's relations with a third country.

A good ex

ample of this relationship was the Spanish Civil War,
when Mexico was supplying munitions to the Spanish Re
publican government while the United States wanted to
be sure that none of those munitions were of American
manufacture.
In the chapter dealing with Spain, the author has
outlined a brief history of the relations between Mexi
co and Spain, since those two countries were bound so
closely through the Spanish empire.

There have been

times when the relationship was one of greatest friend
ship, while at other times there have been no diplomat
ic ties at all.

It was during the years of CArdenas

that Mexico exhibited exceptionally strong ties with
ix

Spain, stronger than any ties between Spain and other
former colonies.

CArdenas committed the Mexican nation

to a policy of brotherhood with Spain, and the policy
he pursued still colors the relations, or lack of dip
lomatic ties, between the two countries.

For this rea

son, the largest part of Chapter III deals with the
civil war years, CArdenas* reasoning in the policy he
followed, and the effects of that policy.
A relationship completely different from that of
Mexico and Spain has been that of Mexico and the Soviet
Union.

An astute student might point out that there

were no relations between Mexico and the U.S.S.R. dur
ing the years of CArdenas, and of course this observa
tion is correct.

Nevertheless, there was something of

a negative relationship between the two countries
throughout the entire period of CArdenas1 presidency.
This negative relationship affected not only the two
countries involved, but other countries as well.

The

very presence of Leon Trotsky in Mexico was enough to
have world-wide impact.
magazine

Innumerable newspaper and

articles were written in the United States

about the ex-Soviet leader.

Some of the articles were

in praise of Mexico for its liberal attitude, while yet
others blasted CArdenas for his leftist tendencies.
Trotsky's presence had more than an international
effect on Mexico.

Internally, groups of Mexicans argued

over his influence on Mexican policy in general.

His

articles in some of the major daily newspapers kept
his residence in Mexico before the public for much of
the time he was there.

His death probably caused lit

tle real grief among Mexicans in general, but it served
as a platform for CArdenas to denounce those respon
sible.
Pressure put on CArdenas from friends of the
Soviet Union to revive diplomatic relations also color
ed his administration, and made the lack of official
ties perhaps more important than if there had been of
ficial relations.

All these factors together, plus the

refusal to deal with the Soviet Union by CArdenas on
any but his own terms, made Mexico's unofficial re
lations with the Soviet Union an important factor in
her external relations with the rest of the world.
Perhaps the single most important event in the
history of 20th Century relations between Mexico and
the United States occurred during the CArdenas years.
This event was the oil expropriations of March 1938,
an act which many Mexicans see as the beginning of
economic independence for Mexico.

For Mexico, the ex

propriation was not just an act of independence, but in
reality a test (although not intended for that) for the
Good Neighbor policy of the United States.

In this most

far-reaching application of the CArdenas Doctrine, the
xi

reaction of the United States was almost as important
as the act of expropriation itself in terms of setting
a precedent for future relations.
The question of oil was not the only issue between
the two neighbors during the CArdenas years.

Almost as

soon as he took office CArdenas signed a decree which
he felt should keep the United States' fishing fleet
out of what he considered Mexico's territorial waters.
There were too many other important matters for discus
sion during these years to give much attention to this
%

question, especially since Mexico was ill-equipped to
try to do anything to

enforce the law.

But the decree

CArdenas signed ultimately was the basis for an agree
ment between Mexico and the United States, and there
fore was another important piece of foreign policy
legislation credited to CArdenas.
One other important issue between these two
countries was related very closely to the oil question,
although this relationship was denied by the United
States.

When the United States Treasury announced it

would stop buying Mexican silver and this announcement
came within a few days of the oil expropriations, then
Mexico could only assume it was in retaliation.

The

U.S. 8ilver-purchasing policy fluctuated during the
next few years and at times caused serious difficul
ties in the Mexican economy.
xii

Sometimes in the United States it is forgotten
that Mexico's foreign relations include other nations
of the world also.

Even in Mexico the special rela

tionship with the United States is always visible in
the form of numerous newspaper articles in all the major
dailies almost everyday.

But the deeds and words of

Ldzaro Cdrdenas are very useful in pointing out the
other foreign relations of Mexico, such as with Spain
and the Soviet Union.

In addition, Guatemala and Mexi

co have had some stormy relations in this century, but
because of the lack of any controversial intercourse
directly bearing on Cdrdenas' years as president,
Guatemala has not been treated in a separate chapter.
But there was one other nation with which Cdrdenas dealt during his years as president that merits
attention.

Too often the issue of the oil expropria

tions is treated as a single subject; nevertheless, the
attitude of Great Britain toward Mexico was so differ
ent from that of the United States that one should look
at the oil question from the two different viewpoints.
While the United States never questioned Mexico's
rights to enforce the C&rdenas Doctrine or to expropriate
the properties, Great Britain was adamant in claiming
that the only solution was a return of the oil proper
ties.

This narrow attitude led to an embargo on Mexi

can oil, and shortly after the expropriations, to a
xiii

break in diplomatic ties..between the two nations.
Not one single point of the conflicts between
the CArdenas government and other nations discussed,
was settled fully during his term of office.

The oil

question with the United States was not settled until
the year after he left office, and the same issue with
Great Britain dragged on into the late 1940's.

The

following administration also renewed ties with the
Soviet Union (as well as with Great Britain), but the
denial of CArdenas to recognize the Franco regime in
Spain has been carried forward as Mexican policy to
the present day.
Cardenas did not completely fade from the scene
in 1940 when his term ended.

Nevertheless, it would

be erroneous to overstate his importance in the years
immediately after he left office in the realm of
foreign affairs.

Although he returned to military

office for a time, his actions affected very little
the foreign affairs of Mexico.
CArdenas the elder statesman of Mexico will be
discussed in the next to last chapter, but because he
was not very active in foreign affairs in the years
following his term as president, most of this dis
cussion will be centered around his political atti
tude, especially as it pertained to the Cuban-United
States' conflict in the early 1960's.
xiv

During the

earlier years, CArdenas himself had not attracted much
international attention.

But because of the situation

in Cuba, he again focused the spotlight on Mexico, per
haps forcing the Mexican government into making policy
statements.
These policy statements were nothing really new,
but again showed Mexico's basic foreign policy of selfdetermination and non-intervention in the affairs of
other countries.

But it was the U.S.-Cuban confronta

tion and CArdenas' defense of Cuba which focused atten
tion once again on these principles.

There may be de

bate over whether CArdenas by this time was being used
by the communists or not, but CArdenas' assertions were
merely his old idea of economic independence of all
nations.
To portray current foreign relations of practical
ly any nation one is often hard-pressed to find sources,
and Mexico proved to be no exception.

Although some

of CArdenas* papers are available in the Mexican ar
chives, they proved to be singularly inadequate for a
complete picture.

Fortunately, there are several books

now in print which quote speeches, and the first three
volumes of CArdenas1 Works have been published.
The United States National Archives and the print
ed series of the diplomatic papers in the Foreign Rela
tions of the United States were both excellent sources
xv

for information not just on the United States and Mexi
co, "but Mexican relations with other countries as well.
Since these sources were somewhat limited, how
ever in dealing with Mexican relations with other
countries, there was only one other readily available
source for the history of 20th century Mexico.

This

source consisted of both newspapers and magazines pub
lished in Mexico during the period of the C&rdenas
years.

Although these proved to be excellent sources,

one problem is faced:
bias.

newspapers often show extreme

This meant that for each article read and quot

ed, other newspapers were researched to try to assure
accuracy.

It was found that the large dailieB such

as Excelsior, Novedades and El Universal, which carried
translated articles from the wire press services, were
likely to be the most accuratei

The official organ of

the government, El Nacional. was relied upon to carry
the party line.

It was fortunate that El Nacional

published entire quoted texts of both official Mexi
can documents and also notes from other countries as
well.

In this respect, this newspaper served the same

purpose as the NY Times for some current documents of
U.S. foreign policy.

Because of this policy of print

ing entire documents, El Nacional was not used to pro
ject Mexican public opinion, but as a primary source
for important foreign policy.
xv i

Some former high-ranking officials who served the
Mexican government before, during and after the years of
Cdrdenas were extremely helpful in filling the gaps
which existed after the major portion of research in
printed sources had been completed.

Ambassador Luis

Quintanilla, former ambassador to the Soviet Union and
also to the Organization of American States, was es
pecially helpful.

Not only did he grant the author

interviews, but arranged others.

One of these which

was extremely valuable was with Jestis Silva Herzog, who
not only was the ambassador to the Soviet Union when
relations between Mexico and that country were broken,
but who also was directly involved with the C&rdenas
government in the newly-nationalized petroleum Industry.
Sources such as these, although minor in the
amount of material used, were extremely valuable in
giving human interest accounts of C&rdenas and making
him more than just an object of research.
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CHAPTER I

LAZARO CARDENAS THE REVOLUTIONARY
When LAzaro CArdenas was born on May 21, 1893 (in
Jiquilpan, MichoacAn), Mexico was still under the dic
tatorship of Porfirio Diaz, a state which was to last
until the Mexican Revolution which began in 1910.

Lit

tle in his background suggested that CArdenas would be
come not only a leading military figure in that revolu
tion, but the political leader to carry forth many of
the social, economic and political ideas which came out
of the revolutionary struggle.
The parents of LAzaro were DAmasco CArdenas and
Pelicitas del Rio.

Unlike most of the family relatives,

they did not own agricultural land, but DAmasco com
bined a career of making soap, working in the local
industry dedicated to weaving shawls, and practicing
folk medicine.

LAzaro began school at the age of six

in 1901, but as the family was poor, he had to begin
working at an early age in 1909* his first position
being in the Office of Fiscal Administration of Ji
quilpan.

The few pesos he earned there were not suf

ficient, and by the time he was fifteen he held another
position also, that of typographer's apprentice in a
1

2

local printing shop.

After the death of his father and

the failure of the printing business, he took a posi
tion as a local jailer.

Here CArdenas first learned

to sympathize with, then to love, the Mexican* Indian.1
The Mexican Revolution had started several years
earlier, and when CArdenas was eighteen he announced he
was going to join the revolutionary cause.

He traveled

from Jiquilpan in 1913 to Buenavista to join the forces
of General Guillermo Garcia Aragdn.

When he arrived at

the revolutionary camp, CArdenas was asked by the gener
al to copy a written order.

After reading what he had

written, Garcia Aragdn made CArdenas a second captain
2
in charge of his official correspondence.
Thus, at
the age of eighteen, with no military experience, CAr
denas began a career as a revolutionary military of
ficer.

His experiences as a jailer in Jiquilpan and

his later travels through many parts of Mexico as a
revolutionary officer enabled him to identify with the
common man, a trait which later made him one of Mexico's

1Por early background on CArdenas, see Carlos Alvear Acevedo, LAzaro CArdenas, el hombre y el mito, segunda edicidn TR?5cTco*i 13TTEorlaT-7u^7™™T9^75Tr^T™TO;
LAzaro CArdenas, Obras; I-Apuntes. 1913-1940. Torao I
(MAxico: Universidad Nacional Aux&noma de MAxico, 1972),
p. 6; and Roberto Blanco Moheno, Tata LAzaro. Vida, obra
y muerte de CArdenas, Miigica y Carrillo hierto (Mexico:
fentorlaroiaM,' '1972j,1pp/'afrzs:----------2
CArdenas, Obras, Tomo I, p. 20.

3

most popular presidents.

He might not even fully have

understood the underlying reasons for the revolution at
the time, hut later he tried to be faithful to the ideals
set forth after most of the fighting was finished.
Although the name of CArdenas is not as promi
nent as the names of some of the other revolutionary
officers, his rise through the ranks was extremely rap
id.

In 1913 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel un

der the orders of General Federico Morales, and in the
same year he joined the constitutionalist cause, head
ed by Carranza.

In May 1920, at the age of only twenty-

five, he became a brigadier general, and had definitely
tied himself to General Plutarco Elias Calles, who,
along with Alvaro Obregdn, was to become one of the
strong men of Mexico after the ending of the military
phase of the revolution.

Serving in various military

posts between 1920 and 1928, with promotions to brigade
general in 1924 and in 1928 to divisional general, CAr
denas also began getting political experience in 1920.
In that year he was appointed as temporary governor of
his home state of Michoac&n at the time when Fascual
Ortiz Rubio, a future president, left that post to be
come Secretary of Communications.

CArdenas retained

this temporary post until September of the same year,
when he once again returned to strictly military

4

duties.

•*

Prom November 1921 to February 1923, CArdenas
served as the commander of the Column of Sonora, and
also as the Chief of Operations in the Isthmus of
TehuAntepec.

Prom March to May 1923, CArdenas had the

distinction of being the commander of the first mili
tary concentration camp in Irapuato, and afterward be
came the head of the 20th Operational Headquarters of
MichoacAn.

During the Adolfo de la Huerta uprising,

he again commanded troops and was wounded and taken
prisoner.

When his capturers learned that General

Obregdn had been victorious in OcotlAn, they not only
released Cardenas, but put themselves under his command.^
In 1925, CArdenas became Chief of Operations in
Huastecas, and while there founded the first School
for Sons of the Military.

After having seved in this

area for two years, CArdenas in 1927 accepted the nomi
nation as candidate for governor of MichoacAn in his
own right.

On September 15, 1928, while still a mili

tary officer, Cardenas took office as governor.

Three

^Alberto Bremauntz, Material histdrico de Obregdn
a CArdenas (MAxico: Avelar Hnos. Impresores, S.A.,
1973}, pp. 155-56; and Agustin Rodriguez Ochoa, MAxico
contemnorAneo (1867-1940)-CArdenas en su historia

rrrmjB.

^■Rodriguez Ochoa, MAxico contemporAneo, p. 142.

5
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years later, Governor CArdenas served notice on foreign
oil companies when he nullified contracts dating back
as far as 1905 for the exploitation of land within the
state.

CArdenas explained that the "representatives"

of the people at the time the contracts were signed
really had been working for the foreign companies,
c
thus making the contracts illegal.
The oil companies still had several years before
their major confrontation with CArdenas, but it was ob
vious his political star was rising when he was named
Secretary of Government in August 1931.

He only re

mained in the office a few months, however, as in
October he resigned to return as governor to MichoacAn,^
where on September 25, 1932 he married Amalia SolArzano.
The parents of the bride refused to attend the ceremony
7

because it was civil rather than religious.' In his
defiance of his bride's parents could be seen the fu
ture defiance of his government toward the Catholic
church.

It appears that CArdenas was not irreligious

at the time, but rather probably felt that the church
had been a factor in holding back the development of
the country.

Later, especially in the case of education,

5Ibid., pp. 146, 152.
6Ibid., pp. 152-53.
7
'CArdenas, Obras, Tomo I, p. 206.

6

Cdrdenas had to face the wrath of the church not only
in Mexico but even in the United States as he was ac
cused of trying to tear down the moral fibre of the
Mexican people.
The church issue, however, still was not a major
problem for CArdenas in 1933 when he accepted a cabinet
post as the Secretary of War and Navy.

He stayed in

this position only a few months as on May 15, 1933,
C&rdenas submitted his resignation in order to devote
full time to his pre-candidacy campaign for the presi
dency.8
When Calles, who still was the strongest man
politically in Mexico, was first approached on the
subject of CArdenas' candidacy for 1934, he objected.
His objections were not based on any dislike for CArdenas, but rather because he felt he still was too
young.

Finally Calles gave in to avoid any conflict

within what had become known as the "Revolutionary
q
Family," and also to placate the military.
Had Calles

8Ibid., pp. 213, 224-25.
^Alvear Acevedo, LAzaro C&rdenas. p. 93. A num
ber of high-ranking military leaders, including General
Abelardo Rodriguez, already had decided in favor of
CArdenas. Added to these military figures were some
of the more powerful civilians such as TomAs Garrido
Canabal. To have refused their wishes, Calles would
have had to run the risk of dividing the Family.

7

known that within a few months of the time he took of
fice C&rcLenas would feel it necessary to turn against
him, he undoubtedly would not have been so anxious to
placate the military and avoid "family" squabbles.
C&rdenas became president of Mexico at the end
of 1934» and probably many Mexicans were surprised to
see him finish out the six-year term for which he had
been elected.

Since the fall of Porfirio Diaz, Mexican

presidents had come and gone in rapid succession.

Only

Obregdn (1920-24) and Calles (1924-28) had been able to
complete full terms, and they had served before the
term was set at six years.

In the period between

1928 and 1934, three presidents had served:

Emilio

Portes Gil, one year; Pascual Ortiz Rubio, two and onehalf years; and Abelardo Rodriguez, two y e a r s . A l l
three of these presidents have been labeled by historians
as more or less puppets for Calles.
C&rdenas succeeded in retaining the presidency
because, in spite of his earlier friendly relations
with Calles, he insisted on being his own president.
To the credit of Cdrdenas, when his time came to step
down, he did so without trying to interfere with the
new president.

Ambassador Luis Quintanilla, a close

personal friend and public servant under Cardenas and

■^Rodriguez Ochoa. Mexico contempordneo, pp. 147154.

8

other administrations, says that Cardenas tried in no
way to influence Avila Camacho to govern according to
the policies established in the previous six years.^
Prank Brandenburg, on the other hand, states that
Cdrdenas continued as head of the "Revolutionary Fami
ly" during the reign of Camacho, and shared the posi
tion as Family head during parts of the administrations
of both Miguel Alemdn and Adolfo Ruiz CortineB.

12

In

spite of this claim of shared leadership, it would seem
from the conservative swing of the Avila Camacho regime
that Cdrdenas did in effect refrain from exerting strong
control over the policies of his successor.

As will

be seen below, Cardenas was strongly in favor of so
cialist education, yet within a few months of leaving
0

office, he saw Avila Camacho completely change the
system.
There is no denial, however, that Cdrdenas re
mained an important figure in Mexican affairs even af
ter leaving office.

He was a divisional general at

the age of thirty-three and president of his country
at thirty-nine.

When he left the presidency he was

^Personal interview. Cecilia S. Tyler with Dr.
Luis Quintanilla, Mexico City, January 16, 1974. Per
sonal files.
12

Frank Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., l^bA),
p. 6.
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only forty-five, an age at which most politicians have
not yet reached the peak of their careers.

Therefore,

Cardenas had a number of years left in which to serve
his country, even if he did not try to impose his will
on those presidents who followed him.
Only one year after leaving office the opportunity
arose for him to serve again.

When the United States

entered the Second World War, it became obvious that
Mexico would be tied to the United States.

C&rdenas

was urged to become Commander of the Pacific Military
Region, a post he accepted at the end of 1941.

In

July of the next year he was elevated to the post of
Secretary of National Defense, a position he occupied
until the end of the war.

Finally, he was able to leave

official public service and began working in the rural
areas to better the lives of the peasants.

J

Since

his days as jailer in Jiquilpan he had sympathized
with the natives, and had tried as president to better
their living standards.

Now he was able to dedicate

himself full time to the task.
In July 1947 Cdrdenas was named Executive Commit
tee Member of the Commission of Tepalcatepec, giving
him an official position from which to work among the
peasants.
13
45.

During the next eleven years he worked in

Rodriguez Ochoa, Mexico contempordneo, pp. 244-
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this position, building roads, dams, schools, hospitals
and helping to develop both industry and agriculture
within the region.

In 1958 he resigned, but in 1961

he was named by President Adolfo L6pez Mateos to a simi
lar position on the Commission of Rio BalBas.*4

This

was his last official position with the government of
Mexico, and probably it was more of a political move
on the part of L6pez Mateos to get Cdrdenas out of the
spotlight in which he put himself because of his stand
on the Cuban-United States
On October 19, 1970,

conflict in 1961.
Cardenas died and is now

buried in the Monument to the Revolution alongside Madero, Carranza and Calles.^

C&rdenas might have felt

uncomfortable being buried next to Calles, but never
theless the Monument has to be a fit final resting place
for the general from Michoacdn who left home at the age
of eighteen to become a revolutionary, then carried the
Revolutionary ideals with him into the presidency.
The Ideals of the Mexican Revolution
So true did Cfirdenastry to be to what
preted as the ideals established by

he inter

the MexicanRevolu

tion that it might be said that the Revolution reached
its peak in the years of his administration, then began

14Ibid., pp. 246-47
15Ibid., p. 266.
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a retrogression.^

However, the Mexican Revolution is

supposedly a continuing process, and the policies of
Cdrdenas have been likened to some extent to the present policies of President Luis Echeverrla. 1 7
One problem encountered in talking about the
Mexican Revolution and the revolutionary policies of
such leaders as C&rdenas and Echeverrla 1b the diffi
culty in trying to define just what it was and the
goals of those who made the revolution.

Victor Alba

claims that the Mexican Revolution breaks all the known
molds of a revolution, especially the Marxist one. 18
Although there definitely was a large proletariat in
Mexico, it was not a unified one knowledgeable of its
existence as a force capable of throwing out a ruling
class.

Neither was there anything such as Lenin'b van

guard to lead the struggle.

Rather there already was a

dictatorship (albeit not of the proletariat!) which may
have remained in power several years longer had not Madero, himself a member of the upper class, suggested the
16Personal interviews. Author with former ambas
sadors Luis Quintanilla and Jestis Silva Herzog, Mexico
City, July 1972. L.S.U. Archives.
17

'Personal interview.
Luis Quintanilla.
18

Cecilia S. Tyler with Dr.

Victor Alba, Las ideas sociales contempor&neas
en Mdxico (Mdxico/Buenos Aires: Pondo de Cultura Bcondmica, i960), p. 207.
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possibility of toppling the regime of Diaz.
Perhaps the only real characteristic the Mexican
Revolution had in common with other social upheavals was
the desire on the part of some of the leaders to improve
the daily living conditions of the great mass of Mexican
peasants. 1 9

It would be hard to say that even this goal

was characteristic, and obviously those who did desire
to improve the living standard of the masses met with
nothing but failure both during the violent years of
the revolution and for a number of years afterward.
There are some who see no revolutionary impact
in the years 1910-1917, or any other period of Mexican
history; therefore, to them the Mexican Revolution is
not a revolution at all.

Their argument is based on

the theory that a revolution must bring about some kind
of radical change, and that there is nothing revolution
ary or radical in Mexico in putting new leaders into
office by rebellion. 20

There is truth in this obser

vation as leaders in Mexico often decided by force who
would be the president, or dictator.

The violent part

of the Mexican Revolution really did little to change
the situation until with the administration of Ldzaro
19

Manuel Gonzalez Ramirez, La revolucidn social de
Mexico (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura ficonimica, l£6o;,p. 59.
20

T. Esauivel Obregdn, "Mexican Problems," in
Foreign Affairs. Vol. I (March 15, 1923), pp. 126-27.
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Cdrdenas Mexico began systematic changes in the presi
dency every six years.
Whether calling the Mexican Revolution a non
revolution because it failed to bring about radical
changes in the manner of selecting officials or whether
it was even a political or a social phenomenon perhaps
is not really paramount in defining it.

But one con

sideration and one tangible culmination of the revolu
tion was the Constitution of 1917r and there certainly
were some revolutionary (at least for the time) parts
to that document.

It was in the area of constitutional

enforcement that Cdrdenas stood out from his predeces
sors as he used it to further the revolutionary goals
of his government.

Those who came before him seemed

either to ignore the constitution or to bend it to suit
their own ends.

One of the outstanding examples of

this practical disdain for constitutionality is the
exploitation of the riches of Mexico allowed by all
governments before Cdrdenas.

When he came to power on

the other hand, Cdrdenas used the revolutionary por
tions of the constitution to the fullest extent to ob
tain what he thought were the revolutionary objectives
of the Nation.
We should at least point out, however, that Sov
iet historians do not look on this document as being
truly revolutionary.

On the contrary, in spite of ad

mitting that it does represent an ideology that Is

14

revolutionary, the Soviets believe it voices protection
for the poor masses of Mexico while in reality it is
nothing more than a document designed to support the
interests of the urban middle class at the expense of
the proletariat. 21

Cdrdenas obviously believed dif

ferently as he used the articles discussed below to al
low the laboring class and the peasants to participate
in the Mexican government.
In relation to both social and economic programs,
the constitution is said to borrow from Western-Buropean socialist theories, 22 and at the same time is a
highly flexible document which can be used by presi
dents (as it was by Cdrdenas) for revolutionary goals
of the government. 21'

In spite of the Soviet accusation

that it is not a revolutionary document, it has been
viewed thusly on a number of occasions, especially dur
ing the Cdrdenas years.

The Cdrdenas government was

accused of being anti-religious and communistic, among
21

J. Gregory Oswald, nLa revolucidn en la historiografia sovietica," in Historia mexicana. Vol. XII
(enero-marzo, 1963), p. 354.
22

Tomme Clark Call, The Mexican Venture: Prom
Political to Industrial Revolution in Mexico (New Yorks
Oxford university Press, 1^53), pp. 16-17.
21

'Anita Brenner, The Wind that Swept Mexico: The
History of the Mexican Revolution. 1910-1942. third
edition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943), p. 51.
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other things; yet his policies, as will be seen, were
based normally on strict constitutional interpretation.
Most criticism that the government of Cdrdenas
was anti-religious and communistic stem from the wide
spread use of four of the constitutional articles to
further the six-year plan established by the Partido
Nacional Revolucionario (PNR).

The first of these

articles was Article 3 which deals with education. The
Cdrdenas government felt so strongly about the State's
responsibility in the field of education that his ad
ministration passed an amendment making the article
even stronger in relation to the church's position.

Es

sentially, the clergy were prohibited from giving pri
mary or secondary school education for laborers and
peasants,^ and naturally the church both in Mexico
and abroad resented the strong application of the anti
clerical constitutional legislation.
Although the church objected to the application
of Article 3, Cardenas was able to weather the storm of
protests and even improved the government's relatione
with the church over those of Calles and the church.
But it was Article 27 which caused so much friction
that at times it seemed that the government might fall.

^Felipe Telia Ramirez, editor, leyes fundamentales
de Mdxico. 1808-1964. segunda edicidn, revisada y puesta
ai dia (Mexico: Editorial Porrua, S.A., 1964), pp.
818-819.

This article establishes the nation as the sole original
owner of all the lands and subsoil minerals.

In addi

tion, it provides for expropriations should the govern
ment establish the public need as long as an indemnity
for the expropriated property is paid. It not only
states that only Mexicans by birth or naturalization
could obtain property, but Article 27 also prohibited
religious institutions from acquiring, possessing, or
administering real property or holding mortgages on
such property.

2R

J

Various Mexican governments before

Cdrdenas had difficulties with the church over the ar
ticle, yet never had applied with any force the provi
sions pertaining to private enterprise.
The wording of the article is very clear and in
vestors coming into Mexico should have been aware of
the Hrevolutionary" content of the article long before
Cdrdenas applied it to the foreign oil properties.

But

governments from the time of Porfirio Diaz had encourag
ed foreign capital and perhaps many of the investors
believed that when the new constitution was promulgated
in 1917 that Article 27 would never be made retroactive.
The various Petroleum Laws had negated the same pro
visions in the 1857 document, and the oil companies
seemed not to believe that Cdrdenas would use the new
constitution against them, especially since other

25Ibid., pp. 825-828.
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"revolutionary11 governments since 1917 had accommodated
themselves to overlooking certain provisions. 26
Although Article 27 displeased both the church
and the foreign capitalists, it was Article 123# the Lab
or Magna Carta, which was considered extremely revolu
tionary for its time.

Besides establishing a maximum

working day of eight hours and prohibiting child labor,
this article made strikes legal and required, at least
by law, that equal wages be paid to employes regardless
of their sex or nationality.^

In the case of the C&r-

denas administration, full use was made of this article
to bring laborers into the government as a very potent
force.

Cdrdenas allowed strikes to the point that it

seemed again that perhaps his own government was in dan
ger because of his policies.
Article 123 could be considered a major break
through for organized labor in Latin America, but the
inclusion of the article in the 1917 constitution did
26

On December 26, 1926, Calles promulgated the
Regulatory Law of Article 27# and tried to limit the
concessions of the oil companies. But the Supreme Court
(and diplomatic pressure) aided the companies in tem
porarily keeping these concessions. For more background
see Antonio Gdmez Robledo, The Bucarell Agreements and
International Law, trans. by Dr. Salomon ae la Selva
^Mexico ftity: Rational University of Mexico, 1940);and
Government of Mexico, The True Facts about the Expro
priations of the Oil Companies' Property in Mexico
{Mexico City: Government of Mexico, 1940).
27
Tefla Ramirez, Leyes fundamentales de Mexico,
pp. 870-872.
---- -------------------
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not guarantee the Mexican workers that they no longer
would be exploited, regardless of the idealistic in
tent of the members of the Querdtaro Convention which
included it in the new constitution.

In fact, it_was

the very exploitation of the workers by the oil com
panies of the United States and Great Britain which
finally forced Cdrdenas to act in 1938, thus thrusting
Mexico into an international defense of what for him
were Cdrdenas1 domestic policies.
Perhaps even more radical in immediate effect than
the above three articles was Article 130.

It prohibit

ed Congress from enacting any laws either establishing
or denying any religion, and at the same time made mar
riage a civil contract, a law still in effect today.
In addition, the clergy were prohibited from criticiz
ing in either public or private meetings the laws or
authorities of the country. 28 Cdrdenas had taken ad
vantage of this article when he insisted on being mar
ried in a civil ceremony in 1932.
Regardless of the origins of the revolutionary
process in Mexico leading up to the Constitution of 1917
or the process it has followed since, these four arti
cles and other parts of the constitution provided the
opportunity in Mexico for true social reform.

Unfor

tunately, the individuals who emerged as the early

28Ibid., pp. 875-877.
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leaders in Mexico could not measure up to the intel
lectual stature of leaders of other revolutions.

Where

as many of the Russian leaders who helped form the gov
ernment of the Soviet Union after the Russian Revolu
tion were educated men who had read and understood the
pre-revolutionary intellectuals, in Mexico some of the
lesser-educated generals assumed power. 29 These were
military men who understood battlefield strategy, but
often failed to understand the social intent of the new
constitution.

Even when they understood perfectly, they

apparently chose to interpret the new document in their
own best interests.
The first of the revolutionary generals to assume
power and to use the constitution in an attempt to bet
ter the lives of the common Mexican was Ldzaro Cdrdenas.
Even before the famous confrontation with the oil com
panies in 1938, Cdrdenas had begun to assert Mexican
independence from the powerful foreigners with money
invested in so many aspects of Mexican life.
By the latter part of 1937 Cdrdenas had expro
priated over 52,000 acres in the Yaqui Valley of the
northwestern state of Sonora alone.

Although most of

the land in this region previously was held by Americans,
Cdrdenas was not picking on the United States, or even
on foreigners in general.

Most of the land expropriated

29
^Francis McCullagh. Red Mexico (New York:
Carrier and Company, 1928), p. 118.

Louis

20

in the Laguna region in northern Mexico was Britishowed, but in the Yucatdn his administration also took
land away from some of the large Mexican landholders.

xn

Cdrdenas thus in the first three years of his ad
ministration had begun applying the revolutionary ideals
of such individuals as Emiliano Zapato.

A revolutionary

from the age of eighteen, Cdrdenas continued his revolu
tionary acts when he became president.

For Cdrdenas,

foreign and domestic policy merged into one, and the
result was the revolutionary six-year plan for the PNR,
a party he changed and molded to suit his own ideals.

•'Charles A. Thomson, "Agrarian Reform in Mexico,"
in Mexico and the United States, editor, S.D. Myers, Jr.
(Southern Methodist University: The Arnold Foundation,
1938), pp. 39-40.
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CHAPTER II

THE CARDENAS DOCTRINE AND MEXICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Although the constitution was approved in 1917,
in the years following it really was not applied.

Few

of the social reforms were enacted as Carranza, Obreg6n and Calles continued to run the government found
ed on their own personal power rather than on the con
stitution.1

Therefore, for the first quarter century

after the beginning of the revolution, there was lit
tle change in the system of Mexican government.

Strong

men such as Porfirio Diaz ran the government before the
revolution, and strong men still were in control after
wards .
Before Cdrdena^ then, the presidents of Mexico
were more concerned with trying to consolidate politi
cal power than with anything else.

Finally Cdrdenas

turned Mexico toward the road to social and political
change and economic growth.

In so doing, he was not

content to copy growth models of industrial and capi
talistic societies, but tended to use a more communal

1Arnaldo Cdrdova, La formacldn del poder politico
en Mdxicp (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1^7^), pp. 22-^3.
21
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form of organization in order to join rural life and
p
industrialization.
Because he refused to copy the
political and economic molds of countries such as the
United States, his regime quickly was labeled as radical.
The Cdrdenas Doctrine
One of the major reasons Cdrdenas and his ad
ministration were called radical is found in the use
of what came to be called the Cdrdenas Doctrine.

The

"doctrine" did not assume a legal, technical stature
until the Socialist Front of Lawyers of Mexico took
part of a speech made by Cdrdenas in September 1938
and molded the doctrine in legal language, but the
ideals of the doctrine were used by Cdrdenas in both
domestic and foreign policy matters much earlier.
Cdrdenas was still a divisional general in the
early 1930's when he began indicating that only eco
nomic independence would free the country from a form
of capitalism which brough no benefit to Mexico and
even became a threat during difficult periods of time.

x

This attitude, which prevailed throughout his life, be
came the basis for the Cdrdenas Doctrine, a doctrine

Raymond Vernon, El dilema del desarrollo econdmico de Mdxico (Mdxico: Editorial Biana, 197^), PP# 88w . -------------

^Analtol Shulgovski, Mdxico en la encrucijada de
su hlstoria, segunda edicidn (Mtxico: Ediciones de
Cultura Popular, S.A., 1972), pp. 125-26.
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which took on international significance when he had to
defend himself and his government against such countries
as Great Britain and the United States.

Cdrdenas was

not the first man in Latin America, however, to take up
the issue of economic independence, and therefore he had
precedents on which to establish the Cdrdenas Doctrine.
Carlos Calvo, an Argentine, in the 19th century
evolved the idea that foreigners should have no more
nor fewer rights than those given to native investors,
and in general the Cdrdenas Doctrine follows the same
reasoning.

In giving Cdrdenas a precedentr the Calvo

Doctrine states that any foreigner must forego an ap
peal for any diplomatic protection from his own govern
ment in cases of dispute, but rather must turn to local
courts to resolve disagreements.

Calvo based this ar

gument on the premises that sovereign states, being
equal, have the right of non-interference of any kind
by other states, and that foreigners may not have more
rights than native citizens and therefore do not have
4.
the right of redress to their own governments.
Although this doctrine was formulated in the 19th
century, it failed to become established as a part of
international law (perhaps because of the opposition of

^Donald R. Shea, The Calvo Clause: A Problem of
Inter-American and International lav and Diplomacy
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955),
P- 19.

the United States).

5

Nevertheless, from the doctrine

has come the Calvo Clause, which binds the foreign in
vestor to using the local courts for any dispute aris
ing from his contractural relationship with the host
nation.

The Clause differed from the original Calvo

Doctrine in that the Clause stipulates that each in
dividual gives his willing consent to waive his right
to seek diplomatic protection of his own government in
cases of contractural disputes, whereas the Calvo Doc
trine was a unilateral enforcement.^
In addition to the Calvo Clause, the first Panamerican Conference in 1889 also gave Cdrdenas a pre
cedent.

At that conference a declaration was approved

which established equality, before the law of nationals
and foreigners in one country.

The declaration stated

that a State was not expected to treat foreigners any
differently from nationals,^ and the policy of the Cdrdenas government nationalized the idea into the Carde
nas Doctrine.
In September 1938, Cdrdenas denied as a fiction
the idea of extraterritoriality.

He claimed that any

5Ibid., p. 27.
6Ibid., p. 28.
7

Salvador Mendoza, La doctrina Cdrdenas: Texto.
antecedentes, comentarios (Mexico: fidiciones Soias.
1939). pp. 55-33.-------
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organization formed under the laws of one country but
actually controlled by citizens of another could not
claim protection of the foreign government.

For Cdrde

nas, "citizenship" and "nationality" only had meaning
within a particular territory, and these conditions
must be given up when one removes himself from that ter
ritory and goes to another either to invest, engage in
commercial activities or simply to reside.

Once inside

that foreign territory, the person (or organization)
must adapt himself to all rights and obligations of the
Q
nationals of the host country.
In explaining the general idea of this doctrine
to the United States, the Mexican Foreign Minister used
the example of expropriated lands taken from both na
tionals and foreigners.

He emphasized that Mexico

could not pay its own nationals to the exclusion of
foreigners or vice versa.

In getting at the heart of

the doctrine, he stated that any foreigner moving to
another country must accept both the benefits granted
as well as the risks, just as nationals.

The Mexican

government believed that all, including the foreigner
in Mexico for investment purposes, must work for the
9
benefit of the entire nation.

8Ibid., pp. 28-29.
^U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of
the United States. Diplomatic Papers, 1958, Vol. V,
pp. 68S-83 (Hereafter abbreviated as Fkt)S).
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In the legal interpretation of the doctrine by
the Socialist Front of Lawyers of Mexico, the person
who goes to a new country must think of that country
as his own.

He must re-educate his mind to think of

himself as a part of his new society and to accept its
moral and social customs.
In keeping with his life-long doctrine of economic
independence and political sovereignty, Cdrdenas stres
sed that the sovereignty of a country is in danger as
long as foreigners bring with them their nationality
and citizenship.

Only with the elimination of these

ideas and the negation of the possibility of turning
to native countries for protection do foreign invest
ors cease being a danger to the host government,^ ac
cording to the Cdrdenas Doctrine.

Cdrdenas consider

ed not only that the foreign-owned oil companies were
extracting illegally the riches of Mexico, but that
their attitudes directly endangered the sovereignty
of the country.
As an indication of the feeling of danger Cdrdenas
had in dealing with the oil companies, it is possible
to look at the attempts at settlement after the expro
priations in 1938.

Mexico always refused to listen to

any idea which included the direction of the companies

10Mendoza, La doctrina Cdrdenas, p. 59.
11Ibid., pp. 60-61.
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by foreigners.

Sub-secretary of Foreign Relations Ra-

m6n Beteta indicated in 1939 that Mexico could not ap
point a foreigner as director of an administrative
agency or have a board composed of a majority of
foreigners.

He also emphasized the political impos-

sibility of returning the properties. 12

Clearly the

reason for the impossibility was that Mexicans believ
ed in the idea of the Cdrdenas Doctrine, and Cdrdenas
would have committed political suicide if he had chang
ed his policy.
That policy was not new in principle, but simply
meant that for the first time the provisions of the
Mexican Constitution would be applied strictly.

Arti

cle 27 basically states that only Mexicans by birth or
naturalization and Mexican organizations may acquire
land and concessions to exploit resources.

The arti

cle adds that foreigners may be granted those same
rights as long as they consider themselves under the
same law as Mexicans, foregoing any right to call for
help from their own governments.

In simple terms this

article states that any foreigner who abrogates this
agreement is subject to losing to the Nation whatever
property rights he had acquired. 1 3y When the oil com
panies refused to consider themselves as bound by

12FRUS, 1939, Vol. V, p. 681.
13

'Tefia Ramirez, Leyes fundamentalea. pp. 825-828.
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Mexican laws, Cdrdenas applied the principles of the
constitution and the Cdrdenas Doctrine to them.
Although the issue with the oil companies un
doubtedly was the most spectacular application of the
Cdrdenas Doctrine, there were others as well.

Even

before this issue exploded, the United States and Mexi
co were involved in discussing adequate compensation for
agrarian claims.

In warning of the legal difficulties

involved in settling these claims. Ambassador Josephus
Daniels pointed out that the State Department should
hesitate to start any discussion over the rights of
the Mexican government to enforce its laws on foreign
ers living in Mexico.

He said that it would only lead

to embarrassment and endanger the United States* posi
tion in other matters.

At the time, in 1935, the

State Department indicated it would not be able to
overlook the principles of international law which
called for adequate compensation.*^- Mexico already
had begun to apply the principles of the Cdrdenas Doc
trine (although they were not specifically defined for
another three years), and the United States, just as in
the case of the Calvo Doctrine, had rejected those prin
ciples.

Fortunately, by the time the problems became

more acute between the two countries, the attitude of

U FRUS. 1935, Vol. IV, pp. 759-60.
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Daniels had begun to prevail, and the rights of Mexico
under the Cdrdenas Doctrine were not really brought in
to question.
But neither Daniels nor the United States could
convince the British government of the sovereign rights
of Mexico regarding foreign investors.

In rejecting

the Cdrdenas Doctrine, the British Legation in Mexico
indicated that the British government never had felt
bound by the Calvo Clause in cases where it believed
intervention necessary for the protection of British
nationals.

The argument was that there was no way a

government could insist that foreign enterprise be in
corporated under local law, then use that incorporation
as a justification for insisting on non-intervention. 15J
In discussing the Mexican problem with Under
Secretary of State Sumner Welles, the British Ambas
sador to the United States said that his government
felt the expropriations were unjustified and carried
out for political reasons not even in the best inter
ests of the Mexican public.

For these reasons, his

government wanted the return of the properties, and
added he believed the United States felt the same.
15

-'Josephus Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State,
April 21, 1938, copy of note from British Minister to
Mexican Foreign Office, Doc. 812.6363/3575, General
State Department Records, Record Group 59, U.S. National
Archives, Washington, D.C. (Hereinafter cited as RG 59).
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Separating the United States from the British rejection
of the Cardenas Doctrine, Welles corrected him and em
phasized that the United States did not question the
legitimacy of the expropriations nor did it undertake
to judge what would be the best interests of the Mexi
can people.^

For this attitude, the relationship be

tween the United States and Mexico was decidedly dif
ferent from that of Great Britain and Mexico during
the oil dispute.
Both the United States and Great Britain had had
prior warning of what might happen when President Cdr
denas signed the Law of Expropriation on November 23»
1936.

Almost immediately the United States State

Department insisted that Daniels talk with Mexican
officials to indicate U.S. displeasure over the law.
But Daniels warned that the Mexican constitution contained the same provisions as the Expropriation Law. 1 7
Again Daniels showed he recognized the right of Mexi
co to make such laws as the government deemed neces
sary without outside intervention.
Nevertheless, Daniels did discuss the issue with
Cdrdenas, who explained that Mexico had not had such a
16

Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and
British Ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsey, memorandum of
conversation, April 1, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3325* Ibid.
17FRUS, 1936, Vol. V, pp. 725, 728.
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law and needed one to make sure that all assets in the
country were productive.

He assured Daniels that the

law would not be used against any enterprise providing
a useful service to Mexico, but he wanted to be prepar
ed against a business which might shut down and paralize a segment of the economy.

Cdrdenas said he recog

nized the value of American investment in Mexico and
would not do anything to hinder this investment.

He

even agreed that his government would not take over
the oil fields since it would be too impractical. 1 8
Two years later it still was impractical, but Cdrdenas
felt compelled to use the Expropriation Law to take
over the recalcitrant oil companies, which obviously
no longer were providing a useful service to Mexico in
the opinion of Cdrdenas.
Article 19 of the law provided for compensation
for any expropriated property, while Article 20 said
that the expropriating authority would determine the
manner and terms of compensation, provided that a tenyear limit be set.

The law was designed to replace a

similar one of November 3, 1903 in order to be more in
line with Article 27 of the constitution.

19

Once the

law was declared constitutional, the companies should

18Ibid., pp. 710-11.
19Ibid., pp. 719-20.
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have realized that they had no legal argument, yet they
still turned to their own governments for help.
But CArdenas already had established in his own
mind the basic principles of the Cardenas Doctrine.

Af

ter years of polemics he announced that Mexico's right
to use the Expropriation Law was no longer subject to
debate, nor was there any use of discussions designed
to allow the companies to take part in the management
of the oil industry. 20

According to CArdenas, their

participation would have amounted to foreign interven
tion, and his goal of complete economic independence
for Mexico would have been destroyed by such action.
Mexican Foreign Policy under CArdenas
Just as Cardenas pursued a policy of Independence
from foreign intervention, so did he generally attempt
to follow the Latin American tradition of strict non
intervention and neutrality with regards to other
countries.

In the case of Spain, CArdenas shifted the

policy to fit the needs of the moment, but on the whole
his foreign policy was much more defensive than aggres
sive.

Foreign policy-making became very much involved

with domestic issues such as the oil dispute, and CAr
denas would not have been very well known outside Mexi
co had not his doctrine been applied to domestic issues

?QIbid.. 1940, Vol. V, p. 976.
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in which countries such as the United States, Great
Britain and even the Soviet Union had interests.

For

the most part, Cardenas considered such issues as oil
and grants of asylum to be completely domestic issues
in which the great powers had no right to intervene.
Mexico's policy regarding problems in other countries
generally was one of neutrality, and Cdrdenas prefer
red that all nations follow that same policy.
Neutrality had been one of the cornerstones of
Mexican foreign policy long before Cdrdenas became
president.

On April 26, 1898, Mexico declared itself

neutral in the face of the Spanish-American War, and
even established sanctions against anyone who failed
to keep to the strict law of neutrality.

Earlier, in

June 1890, Mexico also declared neutrality in the in
ternational conflict in Central America, brought on by
political problems in El Salvador.

The same course was

followed during the civil war in Chile in 1891 and in
Guatemala in 1906.

The Russo-Japanese War in 1904

brought the same response.

When World War I broke out,

Isidro Fabela, as Minister of Foreign Relations, declared Mexico neutral on September 25, 1914.
21

21

Cdrdenas

Isidro Fabela, Neutralidad. Estudio histdrico,
.lurldlco y politico. La Sociedad de las foaclones y el
continente americano ante la guerra de 1939-1940 iM&xicol kiblioteca de Estudios Internacionales, 194-0),
pp. 143-49.
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followed the long tradition, and in September 1939 de
clared neutrality for Mexico in response to the conflict
in Europe.

op

Since Mexico under Cardenas never became involved
in armed conflict, most of his government’s foreign
policy statements were made before the League of Nations,
to which Mexico belonged, ouite possibly to the chagrin
of the United States, whose refusal to .join the League
often has been termed the cause of the failure of that
body.
Prom the actions of Mexico within the League it
would seem that the Cdrdenas government did everything
possible to make it work.

In 1934, the Italian-

Ethiopian conflict forced the League of Nations to
act.

The Coordinating Committee, of which Mexico was

a member, declared a prohibition against exporting arms,
munitions an^ other war supplies, and established eco
nomic sanctions against Italy.

C&rdenas immediately

proclaimed local decrees adhering to the sanctions, but
the lack of general adherance among other League members finally led to the lifting of the sanctions. 2 3
There were some who believed that such weak action
by the League made it useless for Mexico to continue as

22Ibid., p. 217.
23Ibid., pp. 255-257
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a member.

In May 1936 a number of Mexican senators vis

ited CArdenas to ask him to remove Mexico from the Lea
gue.

But Cardenas believed that joining the League

had been a brilliant idea, especially since it advanced
Mexico's international position to the point of resent
ment by the United States.. In addition, CArdenas be
lieved it gave Mexico a European tribunal in which to
defend its interests against "neighbors."

OA

Those

neighbors were not named, but the identity easily could
have been guessed.
CArdenas also used the League to voice Mexican
protests of aggression of one country against another.
True to this policy of denouncing violent aggression,
Mexico protested the Japanese attack against China in
pc
1937. ' Then when Germany annexed Austria on March 13,
1938, Mexico denounced the action and said it repre
sented a grave attack against the Pact of the League
and International Law.

The act of handing over power

by the Austrian authorities did not alter matters, as
for the Mexican government these authorities no longer
represented the Austrian people.

Mexico warned the

League that if it did not fulfill its obligations in
such cases, then even more serious problems would face

^CArdenas, Obras, Tomo I, p, 350.
^Fabela, Neutralidad, pp. 259-60.
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the world. 2 6

The German action in Austria and elsewhere

so offended CArdenas that his government refused several
trade offers from Germany, although finally Mexico did
have to sell some of its oil to that country in order
to survive economically.
Although trying to stick to a policy of neutrality,
CArdenas seems to have been so concerned over the German
aggression that he agreed with the United States to ex
change ideas on a pacific solution to the European pro
blem.

At the same time, in August 1939* CArdenas,

through his Minister of Foreign Relations, refused a
decoration offered him by the German government. 27 He
does not indicate exactly why the Germans wanted to give
him the medal, but his reasoning for refusing is ap
parent.
More of this same reasoning was applied in May
1940 when the German commercial attache talked with
the Mexican Secretary of the Treasury and offered to
make the cancellation of the oil debts owed by Mexico
to Great Britain one of the terms for peace since the
German government was sure of victory.
26

CArdenas told

Secretarfa de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria
de la Secretaria de Relaclones Exteriores, septiembre
1937 - agosio 1938, fltomo 1 (MAxico: b.A.P.P., 1938),
pp. 213-14. (Hereinafter abbreviated MSRE).
^CArdenas, Obras, Tomo I, p. 429.
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his minister to refuse the offer since Germany's expansion campaign was in contradiction to Mexican ideals. 28
Mexico still was having difficulties in marketing her
oil and had not renewed relations with Great Britain,
but Cardenas was not willing to compromise his govern
ment with the Germans.
Germany should have been sure where Cardenas stood
bv this time.

Although the German army invaded and did

away with the Polish State in September 1939, the CArde
nas government continued to recognize Poland first
through the charge and later in 1940 the Polish minister,
while still maintaining strict neutrality in the European conflict. 2 9
In suite of this attitude, the British neverthe
less were concerned about the foreign policy of CArde
nas because of the oil expropriations.

It was evident

that the British were worried because of possible pre
cedents caused by the seizures.

Colombia and Venezuela

we-re believed to be ready to follow suit if Mexico were
allowed to retain the oil properties, and this action
would be to the detriment of the United Kingdom.

The

28Ibid.. p. 439.
^Fabela, Neutralldad. p. 272.
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Herschel V. Johnson, London dispatch, to U.S.
Secretary of State, March 24, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3301,
L/HI, RG 59.

foreign policv of Great Britain toward Mexico over this
issue was colored by the worsening world situation, and
the settlement, might have come ouicker and without as
many hard feelings had the situation been different.
For the United States, the situation was slightly
different, and the pressure felt by Great Britain was
not felt in Washington.

For one thing, Franklin D.

Roosevelt was in the White House and his Good Neighbor
policy would have been completely destroyed had he tak
en a hard stand against Cardenas.

Another very import

ant reason is that the United States did not have to
worry about the flow of petroleum into a military mech
anism to the same extent as the British.
The United States also had foreseen the possibili
ty of difficulties over the oil situation long before
Cardenas expropriated the properties.

In March 1935,

Ambassador Josephus Daniels had been told by the Secre
tary of State that there might be problems and that he
did not want to see the State Department put into a
position where it would have to make official protests
against the Mexican government.

He suggested informal

contacts with Mexican officials to make them cognizant
of the disagreeable consequences which could result.^
This suggestion plainly shows that at the time the State

31FRUS, 1935, Vol. IV. pp. 764-65.

Department had not come around to a strictly legalistic
attitude over the question.

Bv the time the issue did

come to a head, fortunately the United States had back
ed off from any official policy of economic intervention
on behalf of the companies.
Because of the new "hands-off" policy of the State
Department, CArdenas could tell Daniels in December 1938
that he felt nothing but friendship for the United
States.

Cardenas even agreed there would be no prob

lem in allowing the oil companies to work the proper
ties as long as it was understood Mexico would maintain
ownership.

When questioned about oil contracts to Ger

many, Cardenas said they were only temporary and that
Mexicans along the border had been ordered to assure
American businessmen that Mexico preferred to trade
with the United States.

In further expressing his de

sire to cooperate with the United States, CArdenas said
he had told the Mexican delegate to the Panamerican
Conference in Lima to work closely with the Americans. 32
This did not mean that CArdenas told his delegate to
follow anything the Americans wanted to do.

He already

had shown he planned to follow an independent course.
One example of this independent course of action
was the CArdenas policy toward Spain.
32

In explaining

J Josephus Daniels, dispatch, to U.S. Secretary of
State, December 10, 1938, Doc. 812.001-CArdenas, LAzaro/
144 1H, RG 59.

Mexico's apparent divergence from neutrality in the case
of Spain, Cardenas stated that the League Covenant which
Mexico had signed in 1931 made clear distinctions between
States which were being attacked, to which all moral and
material support should be given, and those States do
ing the attacking, in which case economic and other
sanctions were to be applied.

In the case of Spain,

C&rdenas believed that the rebels clearly were being
supported by outside elements, which constituted external aggression against Spain. 3 3'
In explicating this policy to the League of Na
tions, Isidro Pabela cited the Pact of the League of
Nations and the Havana Convention of March 29, 1928.
He said that Article 10 of the Pact called for action
against external aggression, and that in the case of
Spain this aggression was evident.

Article III of the

Havana Convention prohibited the shipment of war sup
plies except to a legitimate government in the case
where the rebels' belligerency had not been recognized.
Pabela claimed this to be the case with Franco, and
therefore Mexico was within the limits of the Havana
Convention.

3A

In other cases, Mexican policy was not quite so

^Fabela, Neutralidad, pp. 261-62.
^ MSRE. septiembre 1936 - agosto 1937, Tomo I,
pp. 31-3T,
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clearly defined.

In 1936 Cardenas stated that in the

cases of Bolivia, Paraguay and Nicaragua, his govern
ment would continue to follow the policy of not break
ing off diplomatic relations simply because of internal
changes.

In Bolivia, President Luis Tejada Sorzano was

deposed and replaced by a mixed junta which amounted to
a dictatorship.

In Paraguay, the military had been un

happy with the government's handling of peace negotia
tions (after the Chaco War) and proclaimed a dictator
ship.^^
In the case of Nicaragua, however, Cardenas re
ceived a note in June 1936 asking for help against the
rebellion of General Anastasio Somoza, who had been
named Chief of the National Guard in accordance with
the wishes of the American forces which had been in
Nicaragua.

Cdrdenas offered the good offices of Mexi

co to invite the United States, Guatemala, Costa Rica,
El Salvador and others to try to resolve the conflict,
but told his Foreign Minister to withdraw Mexico's
diplomatic representative to Nicaragua if the rebel
lion succeeded.

The minister was recalled and C&rdenas

indicated that although Mexico would not interfere in
another nation's affairs, it could not maintain rela
tions with a government which had been established by

^Alvear Acevedo, L&zaro C&rdenas, pp. 488-89.

a military coup. 36

CArdenas indicated more than once

during his term of office that Mexico would not recognize armed conquest, 3 7 yet his policy on the surface
was not always completely uniform.

In referring to

his country's policy of not breaking relations because
of internal changes within another country, CArdenas
was following the foreign policy established by the
former minister of Foreign Relations, Genaro Estrada,
who said that if Mexico broke relations for such a
reason then that would constitute intervention in the
other country's internal affairs.
In the cases of Paraguay and Bolivia, Cardenas
followed strictly the Estrada Doctrine, while in Spain
and Nicaragua he did break relations.

CArdenas point

ed out that in Spain external forces were aiding the
rebels.

As for Nicaragua, the idea that Somoza was

placed in his position as Chief of the National Guard
easily could have been interpreted by CArdenas as out
side intervention causing the eventual overthrow of the
established regime.

Thus, although his policy seemed

to vary, it can be seen that through the eyes of CArdenas, he followed a policy true to Mexican tradition.

3^CArdenas, Obras, Tomo I. pp. 351-52. Also see
Paquete No. 12-1, Exp. 111/1372. the CArdenas Papers,
Archivo General de la Nacidn, Mexico City (Hereinafter
abbreviated AGN)
37FRUS, 1940, Vol. V, p. 1028.
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Toward a Workers * Democracy
Although he remained true to Mexican tradition in
following foreign policy, CArdenas made a number of
changes in the domestic sphere.

Normally in a work on

foreign policy these changes might not be important,
but in the case of Mexico, foreign and domestic mat
ters were so interwoven in the CArdenas years that it
is necessary to take a brief look at some of the changes
made domestically in order to explain fully the foreign
policy.
The Psrtido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) was form
ed in 1929 under Calles, and was the instrument by which
CArdenas ascended to the presidency.

On December 19,

1937, however, CArdenas informed the nation of his plans
to change the PNR.

He believed the doctrine of the PNR

caused discontent among the workers, who he feared
might leave the party.

His main objective, therefore,

was to change the party so that laborers would be at
tracted into its r a n k s . I t was transformed on
March 30, 1938 into the Partido de la Revolucidn Mexlcana (PRM) with the announced goal of preparing for a
workers’ democracy with an aim toward socialism and in%Q

eluding equal rights for women. ^ This aim for a

1.33.

^®Shulgovski, MAxico en la encrucijada, pp. 132------------------ --^Bremauntz, Material hlstArico. p. 190.
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workers' democracy (along with the application of the
CArdenas Doctrine) was another reason CArdenas and his
government were called "radical" outside Mexico.
CArdenas' idea was to divide political groups to
the point where no one group ever again could control
the government.

He played labor against the military,

farm workers against laborers, and to counteract all
sectors, he established a popular sector which contain
ed 250,000 civil servants and professional men.*®

In

effect, he changed the idea of geographical represen
tation to one of functional representation, i.e., the
representation within the party by sectors of the eco
nomy.*1

Without allowing any single individual or

group to approach the power of the Executive office,
CArdenas was able to build up a broad base of support
which would serve him well when he had to confront some
of the world powers.

One only has to look at the trans

fer of executive power at regular six-year intervals
from CArdenas to Luis Echeverrla to see that CArdenas
was an Important element in instituting the new politi
cal system for which the Mexican Revolution was fought.
The PRM was definitely a part of the evolution of

*°Vernon, El dilema del deaarrollo. p.. 88.
*1Daniel Cosio Villegas, El siatema politico
mexlcano: las noslbilidadea.de cambla (MAxico:Edi
torial Joaquin Mortiz, S.A., 1972), p. 53.
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that new political system, as Cardenas began changing
some of the goals of government.

The old PNR stressed

support of large industry as long as it was not to the
detriment of the workers.

At the same time, small in

dustry was given support in order to compete with large
industry, especially that controlled by foreigners, and
products of national manufacture were favored. 42
CArdenas could not argue with support of small in
dustry and advantages to products of national manufact
ure over those imported as indirectly they could be con
sidered as part of the CArdenas Doctrine.

But in con

trast to the PNR, the PRM indicated its desire to na
tionalize large industry as a requisite for.Mexican
1
5
economic independence. 4‘
'
In addition to the foreign oil expropriations, the
CArdenas government passed a number of laws from 1935
to 1938 designed to protect Mexican industry.

These

laws often provided such protection as prohibitively
high tariffs on any product which might compete with
national production.

In spite of predictions that the

Mexican economy would fall into chaos with the decline
of foreign investments, the CArdenas government proved

42Daniel Moreno, Los nartidoa politicos del Mexi
co contemnorAneo. 3» edlcldn (Mexico:Editorial AmArica,
1973), pp. 130-31.
43Bremauntz. Material hlstdrlco. p. 190.
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differently.

In 1936 there were 69 petroleum and 213

mining companies of U.S. origin.

By 1943* there were

only five petroleum and 108 mining companies with large
U.S. investment.

Yet, in spite of the decline in U.S.

investment, Mexican national production continued to
climb, although there was a decline in petroleum the
first few years after the expropriation.

Taking 1929

as a base year and 100 as the base figure, Mexican na
tional production grew in the following proportions:
1934: 111.9; 1935: 126; 1936: 137.1; 1938: 153.4; 1939:
151.4; and 1940: 154 .4.**

Undoubtedly, the decline in

1939 was due to the problems in 1938 with oil production
but as can be seen, the decline was reversed in 1940.
Throughout his presidency, Cdrdenas attempted to
better the condition of the laboring class and to achieve
economic and political independence for Mexico.

In

bo

doing, his domestic policies often were directed against
foreigners who for so long had controlled much of the
Mexican economy.

When those foreigners turned to their

own nations in disputes with the Mexican government,
the C&rdenas Doctrine was applied to them.

**Shulgovski, Mexico en la encruci.lada. pp. 16971.

CHAPTER III

MEXICAN RELATIONS WITH SPAIN:

THE SPANISH CIVIL VAR

In writing about Mexico and Spain in the 20th
century, one must constantly keep in mind that 300 years
of colonial rule and more than one hundred years of in
dependence have made this relationship through the
years extremely unusual.

Just as important, this re

lationship has not been a typical one between Spain
and her former colonies.

Even as a colony Mexico had a

special relationship with Spain.

The diplomatic re

lationship between the two countries in the past cen
tury and a half has also been atypical.

At times Mexi

co has held out the close hand of friendship and at
other times she has turned her back completely on
Spain.

But these changes certainly have not been typi

cal of a solid Latin American bloc.

To the contrary,

Mexico often has acted alone among the former colonies
in her attitude toward Spain.
Because of this uniqueness, and because of the long
years of sometimes stormy, sometimes friendly, rela-*
tions, it is important to get an overall picture of
the general diplomatic relations between Spain and Mexi
co before focusing on the major foreign relations of
47
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the CArdenas years with Spain.
It would be well to divide, completely arbitrarily,
the history of relations in general between the two
countries into four unequal, but sufficiently diBtinct,
periods.

The first of these periods would be that era

before independence for Mexico, including the almost
twelve stormy years after the Grito de Dolores

in 1810

up to General Agustfn de Iturbide's short-lived monarchy
in 1822 after independence.

The second period is one

of some diversity, but is linked at one end by the con
clusion of the Mexican War of Independence and at the
other by the intervention of the Tripartite powers (Eng
land, France and Spain) in 1861.

Although the inter

vention spanned parts of seven years, the interest here
is focused only on those first few months when Spain
was an active partner.
The third epoch starts taking shape in the early
I860'8 and continues through the Spanish civil war un
til General Francisco Franco's takeover of the Spanish
government and the end of the civil war in 1939.

Fin

ally, the fourth period reflects the attitudes of the
two countries toward one another after the end of the
civil war.
looking at these four periods, one might say that
history has revolved full circle for Mexico and Spain.
From the break in "relations" because of the Mexican
War for Independence, through a period of wary, cautious

49

watchfulness and finally overt intervention, to a warm
and deep friendship based on culture and common origins,
and once again to a full break and opposition by Mexico
to Franco1s regime.
Background
The War for Independence did not end the attempts
at Spanish intervention into Mexican affairs.

Within

just a few years the Mexican government was complaining
that the Spanish troops stationed at the fortress of
iSan Juan de Ulua at Veracruz represented a threat of
invasion of the Mexican territory.^

In 1826 when ships

arrived in Cuba and Puerto Rico, President Guadalupe
Victoria warned the Mexican Congress that Spain would
continue to try to re-invade Mexico and that chances
of a peaceful friendship with the former mother counp
try were remote.
The Spaniards continued to increase
their forces on the island of Cuba, and Mexico con
tinued keeping an eye out for the invasion.'*
After an attempted invasion in 1829, which ended

^Archivo Histdrico Diplom&tJco Mdxicano, Vol.
XXXIX, Un siglo de relaciones intemacionales de Mdxico
(Mexico: Publicaciones de la Secretarla de Relaciones
Exteriores, 1935). p. 3. Hereinafter cited AHUM.
2Ibid.. pp. 9-10.
3Ibid., p. 18.
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in failure for the Spanish troops, the Mexican govern
ment expected still another invasion.*

Although this

invasion failed to take place, it was not until the
death of Ferdinand VII in 1833 that the policy of Spain
toward her former colonies could begin changing, and
even then the change was not a smooth one.**

A treaty

of peace and friendship was signed on December 28,
1836, but diplomatic relations were not established un
til 1839.^

Shortly after his arrival in Mexico, the

Spanish minister assured the Mexicans that the relations would be strengthened to benefit both nations.

7

One of the first problems of the new minister was
to negotiate a treaty of commerce, but he recognized
that the .jealousy of England and France would make it
difficult to draw up a treaty advantageous only to
Spain. 8

England and France often had complained during

the early colonial period about not being able to trade
with the Spanish colonies, and both countries had at
times run high risks to engage in illegal trade.

The

*Ibid.. p. 32.
^Relaciones diPloro&ticas hisnano-mexicanas (18391898). Serie I, Despachos generales, Vol. II, 18411&43 (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1952), p. xi.
6Ibid.
7AHDM, Vol. XXXIX, p. 48.
Q
Relaciones diplom&ticas. Vol. I, p. 130.

Spanish tried to better comercial relations, but Mexico,
possibly still snarting from some of the offensive po
licies during the period of the empire, continued to
place obstacles in the way.9
Commercial problems continued to plague Spain and
Mexico in the early years of their diplomatic relation
ship, but with the arrival of Pedro Pascual Oliver in
August 1841 as the new minister, the mood of the rela
tions changed and the two countries tried to forget the
past.10
During the next decade there were a number of
controversies, however, the most serious of which be
came the question of the payment of claims.

This is

sue became the most serious diplomatic question, and
the situation became so grave in 1856-57 that there was
a temporary break in relations.

The problem seemed to

be resolved in 1859 when Mexico accepted Spanish de
mands and signed the Mon-Almonte Convention.11

By

this time Mexico was in the.throes of a civil war, and
when Benito Judres emerged victorious, he was bitter
against the Spanish minister.

Judrez announced

9Ibid.. Vol. II, pp. 14-15.
1QIbid.. p. xx.
11Carl H. Bock, Prelude to Tragedy (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966), pp. 38, 39.
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that his government was forced to discharge the Spanish
minister for the support he had given to the enemies
of the Republic during the civil war.

IP

Matters became even worse as the question of claims
continued to be a source of irritation between the two
countries.

Spain soon tired in her attempts to get

Mexico to settle the claims, and began looking toward
an alliance with England and Prance to intervene in
the American Republic and take what the debtors felt
they deserved.

Spain and England never had in mind

the same goals as did France, and both countries soon
backed out and left Prance in her attempt to establish
a monarchy in Mexico.
Spain was the first of the three countries to take
action, and in December 1861 sent troops off the coast
of Veracrus, claiming she was acting in accord with
England and Prance to try to settle the claims.

The

Spanish denied they had any intention of actively in
tervening in Mexican internal affairs.^

Subsequent

events proved that either Spain was being sincere in
wanting to take only the amount she felt was due, or

12AHDM, Vol. XXXIX, p. 94.
15AHDM, Vol. XXX, Comentarios de Francisco Zaroo
sobre la intervencldn francesa (1861-1865) (Mdxico:
PUblicaciones de la Secretariate Relaciones Exteriores,
1929), p. 51.
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that after the events unfolded, she decided that the
business was too risky to continue.
In.any case, Veracruz was evacuated by the Mexicans
on the morning of December 13th,14 and the Spanish
troops occupied the customs house there until May 11,
1862.^

General Juan Prim was sent as the Spanish

Commissioner, and is credited by the Mexicans for his
diplomacy and insight into the p rob lem . M e x i c o al
so pointed out, however, that Spain need not have join
ed the triple alliance in order to have worked out
17

her difficulties with Mexico. ' In spite of auch ar
guments, Mexico saw the need for relations with Spain,
and began indicating a willingness to re-establish relations.

18

This step was taken in 1871,

I Q

y and

Spanish

and Mexican relations were normalized for the rest of
the 19th century.
It is interesting to note that from this period

14Ibld.. p. 54.
15

^Manuel Payno, Cuentas. gastos. acreedores. v
otros . f d e l tlempo de la fotfnfngljn frM c«g,
iypeglo iMfexlco:Imprenta de Ignacio Cumplldo,

5P

16AHH!, Vol. XXXIX, p. xviii.
17Ibid.. Vol. XXX, p. 112.
18Ibid., Vol. XXXIX. p. 109.
19Ibid., p. 112.
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to the tine when Spain again began complaining about
the property losses of her citizens— this time as a re
sult of the Mexican Revolution— that little is said
in the Mexican "State of the Union" address regarding
affairs with Spain.

Up until this time, there had been

practically always some mention either of difficulties
or improvement in the relationships.

Now Mexico seem

ed to turn her attention to closer affairs, such as
with Guatemala and the United States.

One explanation

could be that Spain was having problems at this time
with other nations (e.g.. the war with the United
States).

By the time Spain recovered, it was time for

the Mexican Revolution, and the beginning of 20th cen
tury relations between Spain and Mexico.
After the Mexican Revolution began, there were
several years of rebellion and bloodshed, and some of
the European powers felt that the United States should
intervene to protect life and property of the European
nations.

Spain was one of these countries, and the

Spanish minister at Mexico City claimed that a number
of Spaniards had been killed in the northern provinces
of Mexico, and the number likely would increase if some
thing were not done.

He stated that the fault

wa B

with

the United States, and he held the American government
responsible for the death of Spanish subjects because of

i

of failure to suppress the disorder.

90

Matters remained unsettled in Mexico until 1916,
when the power struggle was settled sufficiently for the
Mexicans to begin drafting a new constitution.

By

1921, the Spanish government recognized the Obregdn
regime, and expected the Mexican government to appoint
a minister to Spain.

In instituting agrarian reform,

the Mexicans did expropriate some property from Span
iards in 1922, but the major problem remained the settle
ment of claims from the revolutionary period.

The two

governments finally signed a claims convention in 1926
and a special Hlspano-Mexican commission was formed
specifically to consider those claims of Spanish sub
jects who had suffered some kind of loss during the
Mexican revolutionary period. 21
In spite of the losses incurred by Spanish citi
zens, relations at this time were friendly.

The rela

tionship was such that the Spanish delegate to the Lea
gue of Nations even sponsored Mexico's entry into the
League. 22

But matters were becoming unsettled in Mad

rid, and the period of the 1930's was a turning point
90

New York Times. October 30, 1913, p. 1.

21Ibid., April 28, 1921, p. 3: March 15. 1922,
p. 2; August 12, 1926, p. 3.
22

Salvador de Madariaga, Spain: A Modern History
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1^58), p. 38.
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for the Spanish nation.

Before the decade was over,

Spain suffered a civil war, and Mexican-Spanish rela
tions took an unforeseen twist.
Mexico remained loyal to the Republicans in Spain,
and alone among the Latin American countries showed true
feelings of kinship with the Spaniards during the years
of the civil war.

This bond of friendship took the

form of moral support, material aid, and the opening
of the doors of Mexico to refugees who left Spain for
ever.

In relation to the refugees, the C&rdenas govern

ment was able to apply the Cdrdenas Doctrine in the op
posite manner in which it was applied to the American
and British oil companies.

In the case of the oil com

panies, the owners Were forced against their will to
adhere to the idea that they must be treated the same
as Mexican nationals.

Sometimes Mexican citizens had to

be reminded in the case of the refugees that once ac
cepted by the country, they were to be treated in the
same manner as nationals.
The Spanish Civil War
Throughout the period of the civil war, and even
after Franco gained complete control of the Spanish
government, Mexico refused to recognize the Insurgents
led by Franco.

Mexico backed the Spanish Republican

government’s claim of intervention on the part of Ger
many and Italy on the side of the Insurgents, and also
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backed the government *s claim that It was the dulyelected government of the people.

Mexico saw the civil

war as an international struggle with the Spanish Re
public as the victim of external aggression.
Once the civil war had started, Mexico took as
active a part as possible in supporting the Republican
government.

Mexican diplomats and consular officials

even were allowed to act as intermediaries in the pur
chase of war materiel.

The Mexican minister in France

was authorized to buy armaments and airplanes which
France was disposed to sell and which the Spanish gov3
ernment had asked Mexico to buy. 2‘
'
President Cdrdenas announced to the Mexican Con
gress in early September 1936 that the Spanish govern
ment had requested that Mexico sell war materiel, and
that Mexico had complied with the request by sending
20,000 rifles and 20,000,000 cartridges of national
pi
manufacture.
At the same time Mexico was preparing the shipment
to Spain, the Minister of Foreign Relations of Uruguay
sent a cablegram to his counterpart in Mexico request
ing the opinion of Mexico in the matter of Spain, so

^C&rdenas, Obras. Tomo I, p. 354.
2*E1 Universal. September 2, 1936, p. 9.
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that the American republics could coordinate their ef- t
forts.

The Mexican government replied that it could not

take part in any mediation over matters pertaining to
Spain as that would be intervention.2** This answer
shows that Mexico under Cdrdenas exhibited an extremely
flexible foreign policy, interpreting what it termed
intervention to suit the desires of Mexico.

The selling

of arms, and even the sending of Mexican volunteers, was
not considered Intervention, but the coordination of
policy with the other Latin nations would have been.
In discussing just why the sale of arms to Spain
was not a form of intervention, the Mexican government
used the excuse that the Republican government was a
legally constituted government having friendly relations
26
with Mexico.
Nevertheless, the distinction is very
hazy, and Cdrdenas seems purposedly to have used a
vague foreign policy to commit Mexico to action which
he thought proper.
Cirdenas even went further by sending a letter to
President Roosevelt in the United States asking that
country to use its influence with the European powers
to put an end to the intervention by foreign elements

25PRDS, 1936, Vol. II, p. 495. The United States
also turned down the proposal to participate in any
mediation.
2**E1 Naclonal. September 3, 1936, Part II, p. 1.
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in Spain.

He felt that an intervention by the United

States would have shortened the rebellion, and warned
of the haughty attitude that would be assumed by Italy
and Germany if the rebels won.

27

The United States did not seem to be worried
about Germany and Italy at the time, however.

U.S.

policy ranged from a mere urging in the beginning of
the civil war that U.S. companies not involve them
selves in arms shipments to Spain to a total embargo
on such shipments in 1937.

When the Spanish ambassador

approached the State Department right after the opening
of hostilities in 1936, he was told that no U.S. firm
could export arms without an export license, and that
no one had made an application for exports to Spain
since the beginning of the civil war (although there
were rumors of illegal shipments).

28

While the State

Department was telling the Spanish ambassador this
story, it was Informing its missions abroad that it
recognized that the U.S. Neutrality Law did not apply in
the case of Spain since that law applied only to war
between nations.29

Still the United States was trying

2^Cdrdenas, Obras. Tomo I, p. 370. After the reb
els indeed had been victorious, even Cdrdenas was forced
to turn to Germany and Italy for oil markets.
28FRUS, 1936, Vol. II, pp. 558-59.
29Ibid., p. 471.
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tostick to a policy of official non-intervention.
In August 1936 a representative of the Glenn L.
Martin Company approaohed the State Department and said
that the Spanish government wanted to purchase eight
planes from his company.

He wanted to know what the

opinion of the State Department would be since it
would be November before he could deliver the planes.
The State Department admitted that the Neutrality Law
did not apply in this case, but that the sale of arms
would not be in conformity with the spirit of official
U.S. government policy.31
In spite of this attitude, in December of that
year the State Department granted two export licenses
for a shipment of planes and engines for a total of
$2,777*000.

The Department explained that the Con

gressional resolution providing an embargo on war sup
plies still applied only to wars between nations.

None

of the provisions was applicable in the case of Spain
and the Department of State was forced to grant the
32
license against its will.
In 1937, the U.S. government began taking steps to
avoid having to act in this manner against its own

30Ibid., pp. 474-75.
31Ibid., pp. 475-76.
32Ibid., pp. 618-19.

61
policy.

On January 6, 1937, the Congress passed a joint

resolution forbidding the sale of arms to either side in
the Spanish conflict.

This resolution was followed

by the Neutrality Act of May 1, 1937, which eliminated
the loophole in the former Neutrality Acts and set
forth the provision that the president could proclaim
as illegal the shipment of arms to a single country
wherein there was a civil war.'**
But the blocking of legal loopholes at home did
not mean that the United States stopped having troubles
abroad in regard to arms shipments.

In fact, it was

just the beginning of problems with Mexico over the
issue.
In 1936, before the passage of the 1937 U.S.
Neutrality Act, President C&rdenas spoke to the Mexican ambassador in the United States about the possibili
ty of Mexico's buying U.S. arms for transshipment to
Spain.

CArdenas was informed by the State Department

that Spain was represented in Washington and should
approach the United States government directly on the
matter of huying supplies.

The U.S. Neutrality Act at

^Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the
American People. third edition iNew iork: Appletonbentury-Grofts, Inc., 1946), p. 741.
Thomas Brockway, Basic Documents in United
States Foreign Policy (Princetons D. Van ttos’fcrand Co.,
I n c '. ;

1 9 5 7 7 7 p p . "1 1 5 - 1 4 .
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that time did not apply, but the Spanish ambassador was
hesitant to approach the State Department directly.

In

September, the Spanish ambassador to Mexico re-approched
C&rdenas on the subject and Cdrdenas agreed to query
the State Department again.33
In answer to Cdrdenas* query, the Secretary of
State and other U.S. officials stated that the United
States had taken a definite stand against shipment of
arms to Spain, and planned to continue that policy, in
spite of friendly relations with Mexico.3*V Mexican
Foreign Minister Hay assured U.S.‘officials that muni
tions being sent to Spain from Mexico were of national
manufacture and contained nothing purchased from the
United States.

Indicating Mexico's reasoning for sup

plying arms to Spain, Hay said that his government was
doing exactly what the United States once had done in
Mexico by allowing a recognized government to purchase
arms.3^

It seemed at this time that the two governments

understood each other and would continue friendly rela
tions in spite of the difference in policy.

35FRUS, 1936, Vol. II, p. 530.
36Ibid., p. 531.
3^Ibid., pp. 505-06. During the Mexican Revolu
tion the United States had followed such a policy, giving
Mexico a perfect excuse during the Spanish civil war for
supplying arms to the legally constituted government.

Nevertheless, by the winter of 1936, the State
Department was instructing its officers in Mexico to in
form the proper Mexican authorities of U.S. suspicions
that American planes were being exported to Spain via
Mexico in violation of U.S. law.-*8

Since at this time

there was some confusion over just what constituted
itarns of U.S. manufacture, Avila Camacho, then Secre
tary of War, inquired of Cdrdenas if Mexican-made air
planes with U.S. instruments could be shipped to Spain.
Cdrdenas stated that he respected Roosevelt's policies
and would not do anything before checking with the U.S.
He did not, however, state any objection to shipment
of U.S. planes obtained through private sources.^
C&rdenas seemed perfectly willing to cooperate
with the U.S. government when his Ministry of Communica
tions was accused of issuing accidental destruction cer
tificates for some U.S.-made planes for which the Minis
try then supplied Mexican licenses.*0

When Cdrdenas

was informed of these charges, he Indicated only an
awareness that planes were being sent from the United
States to Mexico and then on to Spain.

He said that

he had assumed that the United States was aware of the
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possibility of this happening, and he had not interfered
up to this point in private affairs.

He then assured

the United States that no further authorization would
be made for shipments.4* Apparently Cdrdenas did try
to keep this personal pledge, but subsequent events
seem to prove that some of his subordinates were not
so scrupulous and attentive to U.S. policy.
Thus, in 1937 Mexico apparently had agreed that she
would not serve as an intermediary in shipping materiel
to Spain inle8S the third government involved gave full
consent.

Because of this policy, Mexico agreed not to

ship any planes of U.S. manufacture to Spain even though
the acquisitions were made privately.42

But within a

few days, press reports indicated that the Mexican
government had changed its mind and would allow ship
ment of U.S.-made planes.

When approached on this sub

ject, Cdrdenas denied any reversal of policy, and even
pointed out that Mexico had a number of old U.S. planes
which he would like to dispose of, but had not because
of U.S. policy. ^ Although this statement probably was
true, it should be noted that the planes to which he
referred were obsolete, so that Cdrdenas would have felt

41Ibid., p. 626.
42Ibid., 1937, Vol. I, p. 564.
45Ibid., pp. 567-68.
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guilty in trying to pawn them off on a country at war.
The United States believed C&rdenas, and even
indicated this belief to its officials in Europe.44
But in spite of this belief, the American consul in
Veracruz confirmed that planes of U.S. manufacture
were being loaded for shipment to Spain.

When Mexican

officials were asked to confirm this report, they denied
all knowledge of any planes being shipped to Spain.
They claimed that C&rdenas had given the order that no
U.S. planes could be loaded for transshipment.4** The
Spanish ambassador to Mexico also confirmed this order.
He indicated that he had indeed acquired eighteen
planes of U.S. origin, but that he had not been able
to obtain an export license since C&rdenas had made the
promise to the U.S. that he would not ship the planes.4**
Months of discussion followed as to whether Mexico was
shipping the planes or not, but when Sub-secretary
of Foreign Relations Ramdn Beteta assured U.S. officials
on December 21, 1937, that American planes definitely
were not being shipped,

4.7

this seemed to end the issue.

Cdrdenas obviously did not agree with the U.S.

44Ibid., p. 577.
45Ibld., pp. 580-81.
46Ibid., pp. 584-85.
47Ibid., p. 604.
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attitude, however.

Mexico often complained that the

theory of non-intervention as proposed by England and
seconded by Prance (and backed by the arms embargo of
the United States) was the main reason the Mexican
government had to continue giving aid to Spain.
The Mexican delegate to the League of Nations,
Isidro Pabela, handed the League a note explaining Mexi
co's position in March 1937.

The note stated that the

very universal nature of the League gave Mexico the
authority to involve itself in matters affecting col
lective security.

Mexico complained that the policy of

non-intervention prolonged the conflict by denying the
legitimate Spanish government arms.

The C&rdenas gov

ernment believed that a clear distinction had to be made
in cases such as Spain between the rebelling forces and
the legitimate government which deserved League help. 4-8
The Mexican note was considered a fatal blow to
the League's plan to extend the pact of non-intervention
to non-European nations.

The action in the League dur

ing these days seemed to show that in view of Italy's
aid to Franco the whole policy of non-intervention was
bankrupt.

Mexico sent notes to a number of countries

explaining her stand.49

One such note was sent to the

4**E1 Universal. March 31» 1937, Sect. II, p. 3.
49Ibld.t April 1, 1937, Sect. II, p. 2.
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United States saying that Mexico must reaffirm her in
tention of supporting the legitimate government of
Spain, since the non-intervention policy had failed to
deter aid from outside to the rebel forces.

Mexico

agreed to act together with other nations as long as
the integrity of the Spanish government were respected. 50 Mexico had acted alone among the American nations
but now was willing to seek mediation.

Nevertheless,

the note made clear the Mexican position against the
policy of non-intervention to the detriment of the
Republican government in Spain.
Since the other nations couldn't seem to agree on
any kind of accord in relation to the Spanish question,
Mexico continued sending aid to the beleagured govern
ment.

But the aid could not be called free.

C&rdenas

denied a report which said that Mexico had given war
and food supplies to Spain free of charge.

He stated

that Spain had paid for all war supplies.-51 In his
1937 annual message to the congress, C&rdenas indicat
ed that Mexico had sold $8,200,078.21 worth of supplies
to S p a i n . I n light of the problems the Mexican Trea
sury was having, the amount of supplies sold to Spain

50Ibid., April 2, 1937, Sect. II, p. 3.
^■Cdrdenas, Obras, Tomo I, p. 372.
*2E1 Universal. September 2, 1937, p. 13.
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was a big booBt to the Mexican economy, and can explain
in part the readiness of the Cdrdenas government to
supply aid to the Republicans.
The need for additional funds was not the whole
explanation, however.

Zn addition to material aid,

there were even some Mexican participants in the war.
Mexico freely allowed her citizens to take an active
part in the fighting. ^

This action also seemed to be

in violation of Mexico's own idea of non-intervention,
and a quarter of a century later, another Mexican administration refused to allow citizens to go to Cuba
to participate in the fighting there.
There never were very many Mexicans fighting in
Spain, and they were not the only foreigners there.

As

the Loyalist situation in Spain began to deteriorate
(in late 1937), rumors circulated that the

Spanish

government had signed a contract with Mexico to or
ganize and train an army to send to the aid of the
Loyalists.***

Even had Cdrdenas been in favor of such

a plan, there is serious doubt that the Mexican govern
ment could have justified such action.

No army ever

*^Lois Elwyn Smith "Mexico and the Spanish Re
publicans," in Pnlversity of California Publications in
Political Science. Vol. IV Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1955), pp. 190-96.
^Excelsior, February 6, 1938, p. 1.
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was sent from Mexico, and even if there had been such
plans, the decision a year later to withdraw all in
ternational forces fro* the conflict would have put
an end to the Mexican "army."
Flans were underway in early January 1939 to with
draw all international fighting units from Spain, and
this decision had a special significance for Mexico.
The Cdrdenas government decided to grant asylum, for
humanitarian reasons, to any foreign soldier who could
not return to his home.^

The invitation offers good

insight into Cdrdenas, who often has been accused of
extreme xenophobia.

This accusation is normally based

on his application of the C&rdenas Doctrine to foreign
capital located in Mexico.

But what is often ignored

was the open door policy of his administration in
dealing with political exiles.
In the case of the International Brigades, however,
C&rdenas met with one of his few defeats, for criticism
was very strong against this decision to invite the
56
foreigners to reside in Mexico.
Because of this
strong criticism, on January 29, 1939 permission for

^Paquete 570, Exp. 546.6/200, The Cdrdenas
Papers, Archivo General de la Nacidn, Mexico, D.F.,
Mexico (Hereinafter abbreviated AGN).
^See such documents as ibid., 2414, 5200, 5787,
5615 and 5512 for examples of the criticism forcing
Cdrdenas to reconsider his decision.
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the admission of the members of the International Brig
ades was officially withdrawn.^

This decision was

probably a combination of the pressure of public opinion
and the realisation by Cdrdenas that he had enough
political problems without importing more.
The "Alliance11 of Mexico and the Soviet Union
Although Mexico and the Soviet Union did not have
diplomatic ties during the years of the civil war, they
were considered allies of a sort because of the support
both countries gave to Spain.

Criticism of Cdrdenas'

idea of allowing the International Brigades to reside
in Mexico undoubtedly was based in part on the reason
ing of some that the unofficial alliance of Mexico
and the Soviet Union would be strengthened even more if
members of the Brigades moved to Mexico.
In explaining this strange relationship between
the two countries, it has been pointed out that at least
in the case of the Spanish civil war the U.S.S.R. was
pursuing a sympathetic policy, and that the workers'
unions and popular front in Spain in any case rejected

58 One thing they
any type of communist dictatorship.'
did not reject was the aid given.by the Soviet Union

^ E1 Naclonal. January 29, 1939, p. 1.
**8Ibid., November 3, 1936, Sect. II, pp. 1, 3.
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during the civil conflict.
Originally the Soviet Union agreed with England
and Prance to a policy of non-intervention.

But in

early October 1936, the Soviet Union sent an official
declaration to the committee of Non-Intervention say
ing that because of the numerous violations of the
non-intervention pact, the U.S.S.R. could no longer
be a part of the committee and felt released from the
cq
agreements. ^ Prom this time the Soviet Union con
tinued to accuse Germany, Portugal and Italy of inter
vening in the affairs of Spain.

At the same time the

announcement was made that clothes and food were being
collected to be sent to Spain and that 26 million rubles
already had been collected toward this purpose.^®

So

the Soviet Union joined Mexico in openly supporting
the Spanish Republican government.
In addition to this unofficial relationship, Mexi
co and the Soviet Union shared a somewhat more official
one in the League of Nations.

Maxim Litvinof of the

Soviet Union and Isidro Fabela of Mexico together sup
ported Loyalist Spain's demands that the League recog
nize the German-Italian aggression.

The unified sup

port of these two countries was negated by the offer
England and Prance made to Italy to negotiate over the

^ Ibid., October 8, 1936, p. 2.
6°Ibid., October 12, 1936, p. 2.

withdrawal of troops.^1

The "alliance" with Mexico had

cost the Soviet Union nothing.

For Mexico, the support

role shared with the Soviet Union gave Cdrdenas' op
ponents more reason to brand his government as radical.
Neither the aid given by Mexico nor that given by the
Soviet Union was enough, however, as Franco and his In
surgents won the victory in Spain.
As soon as the civil war ended in March 1939, and
Franco was in control of the government, Mexico suspend
ed relations with Spain, including all commercial
ties. 62

For a time after Franco's takeover, there were

rumors that Mexico would recognize Franco's Spain, es
pecially as he was the supreme authority in the country.
One Mexican newspaper, Novedades. took the position
that Franco should be recognized inasmuch as this recog
nition would simply be an application of the Estrada
Doctrine,^ the guideline which Mexico uses in her
policy of granting recognition to other governments.

^ El Universal. September 27, 1937, Sect. II, p.
4. later in Mexico there was a denial that the Soviet
Union under Stalin really gave much aid to Spain. It
even was claimed that Stalin was responsible for allow
ing the Spanish Republic to die. At the same time, it
was admitted that Mexico had been able to give too lit
tle to do any good. See Siempre?. April 26, 1961, p. 20
62

Smith, "Mexico and the Spanish Republicans,"

p. 206.

^Novedades, April 3t 1939, p. 4.
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Mexico was accused by the new Spanish regime of
being unfaithful to this basic doctrine, while the Mexi
can government proclaimed it was acting in harmony with
the doctrine.

According to Mexican officials, the Es

trada Doctrine simply rejected the principle of formal
recognition, but did not automatically guarantee the
establishment of relations with any regime which might
come to p o w e r . O n e Mexican official, in trying to
explain the lack of the application of the doctrine to
Spain, pointed out that for one thing, Mexico's repre
sentation already had ceased at the time the Republic
fell.

He also added that Estrada contended that Mexico

reserved the right, in the case of a revolutionary move
ment, to maintain or not maintain its representation
without making any statements about the legitimacy of
the new regime.
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Other Latin American governments went the opposite
direction from Mexico, while at the same time using the
very doctrine which had originated in Mexico.

As early

as November 1936, the Nicaraguan government had in effect
recognised Franco's regime and had used the Estrada
Doctrine as the basis for such action.
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It can be seen

^Smith, "Mexico and the Spanish Republicans,"
p. 203.
**^E1 Naclonal. July 3, 1939, p. 2.
66FRUS, 1936, Vol. II, p. 576.

therefore, that the Estrada Doctrine was another part
of Mexican foreign policy which could be used as Mexi
co saw fit.
In this case, for Mexico, there had ceased to be
a government in Spain with which to continue relations.
The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations announced in
January 1939 that the relations of Mexico with Spain
would continue wherever the legitimate government of
Manuel Azafia might be.
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Mexico continued to resist

pressure to establish relations with Franco's new gov
ernment, at that time founded on the Traditional
Spanish Falange.
Perhaps part of the reason for the Mexican hesi
tancy to deal with Franco and the Falangists could be
found in their description of the new national and
ternational program for Spain.

in

The Falange openly ad

mitted that it felt Spain should have an empire and
should be one of the world's leaders.

Sounding some

what ominous, they also referred to the cultural and
economic unification with the countries of Latin
America.

The platform ended on a militaristic note,
insisting on the supremacy of Spanish armed forces. 68

^Smith, "Mexico and the Spanish Republicans,"
p. 198.
68

H. Rutledge Southworth, "The Spanish Phalanx and
Latin America," in Foreign Affairs. Vol. XVIII (Octo
ber, 1939), p. 150.
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Regardless of the ominous sound of this program,
Mexico alone among the former Spanish colonies failed
to recognize Franco, probably because of the stubborn
will of the man at the head of the Mexican government,
LAzaro CArdenas.

CArdenas had commited his government

to support of the Spanish Republicans, and he refused
to back down once that government was defeated.
The Question of the Refugees
Mexico had not been able to save the Spanish
Republican government, but both during and after the
civil war Mexico did what she could to save the Spanish
people (those who wanted to be saved) from Franco.

As

early as October 1936 the Mexican government replied
to a request from the Argentines by declaring that
Mexico would recognize the right of political asylum
cq

of Spanish refugees. 7

In December 1936, the Mexican

ambassador to Spain promised political asylum regardless of political belief of the refugees.
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Within a

few months refugees began arriving in Mexico under
the general asylum given all who fought Franco.
intellectuals accepted the invitation of asylum,

^ E1 Universal. October 25, 1936, p. 2.
^ E1 Nacional. December 8, 1936, p. 2.
^Ibid., November 28, 1938, p. 3.

Many
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and
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they ultimately proved to be of great benefit to Mexi
co, as the refugees contributed to the culture of their
new country in many different ways.
High officials of the Spanish Republican govern
ment also were invited to reside in Mexico.

In Feb

ruary 1939, even before the fall of Madrid, official
sources in Lisbon indicated that General Josd Miaja
was in Valencia awaiting transportation, having decid
ed to accept the hospitality of C&rdenas.

The same

report said that former head of government Juan Negrin
had left Madrid and was waiting in Valencia for an airplane to take him abroad.

72

Among others to decide to make a new start in
Mexico was Diego Martinez Barrio, who had been presi
dent of the Spanish Cortds (and who later became president of the Republican government-in-exile) ^ and the
ex-president of 'the University of Madrid, Joed Giral.74

Part of the Spanish Cortds decided to come to

Mexico,73 and for a time the entire body was discus
sing the possibility of transferring the operation of
the Cortds of the Spanish Republic to Mexico.

72Ibid., February 28, 1939, p. 2.
73Ibid., May 31, 1939, p. 2.
74Ibid., June 2, 1939, p. 1.
75Ibid., June 20, 1939, p. 2.

There
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was a difference of opinion on this matter, however,
and the transfer was not effected.^
Although most of these refugees were cordially
welcomed, Mexico did have to change her original plans
for accepting all refugees.

On March 31, 1939, the

Servicio de Emlgracidn para Republicanos Espaftoles
(SERE) was set up and the Committee assisted by repre
sentatives of the Mexican government.

Mexico, however,

was not in a financial position to do as much as she
might have wanted, and SERE largely depended on funds
belonging to the Spanish Republican government-inexile.

A first shipment of 1,700 Spaniards under this

organisation departed France for Mexico on May 24, 1939
on board a ship chartered by the British National Joint
77

Committee for Spanish Relief. 1 The selection was
strongly influenced by the communists, however, and
this influence led to a cooling off by the Mexicans.
Even from the beginning of the flow of refugees
there were opponents to the C&rdenas invitation to the
Spaniards.

The Mexican government explained that the

refugees were paying their own expenses and even brought
extra money into the Mexican economy.

The only thing

the government was doing was opening its doors to anyone

^6E1 Popular. July 2, 1939, p.
^Madariaga, Spain, p. 584.

2
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who needed help In relocating from his original home78
land.'
To those who opposed his policy, CArdenas
merely said that there was no justification against
the admission of Spaniards into Mexico because the
country needed additional population, and that the
refugees were coming as workers, not as political
actionaries.

He also assured the nation that no Mexi-

can workers would be displaced by the refugees.

7Q

In spite of this assurance, there were those who
were concerned that Mexican workers would lose their
jobs because of the influx.

One workers' syndicate

even wrote the president a letter citing examples of
80
Mexican workers who already had been displaced.
Al
though there were a few such complaints, the major
cause for discontent with the refugees was not because
of labor, but because of political activities.
The first complaints against these political
activities began almost as soon as the refugees arrived.
Although the Mexican government had tried to make it
clear that it would allow none of the refugees to en
gage in disrupting activities on behalf of the Spanish
Republican government, nevertheless, not all the

78E1 Naclonal. April 6, 1939» p. 1.
79Ibid., July 27, 1939, p. 1.
80Paquete 570, Exp. 546.6/200, Doc. 33443,. AGN.
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refugees adhered to this provision.

In addition, making

the matter worse, there were complaints that only com
munists were being accepted in France for transship81

ment to Mexico. *

In August 1939, the president of

the Democratic Institutional Union of Mexico even ask
ed that CArdenas apply Article 33 of the constitution
to any groups which Intervened in Mexican politics.
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In spite of such complaints, CArdenas himself
never had

any regrets about his decision to allow the
8?
Spanish refugees to enter Mexico. ** He believed that

Mexico needed more immigrants, and that because of
cultural and historical ties, there could be no bet
ter choice than the Spanish refugees.

Mexico might

possibly have regretted to some extent her hospitality,
even if CArdenas did not, when some of the refugees
did attempt to engage in political activity.

But

there is no doubt that Mexico benefited in many ways
from the immigration.

Not only did the refugees add

to the culture of the country, but they also contri
buted greatly to the educational process, both aca
demic and vocational.
A 1940 presidential decree authorized agricultural

81Ibid., Doc. 31539.
82Ibid., Doc. 32107.
^Personal interview.
Herzog.

Author with Jesds Silva
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lands to be turned over to some u. the refugees In re
turn for their services as teacher

of modern methods

of agriculture to Mexican communal farmers.8*

Cdrde-

nas realized the value these individuals could con
tribute to Mexico, and therefore, although his action
in allowing them to come to Mexico was humanitarian,
it also had its material benefits.

Because of the

cultural and educational benefits contributed by the
refugees, and the amount of money put into the Mexican
Treasury through purchases of arms during the civil
war, Mexico actually gained from the support given to
the Spanish Republicans.
Recognizing the value of the refugees, Mexico
continued after the civil war was over to try to help
as many as possible.

In July 1940 it was learned that

Mexico had asked the German and Italian governments
for help on behalf of some Spanish refugees who had
5 By the
been trapped in areas of occupied Prance. 8*J
next month, France and Mexico had signed an agreement
whereby the 250,000 refugees in Prance since the end of
the Spanish civil war could migrate to Mexico.
insisted that Mexico adhere to three conditions.

Prance
The

first of these was a guarantee by Mexico that the Mexican

8*New York Tiroes, February 2, 1940, p. 3.
85Ibid., July 2, 1940, p. 3.

government would pay not only all transportation ex
penses, but the upkeep of all the refugees from the
date of the agreement (August 29, 1940) until the time
of departure.

The second point in the agreement was

that Mexico would accept any and all refugees without
consideration of political or religious beliefs.

Fin

ally, France, which had recognized Franco's regime, in
sisted on the right to turn over to Spain any criminal
among the group should the Spanish government so de
sire.8**
There were complaints from one group in the
United States (the Group of Communist Workers of the
United States) that Mexico was not observing the sec
ond point of the agreement.

The argument was that

there was a group of Mexican officials in France in
terrogating the refugees and that certain groups, such
as anarchists, socialists and communists were being
denied admission into Mexico.

The letter to President

CArdenas charged that he would be responsible for the
death of any refugee who was refused entrance into
Mexico.8^ With all he had done for the refugees, and
with the record clear that he had allowed many to enter

86Ibid., August 30, 1940, p. 1.
8^Group of Communist Workers of the United States,
letter, to President CArdenas, Paquete 570, Exp. 546.6/
200, Doc. 33417, AGN.
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Mexico without concern for their political beliefs,
Cdrdenas could Ignore such Isolated complaints with
a clear conscience.
Current "Relations11
The Mexican governments which followed C&rdenas
continued the policy which he started toward Franco's
Spain.

In August 1945, Mexico even extended official

recognition to the Spanish Republican government-inexile.

Not only was Mexico the first nation to grant

this recognition, but she was taking a step frowned on
by many of the nations of the world at a time when
Franco was applying pressure for recognition of his
regime.

88

In December 1946, Mexican president Miguel

Alemdn stated that Mexico would continue to have re
lations with the Spanish government-in-exile, but that
Mexico's relations would always be governed by the at
titude and desires of the Spanish people.8^

Like Cfir-

denas before him, Alemdn was Interpreting Mexico's
flexible foreign policy concerning recognition in
light of what he felt was best for Mexico.
In 1946 also, Franco's government came under fire
88

Smith, "Mexico and the Spanish Republicans,"

p. 287.
8^Alfonso Junco, M6jlco y los refugiados (Mexico:
Editorial Jus, 1959), p. 74.
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in the United Nations• With the United States and
Great Britain opposing the move, Poland and several
other nations, including Mexico, attempted to keep
Franco isolated from the family of nations.

Backed

by Mexico, France and the Netherlands, Poland claimed
that Franco's regime was placed in power against the
will of the Spanish people by Germany and Italy, and
that Franco had been allied with those two nations dur
ing the war.

Charging that France had to close her bor

ders because of the danger from Spain, the declaratiralso accused Franco of allowing former nazi scientists
to engage in dangerous activities within Spain.

go

The New York Times, in covering these debates,
felt that perhaps both the United States and Great
Britain actually would like to see Franco replaced.
The problem seemed to be in just how to get rid of him
and with what kind of regime he would be replaced.

In

spite of this alleged desire on the part of the United
States and Great Britain, and in spite of the election
of Dr. Castillo N&jera of Mexico as president of the
United Nations Security Council which was debating the
issue, the Security Council refused, by a 7-4 vote on
June 24, 1946, to order the other members of the United

^°New York Times. April 12, p. 1; April 18,
1946, p.T:

Nations to break diplomatic relations with Spain.
Attempts both in Mexico and Spain continued
through the years in an effort to re-establish rela
tions, and from time to time news articles appeared
stating that Franco was making another attempt to gain
recognition or that someone in Mexico was making inform
al moves in that direction.
Franco sent a representative to Mexico, and al
though the Mexican government refused to give him any
kind of diplomatic recognition, he still was more im
portant than the representatives of the governmentin-exile, and handled many of the non-diplomatic af
fairs between the two countries. Even the Mexican
I
newspapers often have come out in favor of renewal of
relations, claiming that it is folly to maintain the
same stubborn attitude that has kept the two nations
apart.

Many Mexicans seem to have the attitude that if

the Mexican government can reconcile itself to having
diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, then certainly
qp
Mexico should recognize Spain.
It does seem strange that beginning with C&rdenas
the Estrada Doctrine has been used against Spain.

91Ibid., April 18, 1946, p. 1; June 25, 1946,
p. 1.
Q?
J Sydney Gruson, in ibid.. October 31# 1954,
p. 27

The
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doctrine in essence has made it easy for Mexico to
recognize all kinds of regimes, as it indicates that
the Mexican government should not sit in judgment of
administrations which come to power.

The doctrine has

been convenient for Mexico, allowing her to recognize
regimes not popular with other western nations, for
example, the Castro regime in Cuba.

Yet with the one

country with which Mexico had more common original ties
than any other, this very doctrine has been used in a
negative manner.
ThuB the relationship between Mexico and Spain has
come fill circle since the time of the Mexican War for
Independence, with the full break from the old country
at that time, and the lack of any formal diplomatic
relations now.

During the period of the civil war, the

relations of Mexico with what had been the legitimate
government of Spain had been as close as they had been
since the early days of empire.

C&rdenas1 support of

the Spanish Republican government has affected Mexico
even down to the present, especially with so many of
the former Spanish refugees now firmly rooted in Mexico.
Cdrdenas usually has been venerated for the
policies he pursued while in office, but he has re
ceived considerable criticism for his part in handling
the Spanish question.

Although his supporters have al

ways claimed that he was the great benefactor of the
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indigenous population, his opponents have used the Cdrdenas policy during the Spanish civil war to claim that
he really did nothing for the Mexican Indians, his only
concern being the protection of the Spanish refugees. ^
In light of all the known cases where C&rdenas
tried to help his fellow Mexicans, this denunciation
seems to hold little value.

In the Mexican archives

among the Cdrdenas papers are literally thousands of
documents showing the concern he had for the individual
Mexican.

But as can be seen in his granting of politi

cal asylum to individuals of greatly differing views,
Cdrdenas also granted his hospitality to foreigners,
holding the Cdrdenas Doctrine for those cases where
the foreigners abused that hospitality.

^Todo. November 23, 1950, p. 9.

CHAPTER IV

MEXICO AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
Before any analysis can be made of the relation
ship be.tween Mexico and the Soviet Union, it is neces
sary to realize that the Soviet power elites in the
1920's were attempting to consolidate their own posi
tions, and were much more concerned with matters di
rectly affecting the Soviet Union than with Latin Ameri
ca.

Thus we find little real importance given to the

region of Latin America, although certainly communists
were active in the area.

The situation has been summed

up as follows:
In the theses presented by Lenin to
the Second Communist International, there
is hardly any reference to Latin Ameri
ca. . . .
In Moscow, as can be seen, a
movement in Morocco . . . was considered,
more important than one in . . . Mexico.
In May 1902, a treaty of commerce and friendship

Victor Alba, Historia del comunismoen America
latina (Mexico: Ediciones Occidentales, 1^54), pp. 47Fossibly one reason for the lack of interest was
simply because the U.S.S.R. had diplomatic relations
only with Uruguay among the Latin nations. See also
Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1*357J, p. 33.
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had been signed between Mexico and tsarist Russia,

p

but

after the 1917 revolution even this relationship was
broken and remained dormant until 1924.

The Mexican

Revolution had begun in 1910 and Mexico also had more
immediate problems.

By 1917 Mexico had already ratified

its new "radical" constitution.
Within a

few years early communist such as the

Indian, Manhendra Nath Roy, began surfacing in Mexico.
Then in 1921, a Japanese named Sen Katayama was named to
the Executive Committee of the Communist International
(ECCI) while in Moscow.

One year later he was in Mexico

and is given credit by some as having formed the Com
munist Party of Mexico (CPM).^

One fact seems to be

clear about communist activity in Mexico in the early
1920's:

foreigners such as these were in key positions

and generally were the organizers of the movements.

Lit

tle evidence seems to exist that Mexican nationals play
ed much part in early activities.
This condition was to change rapidly, for in the
1920's a number of well-known artists such as Diego
Rivera, Jos£ Clemente Orozco and David A. Siqueiros^-

2AHDM, Vol. XXXIX, p. 217.
^Alba, Historla del comunismo, pp. 30-31, 23.
^These individuals were all leaders of the. Mexi
can fresco school, whose works interpreted through art
the ideas of the Mexican Revolution. See Howard P.
Cline. Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963)»
p. 130.
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associated themselves with the communists and took over
leading positions.

Although Mexicans were now leading

the party, it is evident that direction came from the
Soviet Union by way of the Comintern.

In 1928, Dmitri

Manuilsky addressed a conference of Latin American com
munists in Moscow and left no doubt in their minds that
Stalin's policy and the strategy of the Communist Inter
national were one and the same, with the defense of the
Soviet Union as a primary objective.
By now the Soviet Union had become interested in
Latin American countries and desired to establish ties
with some of them.
co in August 1924.^

Relations were established with Mexi
It is interesting to note that in

a report on foreign relations, the Soviets mentioned
the establishment of relations, but implied that the
importance was in now having a political baBe in the
country neighboring on the United States.

7

Later state

ments made when the two countries broke relations also
indicated that the Soviet Union had attached little
significance to Mexico itself at that time.

^Alexander, Communism in Latin America, pp. 322,
43-44. Manuilsky held key positions in the ECCI during
these years, including that of permanent Comintern rep
resentative with the German Communist party.
6AHDM, Vol. XXXIX, p. 379.
^Pravda, March 6, 1925, p. 5.
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Mexico was significant enough to be made a subSecretariat for the Comintern, but soon was considered
to have a reactionary, fascist government.

In January

1930, the ECCI issued a manifesto from Buenos Aires, de
nouncing the fascist regime in Mexico and calling for
collections from the Latin American parties for the
‘•victims'* of reaction in Mexico,and for demonstrations
O
of protest.
Demonstrations soon broke out in various
capitals in both North and Sonth America, and Mexico
held the Soviets to blame for the action, claiming that
they were interfering in Mexican Internal affairs by
a
directing the attacks.
The Mexican government then
began a campaign of persecution of communist agitators
in Mexico City.^®

The Soviets stated that their govern

ment could not be held responsible for attacks in the
press11 or for anything done by the Comintern, which
was considered by the U.S.S.R. as an autonomous organi
sation led by members of the various Communist parties
o
Ibid., January 15» 1930, p. 1. There was repres
sion in Mexico, but the single party was not yet the in
stitutionalized party it became later. The government
of CArdenas was more reminiscent of the corporate state
than the series of governments in the late 1920's.
9AHDM, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 420-21.
^°La Prensa (Buenos Aires), January 17, 1930, p. 11.
*^?or an example of anti-Mexican opinion in the
Soviet press during this time, see Pravda. June 26,
1929, p. 1.

throughout the world.

12

Mexico continued to insist that

the propaganda was being directed by the Soviets, and
decided to break relations in late January 1930.

The

news of the rupture first appeared in the Western press,
which reported that Soviet officials were caught by sur
prise.

The Mexican ambassador, Jestis Silva Herzog, ear

lier had protested to Soviet officials about the propa
ganda and demonstrations, but when he departed for a
vacation in Berlin, Soviet authorities supposedly were
I*
unaware that relations even were in danger. J Silva
Herzog, although no planning to return to the Soviet
Union himself, also was not aware of the break in re
lations until during intermission at the opera with
the Mexican ambassador to Germany he received a tele
gram informing him of the rupture.1^
Pravda reported the break by quoting Mexican
Foreign Minister Gsnaro Estrada, who in essence said
19
Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR, Dokumenty
Vneshnel Politiki. Tom XII (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo i>oliticheskoi Literatury, 1967), p. 573. Subsequent references
will be cited as DTP, followed by volume number. In
the Pstrograd Pravda. on August 5, 1920, the close relationship or the soviet Union and the Comintern had been
clearly defined and Lenin himself indicated the subor
dination of the press to the Central Committee. See Com
munist Perspective (Washington, D.C.: ?), pp. 488,651.
^ La Prensa (Buenos Aires), January 24, 1930,
p. 11; January Z5, 1930, p. 11.
■^Personal interview.
Herzog. L.S.U. Archives.

Author with Jestis Silva
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that any communist activity anywhere in the world had to
be directed

by the Soviet government,

1 *5

and this meant

that recent demonstrations were the works of Sovietdirected communists.

Izvestia immediately published

reports blaming the United States for the break, claim
ing that U.S. capital controlled Mexico.^
In explaining the break to his congress, Mexican
president Fascual Ortiz Rubio spoke of Mexican rights
in denying to foreign elements the power to intervene
in internal affairs, and added that it was this intervention which forced Mexico to sever relations. 17 There
is little evidence that any real attempt on either side
was made to renew relations until Cfirdenas became presi
dent.
Although Cdrdenas did not renew relations with the
U.S.S.R., there was considerable communist activity in
Mexico during his regime.

Neither Cdrdenas nor his

closest advisers were even Marxists, but the communists
had more opportunity to act in Mexico during his time

^Pravda, January 27, 1930, p. 1.
16Izvestia. January 27, 1930, p. 1. U.S. capital
did have considerable influence in Mexico at this time.
U.S. and British companies practically controlled the
economy, leading to the eventual confrontation with
Cdrdenas.
17AHTM, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 420-21
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than anywhere else in Latin America,

1ft

Communist Influences on the C&rdenas Administration
The C&rdenas Government of Mexico is
probably the most radical government in the
world today, with the exception of that in
the Soviet Union.-*-9
The above quotation was taken from the Richmond
(Va.) Times-Dlspatch in 1938, and expressed an opinion
widely-held by many U.S. officials, businessmen, news
papers and the public in general.

Apparently there

were four major reasons why many Americans began seeing
"red" in Mexico in the years 1935-40.

The first of these

was the land reform program of C&rdenas and, closely re
lated to it, the expropriation of the Eritish and Ameri
can oil holdings.

Before his election C&rdenas had pro

mised lands to the peasants, and committed himself to
giving them all possible aid, 20 although C&rdenas him
self admitted that Mexico could not pay for the expro
priated properties immediately.
Perhaps the second most important factor influen
cing foreign public opinion was the role of labor and
18

(NY:

See Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, l§bo;, p. 1^7.

^Burt M. McConnell, Mexico at the Bar of Public
Opinion (NY: Mail 4 Express Publishing Co., 1939)»
p. 226.
20

William Townsend, L&zaro C&rdenas. Mexican Demo
crat (Ann Arbor: George Wahr ±>ublishing Co, 1952)» p. 87
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the labor leader, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, under Car
denas.

Labor gave C&rdenas a strong base of support,

and he reciprocated by aiding the workers when possible.
An example of such support occurred in February
1936, when C&rdenas went to Monterrey, the scene of wide
spread 8trlkes,and issued his "Labor Doctrine" of 14
points.

C&rdenas wanted both employers and workers to

form separate united front organizations with which the
government could work.

Both groups were to have the

same rights, but the government would be the sole arbit
er in solving problems.

C&rdenas wanted management to

realize it could not intervene in labor affairs, but
then stressed to labor that its demands would be con
sidered only insofar as the industries had the capabili
ty of paying and meeting them.

In this policy state

ment, C&rdenas clearly indicated that the nation needed
the continued development of industry, and that indus
trialists who felt they could not meet labor's demands
would be prohibited from simply locking out the workers. 21

C&rdenas later warned the Confederation of

Mexican Workers (CTM) that they should be concerned not
only with their own problems, but with those of other
sectors of the nation as well.

22

This admonition fit

91

L&zaro C&rdenas, Ideario politico (M&xico:
Ediciones Era, 1972), pp. 189-90.
22

Alba, Las ideas sociales. p. 252.
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in well with C&rdenas1 idea of how the political system
should work as well, since he expected each of the four
sectors to support the others in elections.

But his

general support of labor gave critics both at home and
abroad the chance to brand his government radical.
Even more widely discussed on an international
scale than the labor doctrine was the admission of Leon
Trotsky for permanent residence in Mexico during the C&r
denas years.

Immediately U.S. newspapers saw Trotsky as

directing a new revolution patterned after the Soviet
one.

That C&rdenas purposely remained aloof and re

fused personal contact with Trotsky was largely ignored.
The most important aspect of this episode is that C&rde
nas had the power to allow Trotsky to live in Mexico
despite the protests of supposedly influential Marx
ists in his government.^

C&rdenas chose instead to

apply his doctrine to Trotsky and treat him just as
any Mexican national.
Finally, there can be no doubt that some of the
key officials and advisers in the government were either
admitted communists or at least sympathizers, although
in retrospect, they seem not really to have determined

^Benito Xavier P&rez-Verdia, C&rdenas apostol
vs. C&rdenas estadista, 2« edicidn (Mlxico: n.p.^
1940), pp. h-W.
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21

government policy. *

Lombardo Toledano and Trotsky

could have had some effect on the thinking and policy
of Cdrdenas; the other officials must be considered
minor in their ability to influence him.
Lombardo Toledano and Labor
Originally Lombario Toledano seems to have had no
leaning toward Marxist ideology, but after he became in
volved in workers' movements, his personal ideology
changed.

By 1934 he was an avowed Marxist and since

his views were frequently published in various news
papers, his Marxist connection undoubtedly was known
to Cdrdenas.

Some of the Mexican newspapers even

branded him as nothing less than the Mexican agent
of the Third International, saying that he received a
monthly sum from the Comintern for directing the communi8t campaign among the workers.

2*5

There was some evidence to support this accusation,
as Lombardo Toledano supposedly wrote a letter dated
June 4, 1938 from Paris in which he speaks of his chief,
Joseph Stalin. 26

There is also a copy of a confidential

2*Victor Alba, The Mexicans (New York:
A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), p. 183.

Frederick

2^For example, see Excelsior. Jan. 30, 1936, p. 1.
26

Vicente Lombardo Toledano, letter, to the CTM,
Paquete 510, Exp. 542.1/2415, AGN.
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report to the CTM in which he again refers to Stalin
the chief, and adds that Stalin will give then money
27

to aid in the oil expropriation struggle. '
If these reports were not enough (if they are
authentic) to convince one of Lombardo's tendencies, his
writings and speeches certainly clearly reflected his
attitude.

In 1937 he wrote his "philosophy," and the

thoughts were undoubtedly influenced by Hegelian-Marxian
28
ideology.
His writings, while illustrative of the
thinking of many labor leaders during this epoch, were
criticized by a number of intellectuals for being com
pletely unoriginal, and this added to the accusation
that he was a stooge of Soviet communism.
Indeed, Lombardo Toledano was highly compliment
ary of the Soviet Union, pointing out that only in that
29
country was democracy truly of the people. * He seemed
convinced that the only way to peace and happiness for
mankind was through the elimination of private property,
30
which he defined as the cause for class struggle.
In this matter of property, his views often seemed

2 ^Ibid., Document 63224.
28

For example, see Vicente Lombardo Toledano,
Sscritos filosdficos (Mexico: Editorial Mexico Nuevo,
1937;, p. 4U.
29 Ibid., p. 102 .

3°Ibid., p. 53.
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to, coincide with those of C&rdenas.

The record shows

that Cdrdenas redistributed more land than any other
Mexican president before him, and in 1938 he decided
that all holdings larger than 370 acres should be brok
en up and distributed to the peasants,^ an action sup
ported by Lombardo Toledano.

Cdrdenas respected the

rights of private property as well, however, and his
government established credit systems for both the
ejidatarlos and small landholders.

•*2

It is in this

point that C&rdenas and Lombardo Toledano disagreed and
where C&rdenas showed his independence from the labor
leader.
In spite of the evidence against him, Lombardo
Toledano expressed his loyalty to the ideals of the
Mexican Revolution, including those portions of the
constitution guaranteeing the rights of private land
holders.

In a confidential letter dated November 13,

1940, he complained to C&rdenas that police officials
were telling high government officials that they had
found eight agents of the Soviet military intelligence
network in the country on his orders to commit criminal
acts.

Although stating that the charge was so ridicu

lous as to be undeserving, of attention, he wanted to

^Townsend, l&zaro C&rdenas. p. 152.
^Alba, Las Ideas sociales. pp. 251-52.
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assure C&rdenas of his personal loyalty.^
His protests to the contrary, Lombardo Toledano
looked and sounded like an agent of international com
munism.

First, there was the unmistakable evidence of

his own writings.

His visit to the Soviet Union and

his glowing reports also did nothing to dispel the idea
\

of his communist affiliation.

He was the editor for a^

time of El Popular, a known socialist organ, and he
was often supported from other communist organisations,
such as La Vos, the official publication of the Com
munist party.

His later association with the Confed

eration of Latin American Workers also made him sus
pect.

Finally, both Lombardo Toledano and the CTM

strongly protested when Trotsky was allowed into Mexico.
The influence of Leon Trotsky on C&rdenas undoubt
edly was even less than that of Lombardo Toledano, but
the possibility received much more space in the inter
national press.

In an interview, Ambassador Josephus

Daniels indicated that he believed that Trotsky had
about as much influence on the thinking of C&rdenas as
did the Soviet Union,implying he felt Trotsky had
no influence on the policies of C&rdenas.

“"Vicente Lombardo Toledano, letter, to President
C&rdenas, November 13, 1940, Paquete 510, Exp. 542.1/
2415, unnumbered document, AON.
^E 1 Naclonal. January 14, 1939, p. 1.

t

100

The story of Trotsky's exile from the U.S.S.R. and
his residence in Turkey, Trance and Norway are too welldocumented to go into here.

On August 28, 1936, the

Soviets indicated they felt Trotsky should be expelled
from Norway because of his "criminal-terrorist actions,"
and they branded him as the leader of "counter-revolutionary assassins."
Friends of Trotsky then began considering where he
could go if the Norwegian government decided to act.
Mexico Boon became the only possible choice, and Mexi
can newspapers started spreading the word that Diego
Rivera had requested permission from the government for
an entry visa.

By early December 1936, Norwegian prime

minister Johan Nygaardsvold indicated that Trotsky would
have to leave when his visa expired

on December

that date Trotsky had not made all the

18.By

arrangements, and

TtC.

became technically a prisoner.
In Mexico, a number of groups were concerned that
C&rdenas would grant asylum.

The CTM announced that

all necessary steps would be taken to avoid allowing
foreign leaders of contrary ideology entrance into the
country,

■*7

obviously with reference to Trotsky.

For

^Pravda, August 28, 1936, p. 2.
36Excelsior. Dec. 8 , 1936, p.
Sect# ^I9 p* 4#

1; Dec. 19, 1936,

3 ^Ibid., December 1, 1936, p. 1.
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all the good the protests did, C&rdenas seemed to be
unaware of them.

C&rdenaB proved, as he was to show

a number of times in the next few years, that he was

not to be intimidated by one of the world powers.
In giving his instructions to the Minister of
Foreign Relations on December 1, 1936, C&rdenas indi
cated that, no country should be frightened of one man,
especially if that country had a clear definition of
its own nationalistic g o a l s W i t h i n a few days, the
Foreign Minister indicated that the request for per
mission for Trotsky to live in Mexico had been grant
ed.

He went on to say that this should not be inter

preted as an adherence to the beliefs of the exile, and
that no one should fear that his residence would in any
way affect the internal situation of Mexico. 39? That
his residence did not affect internal politics does
seem obvious when looking at Trotsky's few years in
Mexico in retrospect.

On the other hand, one must ad

mit that he did affect the internal situation to the
degree that opposition groups rather strongly voiced
their displeasure at his presence.
These protests began as soon as the government an
nounced its intention to grant asylum, but to no avail.

^C&rdenas, Ideario politico, p. 326.
^ElNacional, December 7, 1936, pp. 1, 3.
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In spite of these protests, the government went ahead
with the grant of asylum.

On his arrival in Mexico,

Trotsky stated that his desires and those of the Mexi
can government were exactly the same.

He declared that

he had no intention or desire to interfere in any way in
the internal affairs of Mexico.*0
Some groups such as the CTM decided to take a posi
tion of indifference toward Trotsky.

The CPM, however,

and groups affiliated with it, continued to voice dis
approval of his residence.

Mexican communists had been

strong enough to put up their own ticket in municipal
elections held just before the grant of asylum.

Many

of these leaders claimed they had been too involved in
their own activities to concern themselves with the
question of Trotsky.

Nevertheless, the official CPM

line, given by Hern&n Laborde, the leader at that time,
was that it would try to break up any participation of
Trotsky in public acts. 41
As might be expected, within a short time there
were reports that the Soviet Union would protest the
asylum.

One of the Mexican papers quoted the London

Daily Telegraph as saying that the U.S.S.R. would

*°Excelslor. January 10, 1937, p. 1.
41Ibid., Jan. 23, 1937, p. 3; Jan. 12, 1937, Sect.
II, p. 27“7an. 9, 1937, Sect. II, p. 2; and Feb. 8,
1937, p. 1.
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protest to Mexico and hold the Mexican government
responsible for any disruptive activities caused in
the Soviet Union by Trotsky's activities in Mexico.^2
Another newspaper dispatch from Moscow indicated that
the Soviet government would present a protest to Mexico
through the league of Nations, to which both countries
belonged, against the declarations being made in Mexico
by Trotsky on the Moscow trials.*'5
CArdenas was not intimidated,

luring his years in

office he built up a record of allowing many exiles to
enter Mexico, and most of the communist elements in
Mexico recognized his liberal actions.

Some of them,

notably Hernan Laborde, seemed to want to avoid taking
any part in action against Trotsky for fear that the in
fluence of the CPM on the government would be diminished.

AA

laborde and the other communists probably had an

inflated idea of Just how much influence they were ex
erting on the government, and this lessened their at
tempts at overt action against Trotsky.
Covert action was a different matter, however,
although events which took place in the summer of 1940
cannot be traced to the CPM.

After the first attack on

*2Ibid., editorial, February 5, 1937, p. 5.
*^E1 Universal. February 4, 1937, p. 1.
**Alba, Historla del comunismo. p. 97.
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Trotsky'a house, he accused Stalin, agents of the Soviet
Union and several Mexicans of wanting him killed.
specifically referred to lombardo Toledano.

He

The CTM

in turn sent a note of protest to the Ministry of In
terior, claiming that Trotsky not only unjustly had
accused Lombardo Toledano, but that he had repeatedly
abused the hospitality of Mexico.

The CTM claimed that

his attitude was contrary to the good of the Mexican
Revolution. 45
Polemics continued until Trotsky's death in August
1940.

One of the first groups to attack the crime as a

counter-revolutionary act was the CTM, which guaranteed
full cooperation with investigators.*6

In a message

directed to the Mexican workers, Cdrdenas, while deny
ing that Mexico was communist, said that the CPM enjoy
ed great liberty in Mexico, but that if any members of
that party had allied themselves with the foreign ele
ments responsible for the death of Trotsky, then those
Mexicans had committed treason against their country
and its institutions.*^

Showing the strength of his

feelings on this subject, Cdrdenas even mentioned the
fatal attack in his message to the Mexican Congress on

*^E1 Nacional. June 6, 1940, p. 8.
*6E1 Popular. August 22, 1940, p. 1.
*^E1 Nacional. August 30, 1940, pp. 1-2.
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September 1st.

In his conclusion he indirectly attacked

the Soviet Union for perpetrating a crime against a
State which had granted asylum.*8

The language he used

was much stronger than one might expect from a man ac
cused of leading his country in the same direction as
the Soviet Union.
Cardenas was known to be extremely wary of all
foreign influences, and indeed had based his doctrine
on the idea of ridding the country of any kind of
foreign intervention.

For this reason, if for nothing

else, had he been influenced toward a communist ideology
it would not have been from Trotsky, but from Mexicans
who were communists.
One Mexican who could have been an influence on
C&rdenas was Diego Rivera, whose own brand of communism,
carried on through organizations such as the Revolution
ary Party of Workers and Peasants, formed in 1938, soon
clashed with that of Trotsky, and even more so with
that of Joseph Stalin.
In an interview in October 1939, Rivera accused
Stalin of trying to get control of Mexico, and said that
he had "documentary evidence" of this fact.

Perhaps

*8AHDM, Las relaclones internaclonales de M&xico.
1935-1936. 2* serle, numero 9 (ta&xico; tublicaciones
de la Secretarla de Relaciones Exteriores, 1957), p.
41.
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trying to stir up the American press, Rivera added that
Stalin wanted a base In Mexico from which he could work
against the United States.

The main point Rivera want

ed to make was that "totalitarian agents" of Stalin
were well-placed in high government positions in Mexi
co, and that money from Stalinist organizations was
being used in the Mexican presidential campaign then
in progress. 4.9
Rivera's accusations were important in two respects:
first, he was a well-known and influential revolutionary
artist, and many persons could have been influenced by
what he had to say.

Secondly, and most important, he

gave names of a number of the high-ranking government
officials whom he labeled as Stalin's agents.

If Cdr-

denas had been an admirer, however, of Stalin, and had
listened to these men who supposedly were in the ser
vice of Soviet communism, he would not have been so
agreeable to Trotsky's residence within the country,
and he probably would have made more of an effort to re
establish relations with the U.S.S.R.
As Rivera saw things, some of the chief ministries
and even the executive office had been infiltrated by
agents of Stalin.

Included in his list was the Minis

ter of Public Education, Ignacio Garcia Tellez.

^ New York Times. October 29, 1939, p. 39.
^°Excelsior, December 9, 1939, p. 1.

He

was not the first person to single out the Ministry of
Education, as a number of other sources, including Mexi
can newspapers, already had mentioned Garcia Tellez as
a communist agent.

He even allegedly had said he was

happy to see the Mexican proletariat following the example of the Marxists in Europe.
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The attacks on him

in the Mexican press over his socialist educational
program even reached the point where Cdrdenas was forc
ed to order him to refrain from any kind of polemics
with the press.

CO

In summing up its six years in office, the C&rdenas regime explained its original collective aspira
tions as mainly having been to put an end to the miser
able conditions in which the Idians and mestizos found
themselves, and to end the dogmatism found in both re
ligion and education.

The government had been concern

ed about religious privileges and immunities and the
economic and political privileges which effected un
equal distribution of wealth and continued exploitation
of the masses.^

co:

Social education was considered by

^Eduardo Correa, El balance del Cardenismo (M&ci
Talleres Linotipogrdficos "Acci6n", 1941;, p. 28.
^Presidential order, Paquete 461, Exp. 534.6/74»

AGN.
•^Secretario de Gobernacidn, Seis aflos de gobierno al Berviclo de MAxico. 1934-1940 (Mexico: La
Naciona! Impresora, S.A., l§4b), p. iii»
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the Cdrdenas administration as a major plank in this
progressive program.

In carrying the program to its

fruition, his administration did little more than enforce
the religious issues in the constitution which had been
called anti-clerical.

But this enforcement led the pro

religious forces to brand the regime as communistic.
Early in his term the government passed an amend
ment setting up a socialist form of eduction, which
planned for a future where the means of production would
belong to the Mexican people.^

For Cdrdenas, what this

definition meant was that social education would counter
religious fanaticism and would prepare the future genera
tions of Mexicans so that they would better understand
their responsibilities tottie collective society.

cc

J

This

amendment was repealed within a short time after the end
of the C&rdenas administration.
In answer to his critics in the church, C&rdenas
stated that while the church had been involved in educa56
tion, few of the people were really educated.
He at
tempted to convince critics that he was only in conflict
with fanaticism, and that he was not waging a battle

-^Alvear Acevedo, Ldzaro C&rdenas, pp. 318-19.
'^C&rdenas, Ideario -politico, p. 208.
^Josephus Daniels, Shirt-sleeve Diplomat (Chapel
Hilli University of North Carolina IPress, 1$47),
p. 70.
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against the church.

Nevertheless, he continued to re

ceive criticism from various parts.^
Perhaps some Mexicans felt this criticism was not
without basis, as the Minister of Education even sent
representatives to the Soviet Union to study methods
and materials used in teaching there.

58

But more than

likely it was a combination of events which caused iso
lated criticism rather than any concentrated effort to
bring communist-style education to Mexico.

For one thing,

the criticism was only isolated, and came at a time when
CArdenas' enforcement of the anti-religious articles
was arousing a great deal of opposition, even in the
United States.

There was probably more church-led ac

tivity in opposition to the program than communist-led
activity in support of it.

Perhaps one of the reasons

CArdenas refused to renew relations with the Soviet
Union was that the religious opposition would become
even stronger and represent a threat to his regime.
Although CArdenas probably influenced education
rather than being influenced by those he appointed to
posts within the Ministry of Education, he was very
likely influenced by the thinking of some of his other

57 Federation of Societies of Fathers of the Family,
Uruapan, MichoacAn, letter, to President CArdenas, Novem
ber 29, 1938, Paquete 431, Exp. 533.3/115, Doc. 77600,
AGN.
58E1 Universal, April 14, 1937, p. 1.
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ministers.

One of these influential members of his cab

inet was General Francisco Mligica, who had flirted with
the communists in earlier days and had been one of the
most influential persons at the Constitutional Conven
tion in 1916.

Under CArdenas he served in the cabinet

until he resigned to run for the presidential nomination.
It was said that he had both a physical and philosophi
cal resemblance to Lenin.

No doubt CArdenas might have

cq

been influenced by him, ^ but the events of the six
CArdenas years seem to indicate that CArdenas was able
to use those around him, without being unduly influenced
in turn.

Certainly the presidential election of 1940

should illustrate this objectivity.
CArdenas indicated years later that he had held
himBelf aloof from the election in spite of being a
close friend of Mdgica.^0

With the support of CArdenas

the results might have been different; without his sup
port, Mtigica probably never had a chance.

There is no

evidence that the Soviet Union intervened in any way in
the elections (and certainly the Soviets probably would
have been happier if Mtigica had been the candidate), but
no fault could be found in the results, especially when

"^Joe C. Ashby, Organized Labor and the Mexican
Revolution under LAzaro CArdenas (chapel Hill: Univer
sity of North Carolina Press, 1^67), pp. 11, 19.
60

CArdenas, Ideario politico, p. 85.
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Camacho renewed relations with the Soviet Union shortly
after his election.
Even without having the official relations later
established, the CArdenas government could be said to
have had a type of relations with the Soviet Union
through the Communist party of Mexico.

There was a

network of parties throughout Mexico at the time, and
they were allowed to function without harra»sment,^
and throughout most of his administration, CArdenas
was given support by the CPM for his liberal policy.

62

Although the communists might have praised CArdenas, the 7th CPM Congress established without a doubt
its international connections in two articles promulgat
ed:
Art. 72:

The Communist Party of Mexico is af
filiated with the Communist Interna
tional, with all the rights and obli
gations according to its Statutes.

Art. 73:

The Communist Party of Mexico will main
tain fraternal relations with the com
munist parties of all countries.

Por the man who established the CArdenas Doctrine
as aneffective

tool against foreign intervention, these

articles musthave appeared somewhat

menacing.

CArdenas

^Prouncement, CPM of Veracruz, October 16, 1937,
Paquete 280, Exp. 433/238, Doc. 51230, AGN.
/•a

CPM Campeche, telegram, to President CArdenas,
May 13, 1939, Paquete 282, Exp. 433/409, Doc. 23448, ibid
6^Ia Voz, January 23, 1939, p. 10.
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might not have worried about the rights the local party
might have, but the obligations should have caused him
to wonder.

Cdrdenas1 fight against foreign intervention

sometimes, however, made him forget about the danger
from within.
Toward the end of the Cdrdenas administration, the
CPM came out with its national program for Mexico.

The

proposals for the next six-year term contained the fol
lowing main points:

expropriation of lands of both

foreigners and nationals to be given to the peasants;
nationalization of banks, the electric industry and
centralization of the administration of railroads,
petroleum and electricity; minimum salaries for workers
based on actual cost of living and a form of social se
curity with a federalization of the labor tribunals; re
forms in the fiscal system with a maximum amount of rent
and protection for the small business owners against
the giants; development of cooperatives among small
producers; better economic conditions for the indigen
ous population;' permission for the natives to elect
representatives according to traditional customs; the
teaching of natives in their own language and respect
for their institutions; increased emphasis on wiping
out illiteracy and communal diseases; right to vote and
equal rights for women; improvement in the life of the
army; strong ties with all countries of the continent,
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especially with the United States, and renewal of re
lations with the U.S.S.R.64
Sounding very Mexican and not at all extremely
radical, undoubtedly some of these planks were the same
as CArdenas himself would have wanted, along with the
majority of the Mexican population.

But the CPM never

gathered enough support to make its programs part of
the national picture.
Although the CPM had full freedom during this ad
ministration, it had a difficult time recruiting mem
bers, and was always in trouble financially.

In spite

of constant urging by the party newspaper, the handful
of members seemed unable to attract new recruits.

The

paper was in financial difficulty from the beginning
and finally had to cease publication.

Had the Soviet

Union been trying to intervene actively in Mexican af
fairs, there would have been fewer difficulties for the
local party.

In addition, if CArdenas had been support

ing the party, it should have been much stronger.
Mexico, the Soviet Union and World Affairs
After looking at the internal affairs of Mexico

**4Ibid.. August 27, 1939, p. 9.
65
^For examples of problems that beset the party,
see ibid., Jan. 11 and 15; March 6 and May 3, 1939.
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and the possible communist influences within the country,
it is now necessary to look at what both the Soviet
Union and Mexico were doing and saying about each other
in the context of world affairs.

Although the two coun

tries did not have diplomatic relations as such during
the G&rdenas years, there was some contact through the
League of Nations, and also through the Comintern's re
lationship with the CPM.
Even without official relations, there was support
in Mexico for the Soviet Union.

On November 7, 1937

a meeting was held to commemorate the 20th anniversary
of the Soviet Revolution.

It was sponsored by the CTM,

the PNR, the Society of Friends of the U.S.S.R. and the
CPM.

Valentin Campa, representing the party, spoke of

the development economically and militarily of the
Soviet Union, then the press secretary of the PNR spoke.
He talked of the similarity of the Mexican and Soviet
revolutions, and said that both countries were seeking
a common goal— a democracy of the workers.
Following the press secretary, Narciso Bassols
spoke for the Friends of the U.S.S.R., who claimed that
the renewal of relations between the U.S.S.R. and Mexico
was a necessity.

He indicated that the capitalists of

the world had allied themselves with the fascist pow
ers in Berlin, Rome and Tokyo, and that presently Mexi
co seemed to be allied with them while the proletariat
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forming the Red International continued the fight against
imperialism.

He pointed out that in this battle com

munism was shoving the way for solving the social
problems of the nation, and that a Soviet diplomatic
mission in Mexico could show how to profit from the
ways of communism.^
In addition to this internal support of the Soviet
Union, there was one possible point of confusion for one
studying Mexican-Soviet relationships during these
years:

both countries were on the same side in the

civil war in Spain, albeit for different reasons.

Af

ter the demands of war cleared the way for extreme
Leftists to enter the Spanish government, these in
dividuals were disposed toward friendship with both the
67
Soviet Union and Mexico.
Because of the friendship
of the leftists in Spain, Mexico could be accused by
those so disposed of aligning the Mexican government
with the communists.
Although Mexico was friendly toward the Spanish
Republican government from the beginning of the civil
war, the Soviet Union at first seemed to favor the
British and French policy of non-intervention.

In July

1936 the U.S. chargd in Moscow had been assured that no

*^E1 Nacional, Nov. 8, 1937, pp. 1, 5.
67FRUS, 1936, Vol. II, pp. 556-57.
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Soviet equipment had been sent to Spain.

Both Italy

and Germany charged Interference by the Soviet Union
as their reason for giving aid to the rebels.

The

Soviets then prepared the way for possible future aid
to Spain.

Sounding much like the Cdrdenas government,

the Soviet Union claimed there was no reason why one
government could not furnish aid to another to put
down a rebellion.®8
When Germany, Italy and Portugal refused to adhere
to a policy of non-intervention, the Soviet Union ex
pressed the feeling that she would probably have to de
nounce the non-intervention pact, although at the same
time the Soviets announced that this act would not nec
essarily mean they would supply the Spanish Loyal
ists.®^

In effect, it meant juBt that, and soon there

were reports that foodstuffs and supplies including
70
Soviet planes and tanks had been sent to Spain.'

Thus

the Soviet Union, along with Mexico, became the major
supplier of munitions to the Republicans.
In writing about the Mexican part in the Spanish
civil war, Soviet writers have pointed out that of all
the "bourgeois" countries, only Mexico fought against

68Ibid., pp. 452-53.
®9Ibid., pp. 539-40.
70Ibid., p. 544.
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the fascist aggression.

Cardenas was praised for turn

ing away from the ineffective policy on non-intervention*
and for helping Spain with all the means at his dis71

posal.'

The significance of the Spanish civil war is that
when Mexico allowed Spanish emigres to make a permanent
home in Mexico* many of those who came were communists*
and although they were supposed to refrain from any type
of political activity, this rule was not always follow
ed.

Nevertheless* Influence on the CdrdenaB government

seems to have been nominal.

Aside from perhaps sug

gesting to the Mexican government the possibility of
renewing diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.* the
unofficial alliance of the two countries had little ef
fect on Internal politics.
The attitude of the Cdrdenas government toward the
Soviet Union's relations with three other countries—
Germany* Poland and Finland— is perhaps more illustra
tive of the true relationship between the two count
ries.

When Germany and the Soviet Union signed the non

aggression pact* there was an immediate outcry in the
Mexican press claiming treason on the part of the Soviet
Union.

Perhaps because of the outcry in the press* some
71

' A.A. Akhtamzian, Istoriia Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenil i Vneshnei Politikl SSSh. tom I. 1^17-19^9
(Moskva: Izclaiel*stvo "Mezh&unarodnye Otnosheniia,"
1967), p. 362.
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Mexican congressmen decided it vras time to propose a
law to dissolve all groups holding to "exotic" doctrines,
such as the communists, fascists and nazis.

Some of the

congressmen argued that the CPM was directed by the
Soviet Union, while more moderate deputies pointed out
that workers already were taking matters in their own
hands and eliminating communists from their ranks.

Be

cause of the division of opinion, the Chamber of Depu
ties could not decide whether such groups should be dissolved or not.

72

It is noteworth that Cdrdenas did not

take part in any of these discussions over whether to
break up local groups.

His doctrine had been formulat

ed to make sure that all foreigners adhered strictly to
the laws of the nation.

Native elements were never much

of a question for him, as he seemed to ignore the pos
sibility of danger from Mexicans.

For this reason, more

than because of his sympathy with the communist cause,
he allowed such groups as the CPM almost total liberty.
When Germany turned on the Soviet Union, an of
ficial of the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Mexico
reminded the Mexican press that although the aggression
was a violation of international law, they nevertheless
7x

should not be confused by the various Ideologies,'r

^Excelsior. Sept. 30, 1939. P. 1; Oct. 4, 1939.
p. 1; O c T T m m p. 1.
*^MSRE, septiembre 1940-agosto 1941, p. 153.
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implying that they should remember the ideology of the
Soviet Union before rushing to its defense.
There was little confusion over right or wrong for
most Mexican officials when the Soviets marched into Po
land in September 1939 with the announced attention of
protecting minority groups of Ukrainians and White Rus
sians numbering eleven million.7^

There were those in

Mexico, however, who bought this line, and tried to jus
tify completely the Soviet action.

Hern&n Laborde ad

vanced this line in a speech just a few days after the
invasion of Poland by saying that it would not have been
fair for the Soviet Union to have abandoned the minority
groups. 75
The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations felt dif
ferently, and in answer to the press regarding how the
government would react to the Polish situation stated
that in no case could the Mexican government recognize
76
a conquest by force.
At this time, the Soviet Union was still a member
of the League of Nations, and the possibility existed
that something could be worked out through the frame
work of the League.

The U.S.S.R. had not been included

^ Excelsior. Sept. 18, 1939, Sect. II, p. 5.
75Ibid., Sept. 20, 1939, p. 1.
76Ibid., Oct. 3, 1939, p. 1.
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in the early daya of the League and had denounced its
activities as being a front for the ambitions of strong
military nations to oppress weak nationalities.

The

Soviet Union had announced that it could not become a
part of a body whose doctrines sanctioned the exploita
tion of weaker nations.77
This attitude prevailed until 1934 when Mexico,
along with twenty-nine other nations, sent a telegram
to the Soviet Foreign Secretary inviting the Soviet
Union to join the League.78

In spite of their earlier

protests of the oppressive doctrines of the League, the
Soviets accepted and continued in the body until the in
vasion of Poland was followed shortly by an attack on
Finland.
After this attack, public opinion in Mexico seem
ed to be unanimous against the Soviet Union.

Naturally

there were some who insisted on the correctness of the
action, and anyone familiar with communist party purges
of those years might have predicted that there might be
changes in the ranks of the local CPM of those who fail
ed to support the Soviet policy.

Within a very short

time the CPM did decide to change itself into a true
Popular Front and in

so doing to determine those who

77PVP. Vol. VIII, p. 688.
78MSRE. 1934/35-1935/36, Vol. I, p. 18.

121

needed to be eliminated from the ranks, such as those
who failed to support the action In Finland.
Soon there were were reports of a division within
the ranks because of both Internal politics and the at
titude of some members toward the Soviet Union.

In

Harch 1940, the Secretary General of the Comnunist
International sent a cable to the Extraordinary Session
of the CPM, and spoke of the need of expelling hostile
elements within the CPM.*^
Indicating the power of the Comintern, the CPM
decided to expel Herndn Laborde and Valentin S. Campa,
former president and secretary, from the party.

They

were accused of maintaining a policy contrary to the
interests of the party which were neutralising the
revolutionary activity of the CPM.

80

Thus* on the

question of Finland two of the major leaders of the
CPM temporarily were dismissed from the ranks.
Non-communist elements meanwhile were extremely
outspoken in their attacks on the Soviet aggression,
and these included not only the newspapers, but the
president himself.

Excelsior stated that no reason

oould be found, political, military or economic, for

*^Novedades. March 24* 1940, p. 1.
80B1 Popular. March 24* 1940, p. 1. Both men lat
er were to be reinstated in the party, and Laborde once
again gained the top position.
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the Soviet action*

81

CArdenas sent a message of sympathy

to the Pinnish people and left no doubt which side he
was taking when he said that all civilized nations must
of necessity identify with Finland.82

In spite of this

verbal reprimand, Mexico was not prepared to meet a
Norwegian request for extreme sanctions against the Sov
iet Union, as along with Chile and Peru Mexico refused
to go along with the proposal.

Mexico did say that it

would support a proposal for a ceasefire and arbitration
of the U.S.S.R.-Finland question.8^
In addition, Mexico also seemed ready to support,
along with other American nations, the idea of Ecuador
and Panama to draft a joint Pan American declaration
against the Soviet Invasion of Finland.8*
But by this time, the League of Nations was ready
to take more aggressive action.

Argentina, backed by

other Latin nations but not by Mexico, demanded that the
Soviet Union be expelled from the body.

The League at

tempted to get the Soviet Union to agree to allow it
to mediate the conflict, but the offer was rejected,
leaving the delegates with what they felt was little

81Excelsior. editorial, Dec. 7, 1939, p. 5.
82Ibid., Dec. 8, 1939, p. 5.
8^E1 Nacional. Dec. 11, 1939, p. 1.
8*FRUS. 1939, Vol. V, p. 132. Chile refused to
make the resolution unanimous, and thus the idea was
dropped.

choice.
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Mexico might have frowned on the Soviet ac

tion, but she also opposed League action which might
shut off all chances for settlement.
Because Mexico wanted to see the conflict judi
ciously settled through the League of Nations, the
Mexican delegate alluded to the high calibre of Finland
but then added that his government could not concur in
expelling the Soviet Union.

Fart of his argument was

purely technical, saying that the League never before
had considered expulsion in earlier cases.

He conclud

ed by pointing out that Mexico felt that expulsion of
the Soviet Union actually would be harmful to Finland,
since with that act all possibility would be eliminated
of finding a solution that would be favorable to the
smaller country.®**
The council which met to discuss the situation
nevertheless felt that the aggression demanded strong
action, and concluded that the Soviet Union had ex
cluded itself from the League.®*^

Once this action had

been taken, Mexico went along with the rest of the Lea
gue in its condemnation.

The Soviet press did mention

that Mexico, whose policy was independent from the

®^Excelsior. Dec. 5. 1939, Sect. II, p. 5;
Dec. 13,' 1939,""Sect. II, p. 5.
®6MSRE, 1939-40, pp. 239-40.
87___
___
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United States, had voted against the expulsion.8** Of
course, the United States was not a member of the lea
gue, and thus, whatever position Mexico had taken
would have been independent in that sense.
The first and most important outcome of Mexico's
stand was that many of the avowed communists in Mexico
began arguing among themselves.

The party never was

very strong anyway, even under the liberal policy of
CArdenas.

With the split in the ranks because of the

Trotsky affair, and the purges to which the party sub
mitted itself over questions in Europe, such as Finland,
the CPM practically committed suicide.
A second factor in the Soviet invasion of Finland
is that it very likely ended whatever chance there had
been for a renewal of relations under CArdenas.

Even

before he had taken office there had been rumors that
there might be a renewal, and these rumors persisted
throughout the regime.

But just as CArdenas could not

back down from his own doctrine in the case of the
foreign oil companies, so would it have been a politi
cal mistake of the highest degree to agree to a resump
tion of relations with popular feeling running so high
against the Soviet Union after the events in Europe.

88Pravda, December 17* 1939, p. 1.
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The Question of Renewal of Relations
In an administration filled with history-making
decisions, one of the questions which Cdrdenas eluded
was that of the renewal of relations with the Soviet
Union.

Hardly had he taken office when the requests

started coming in asking that he consider this ques
tion.

In the early months it seemed that most of the

requests of this nature were based on the possible
economic benefit to Mexico once diplomatic ties had .
been re-established.

The point was made that Mexican

goods at that time had to be sent to the United States
and then sold to the Commercial Agency of the U.S.S.R.,
and that the re-establishment of relations would elimiQQ
nate this measure which was costly to Mexico.
The
argument was valid in that Mexican goods transported
to the United States were subject to import duties,
making the cost higher.

But since the Society of

Priends of the U.S.S.R. was the organization most ada
mant in these demands, no matter what the outward rea
son for the request, there was more than a little
political reasong also.
One other argument used was that the United States
had agreed in November 1933 to the renewal of relations

8^See such requests in Paquete 686, Exp. 577.2/1,
Documents 16178 and 13096, AGN.
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with the Soviet U n i o n , a n d if a country such as the
United States could take that step, there was all the
more reason for Mexico to do the same.

When the press

in the United States began publishing articles unfavor
able to the Soviet Union, the Society of Friends in
Mexico emphasised to CArdenas the danger that the United
States might break relations with the U.S.S.R., and then
the only link Mexico had would be cut off, thus costing
Mexico precious commercial sales.

91

When CArdenas failed to respond to these pleas
for renewal on economic grounds, the Workers Federation
of Tamaulipas sent him a letter requesting that he renew
relations because the Soviet Union had never done any
thing to offend Mexico and it was the only country cap92
able of preventing another war.7

These arguments CAr-

denas obviously saw as erroneous.

He knew that the

Soviet Union had offended Mexico with anti-Mexican de
monstrations which led to the break in relations in
January 1930.

And just as obviously he recognized that

Mexico's relationship with the Soviet Union would have
nothing to do with that country's alleged ability to

^°FRUS. Soviet Union. 1933-39, p. 27.
^Society of Friends of the U.S.S.R., letter, to
President CArdenas, February 1, 1935, Paquete 686, Exp.
577.2/1, Doc. 17540, AGN.
^Workers Federation of Tamaulipas, letter, to
President CArdenas, May 4, 1935, Paquete 686, Exp. 577.2/
1, Doc. 36851, ibid.
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prevent another war.
One of the most logical arguments for reestablish
ment of relations came from the Syndicate of Railroad
Workers.

This organisation emphasized that Mexico

maintained relations with most countries of the world
without regard to ideology, and that the U.S.S.R. should
not be excluded.^

Had CArdenas adhered strictly to the

Estrada Doctrine, his government might have listened to
such arguments.
But CArdenas seemed to fear that Mexico would
be dealing from a position of inferiority, and that the
previous insult had been too great.

In a meeting with

a group of radical labor leaders in early 1935 he had
indicated that the Soviet demand for an apology from
the Mexicans for the brusque manner in which Soviet of
ficials had been asked to leave the country was comQC
pletely unacceptable to his government. ^ Had he
agreed to this demand, it would have been contrary to
his principles.

It would, to his mind, have constitut

ed a form of intervention in the internal affairs of
Mexico, and for CArdenas this was unacceptable.

^Syndicate of Railroad Workers, letter, to Presi
dent CArdenas, April 23, 1937, Paquete 686, Exp. 577.2/1,
Doc. 18398, ibid.
^Personal interview.
Herzog, L.S.U. Archives.

Author with Jesus Silva

^Pravda, April 3, 1935, p. 1.
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The question did arise, however, from time to time
during the C&rdenas years.

In a secret session of the

Mexican Senate in September 1936, the possibility of a
renewal was discussed.

After lengthy debates the Sen

ate simply stated that the area of foreign relations
was strictly the province of the executive office, and
therefore Cdrdenas would have to be the one to decide
the issue. 96 That C&rdenas chose not to press the mat
ter should be considered in analysing the relationship
of communist elements in Mexico with the C&rdenas
government•
Por the C&rdenas years, the attitude never really
changed.

About the only real gains made by communists

were in the field of labor, where Lombardo Toledano un
doubtedly was the strongest leader.

Soviet historians

have stated that by the beginning of 1936 the CPM had
reached an agreement with Lombardo Toledano's CTM.

07

By 1939, Lombardo Toledano had been elected president
of the Confederation of Latin American Workers, whose
open connections with the left confirmed to many Lom
bardo Toledano*s ties with the Soviet Union.

At the

same time it should not be forgotten that C&rdenas
showed favoritism to labor, no matter the political

^ Excelsior, September 25, 1936, p. 1.
97

^'Akhtamzian, Istoriia. p. 365.
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inclinations of the leaders.

In this respect, his

policies have been compared to those of Franklin Roose▼elt's New Deal,

98

mon man of Mexico.

and Cdrdenas never forgot the com
His sense of dignity of the indi

vidual Mexican colored both internal and foreign poli
cies of his administration.
It was this sense of dignity for the Mexican that
kept Cdrdenas from renewing relations with the Soviet
Union.

No doubt his ideology was not so far removed

from that of the Soviet Union that he could not have
reconciled his administration to having diplomatic
ties.

But in spite of the freedom of the CPM, and the

number pf requests that came in asking for a resumption
of relations, C&rdenas probably recognized the damage
it could do to Mexico.

This he could not reconcile.

^Victor Alba, Historia del movjLmlento obrcro
en America latina (Mexico: iiibreros Mexicanos uni&os,
1964), p. T77“

CHAPTER V

MEXICAN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES:

Oil

When President CArdenas took office in December
1934, the typical Inage of the Mexican for many North
Anericans was that of the sleeping Indian with his som
brero pulled over his face.

March 18f 1938 began chang

ing that image and the events of that day caused the
United States to begin looking at Mexico differently.
For it was on that day that lAzaro CArdenas start
ed Mexico on the road to economic independence by an
nouncing the expropriations of the giant foreign-owned
oil industries which had in effect controlled the eco
nomy of Mexico almost since the turn of the century.
Porfirio Diaz, in an effort to attract foreign capi
tal and keep the favor of the United States, had grant
ed concessions which in retrospect had been to the
detriment of the Mexican people, in spite of the ob
vious benefit of opening up the country's vast petro
leum resources.
Because of the treatment received throughout the
early years of exploitation of the oil fields, the oil
130
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companies felt that they were outside the laws of the
country.

In applying the Cardenas Doctrine and Mexi

can law to the companies, CArdenas surprised not only
the owners of the companies, hat the entire world.
In making the announcement of the expropriations,
Cardenas told his surprised listeners in part that:
. . . the oil companies have adopted a posi
tion which obliges the Executive of the Union
to seek among the recourses of our legisla
tion an efficacious means of definitely pre
venting . . . the attempted annulment of
judicial decisions at the simple will of
one or both of the parties to a dispute by
means of a declaration of insolvency, as is
being attempted in the present case.
Background to the Crisis
After Mexico had gained her independence, she had
claimed that the subsoil rights which previously had be
longed to the Spanish Crown were then invested in the
new government.

But in 1884, a new mining code was

drawn up, and this code allowed the surface owners to
claim all subsoil rights.

The Mining Law of 1892 gave

additional weight to the 1884 code giving the surface
owners full rights to exploit subsoil wealth without any
need of special concessions.

2

Government of Mexico. Mexico's Oil: A Compila
tion of Official Documents in the Conflict of ^conomlc
Order in the Petroleum Industry, with an Introduction""
summarizing its Causes and Consequences (Mexico: Govern
ment of Mexico, 1940;, pp. 877-^3.
2

Ibid., pp. xxvii-xxviii.
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This situation prevailed throughout the time of
Porfirio Diaz, and reached its peak with the Petroleum
Law of 1901.

The exemptions of 1901 were factors ac

counting in large measure for the rapid development of
the oil industry.

Among them were 1) exportation, duty

free, of the natural, refined or finished products re
sulting from their exploitation; 2) importation, duty
free, of the initial lot of requisite materials and
machinery for any new well, pipeline, or refinery;
3) exemption of invested capital and capital goods of
exploitation for two years from all federal duties ex
cepting the 8tamp tax; and 4) continued enjoyment of the
provisions of Article 4 of the Mining Law relative to
free exploitation without the need of special concesslons.
Through these laws, the oil companies managed to
exploit the wealth of Mexico and remove large profits.
U.S. Ambassador Josephus Daniels even admitted that the
foreign oil companies had managed to gain control of
Mexico's most valuable riches without having to pay any
thing like the true value, while at the same time keep
ing wages and living standards of the Mexican oil workers
extremely low.

A

^Ashby, Organized Labor, p. 184.
^Daniels, Shirt-sleeve Diplomat, p. 212.
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The laws were changed with Mexico’s 1917 constitu
tion, however, when Article 27 reaffirmed the 1857 con
stitution and gave back to the nation ownership of all
e
subsoil wealth.
Although the article was very clear,
the governments in Mexico were either too weak, or un
willing, to enforce the law.

Because of the backward

ness of the country, and the lack of capital to invest
in

such large-scale endeavors, the various governments

felt the exemptions and privileges given to the oil com
panies were justified in that riches which otherwise
would have been unexploited were extracted by the for
eigners.

Diaz and others failed to have sufficient

foresight to realize that the wealth could have remain
ed in the country indefinitely until such time as Mexi
co did have the resources and technology to exploit and
receive the benefits of her own riches.

Had they not

been so anxious to receive even the small portion of
what the oil companies extracted, Mexico would have re
ceived in the long run far greater benefit with much
less friction.
Because of this lack of foresight, troubles did
start with the foreign companies which claimed that they
had exploited their holdings prior to the drafting of
the new constitution, and therefore believed they should
not be affected by it.

^Tefla Ramirez, Leyes fundamentals, p. 826.
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The complaints of the oil companies reached the
U.S. State Department, and resulted In a decision as
part of the Bucareli Conference in 1923, wherein the
oil companies were assured that Mexico would not con
sider the 1917 constitution as being retroactive, and
as long as they had performed some "positive act" in
dicating their intention to exercise their former
rights, those rights would not be abrogated.

c

Then on December 26, 1925» President Calles pro
mulgated the Regulatory Law of Article 27 of the con
stitution dealing with petroleum.

Article 14 of the Law

did recognize certain rights for the oil companies but
limited those rights to fifty years, and demanded that
the companies apply for their concessions within a period of one year.' Inherent in the law was what was to
become known as the Cdrdenas Doctrine, since the law
stipulated that all foreigners should be treated equal
ly with nationals rather than having access to their own
governments for any grievances.

Had the rules been en

forced by Calles, it might have become known as the Cal
les Doctrine, but just as his predecessors had done,

^Antonio Gdmez Robledo, The Bucareli Agreements
and International Law, trans. by br. Salomon <Sie la Selva
(Mexico: National University of Mexico, 1940), p. 8 3 .
7

Government of Mexico, The True Pacts about the
Expropriation of the Oil Companies1 Properties In Mexico
(Mexico: Government of Mexico, 1^46), p. 5$.
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Calles failed to tighten the reigns on the foreigncontrolled companies.
The companies almost immediately showed their dis
dain for Mexican authority, and the Mexican Petroleum
Company instituted amparo proceedings in the Mexican
courts to have the fifty year limitation lifted.

The

action was successful, as on November 17, 1927, the
Federal Supreme Court upheld the company's contention
that the rights could not be limited to fifty years.

8

Just a few months after this decision, the United States
State Department issued a formal statement agreeing that
any questions that should arise concerning the oil
problem would have to be settled in the Mexican courts.

q

There is no substantial proof that Cardenas later took
this as a basis for enforcing his doctrine, but he must
have been aware of this precedent.
Although the State Department agreed to abide by
the decisions of the Mexican courts, the companies still
rebelled against bettering the position of the workers.
Between 1917 and 1920 their opposition had reached a
point wherp the companies formed their own armies to
make sure of the exportation of their oil.

Then between

1931 and 1934, they took a new tact and simply tried to

8Ibid.. p. 59.
^Ibid., p. 62.
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deny to the government Its portion of the Income from
the oil exploitation.
Then on December 1, 1934, Idzaro C&rdenas became
president of Mexico, and announced a six-year plan which
Included the nationalization of Industries controlled
by foreign capital.^1

He also announced that his gov

ernment would seek stronger legislation regarding petro
leum exploitation since the Petroleum Law of 1925 had
proved to be insufficient and probably even unconstitutional.

12

Although undoubtedly the companies believed

Cdrdenas was bluffing, there was some concern among the
foreign Interests in Mexico.
Previous presidents had threatened to try to con
trol the enormous oil industry, but their words had
been empty threats.

Nevertheless, the companies im

mediately saw the possible danger and conferred with
Ambassador Daniels, claiming that the Morrow-Calles ar
rangement likely would be disregarded.

Before the years

of Cdrdenas, the Mexican Supreme Court in five different
decisions had declared that land held prior to Kay 1,
1917 also carried with it subsoil rights.

These de

cisions had been reconfirmed by the Warren-Payne talks

10E1 Nacional. editorial, March 18, 1940, p. 5.
1],The New Republic, editorial, Dec. 8, 1937, p.
114.
12E1 Universal. Sept. 2, 1935, p. 4.
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of 1923, and the United States had Insisted that Mexico
recognize this principle before official recognition was
given to the 0breg6n regimb.

The Supreme Court again

had recognized the validity in 1926, and this decision
served as the basis of the Morrow-Calles agreement of
1927.13
After conferring with representatives of the oil
companies, Daniels set the tone for the U.S. attitude
by completely accepting the cArdenas Doctrine and ad
vising the State Department that it had no more right to
interfere in Mexican court decisions than any Mexican
would have to try to interfere with U.S. Supreme Court
decisions.
The State Department made no effort on the part of
the companies, and in 1935 CArdenas made attempts at
settlement.

But in July 1936* representatives of the

18,000 members of the Union of Petroleum Workers met
in Mexico City and proposed a collective labor contract.
The companies rejected the proposal of the workers and
a strike was set for November 1936.

CArdenas succeed

ed in getting the workers to stay on the job while

■^T.R. Armstrong, on behalf of the oil companies,
to U.S. Secretary of State, September 21, 1938, Doc.
812.6363/4783, RG 59.
■^Daniels, Shirt-sleeve Diplomat, p. 221.
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further attempts were made to work out a settlement.^
When no agreement was reached with the companies,
the oil workers began demanding even more than previous
ly.

The Syndicate of Petroleum Workers sent a request

to C&rdenas asking not for higher wages and more bene
fits, but for expropriation.^^

Although this was not

the first time the word had been used in relation to the
oil companies, coming at this time it must have bother
ed the foreign owners.

They still were not afraid that

this action would be taken, but Cdrdenas had announced
his six-year plan in terms less than comforting to the
companies.
Although they might have been worried about the
future, the petroleum companies indicated they still
felt they held the upper hand as they indicated they
would refuse to abide by the decision of the Labor
Board if it accepted the terms the government experts
had indicated. 1 7

The companies had been able to get

away with this attitude in the past, and there seemed
no reason that they could not wait out the Mexican gov
ernment this time also.

When in 1933 the Supreme Court

^Townsend, L&zaro Cardenas, p. 248.
■^Syndicate of Petroleum Workers, letter, to Presi
dent Cdrdenas, August 20, 1937, Paquete 421, Exp.
527.1/8, Doc. 51332, AGN.
•^El Universal. Aug. 21, 1937, Sect. II, p. 3.
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rejected their appeal and upheld the Labor Board's de
cisions, the companies had little choice.

They either

could abide by the decision until they had shown there
had been a denial of justice, or they could refuse to
obey the court and see how the government would react.
The latter was their chosen course of action.
The companies might have felt they had some legal
foundation for their refusal to obey, since earlier even
the Mexican Bar Association objected officially to the
Law of Expropriation which had been promulgated on
November 25, 1936.

The Association objected because it

felt the act was unconstitutional, 18 but the Mexican
IQ
court on October 23, 1936 declared it was legal.
On January 1, 1938, Cdrdenas spoke to the nation
and talked about the law.

He stated that it could not

be used except for expropriations deemed indispensable
for public utility, and emphasized that the law was
not confiscatory since it provided the obligation to
pay for any expropriated property.

20

After the expro

priations actually took place, Mexico insisted that
recognition of the obligation to pay for the properties
made the act completely legal.

18E1 Nacional, Oct. 13, 1936, Sect. II, p. 1
19Ibid., Oct. 24, 1936, p. 1
20
Cdrdenas, Ideario politico, p. 42.
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While Cdrdenas was defending the Expropriation
Law, the companies were doing everything they could to
avoid having the Mexican government use that law.

As

time began running out for compliance with the arbitral
award to the workers, the oil companies sent a written
message to the Federal Board of Conciliation and Arbi
tration again stating they could not economically meet
the figure set.

The companies stated that to comply

would mean their economic ruin.

The oil workers' union,

on hearing of the refusal, petitioned the Board to condemn the companies for disobediance. 21

Still the com-

panies refused to comply, 22 and the CTM and the Syn
dicate of Petroleum Workers requested that the Board
terminate their contracts with the companies. 23'
By failing to comply with the Labor Board's de
cision, the companies left Cdrdenas little alternative.
When he announced the expropriations on March 18, Am
bassador Daniels was surprised, but admitted that Cdr
denas was acting in accordance with clearly-understood
Mexican law.2^ Although the ambassador saw the situa
tion thusly, there were many others who would express

21E1 Universal. March 16, 1938, Sect. II, p. 3.
22B1 Nacional. March 16, 1938, pp. 1, 6.
25Ibid., March 17, 1938, p. 1.
2^E1 Universal, March 17, 1938, Sect. II, p. 2.
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the feeling that not only had Mexico committed an il
legal act, but had over-reacted and now would suffer
economically and politically.
There were even some who believed that the Mexican
government had contrived the entire plan so it would ap
pear that Cdrdenas had been forced into the act.

Ac

cording to Ambassador Daniels, he was informed by an
American bank official that the reason for the timing
of the expropriations was the lack of money left in
the Bank of Mexico.

Supposedly, the bank only had five

million dollars more to support the peso, and had warn
ed Cdrdenas of this on March 14th.

Had the peso been

devalued, then the oil companies would have been able
easily to meet the financial demands made of them, and
the principal cause for expropriation would have been
postponed.

25

This argument is weak from two standpoints.

First

of all, the companies had access to the same information
as did the ambassador, and should have known that the
Bank of Mexico could not support the peso for a long
period of time.

Under these circumstances, their fi

nancial advisers would have been able to tell the com
panies that with an impending devaluation they would be

^Josephus Daniels, memorandum, to U.S. Secre
tary of State, September 20, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/4819,
RG 59.
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able to meet any demands made previously, and therefore,
it would not be worth the risk of expropriation to re
fuse to comply with the labor Board's decisions.
A second factor to consider is that the Mexican
government obviously was not surprised by the bank's
announcement that the reserve funds were low.

The gov

ernment had to have been aware for some time of the
dwindling funds.

Since it would have made more sense

to expropriate the properties when the government still
had considerable funds with which to ride out the in
evitable time of trouble which would come with the ex
propriation, the government could have taken the prop
erties sooner.

The Expropriation Law was already

recognized as constitutional, and the companies had
given Cdrdenas ample opportunity to expropriate their
properties with justification.

That Cdrdenas attempted

to work out settlements seems to indicate that the gov
ernment knew it was not ready to take over the foreignowned oil industry.
Regardless of what prompted the decision to ex
propriate the properties, one of the first issues dis
cussed was simply the matter of expropriation versus
confiscation.

Those who were anti-Mexican on this mat

ter held that even if the country had the right to ex
propriate the property, this was not what Mexico had
done.

Their main point was that Mexico was unable to
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pay, and therefore the expropriations actually were con
fiscations.
There was some cause to doubt that the government
would pay,.as Mexico had failed to satisfy U.S. claims
over previous expropriations of agrarian lands.

When

Daniels had asked that the Mexican government fix im
mediate payment for the expropriated properties, warn
ing that President Roosevelt could not otherwise def
end Mexico before the attacks of some senators, Cdr
denas answered that Mexico would pay its debts chrono
logically, and could not give preference to American
property-holders. 26
Regarding the oil expropriations, the U.S. Secre
tary of State issued a press release on March 30, 1938,
in which he gave an initial U.S. government policy
statement.

He indicated that the United Staes could

not question the right of a sovereign power such as
Mexico to expropriate property, but that it was the
U.S. position that those properties expropriated must
be paid for in an amount accurately reflecting their
true value.27
Within a few days of this press release, the oil
companies were in contact with the State Department,

Cdrdenas, Obras, Tomo I, p. 376.
27FRUS, 1938, Vol. V, p. 662.
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and In a letter to the Secretary of State, Indicated
the points of protest they felt he should present to
the Mexican government.

First, they believed that he

must clarify what he said on March 30th, pointing out
that he had not recognized that any valid expropriation
had taken place.

Secondly, the companies felt he should

insist that compensation be paid immediately and in
cash as per the agreement in the Warren-Payne negotia
tions in 1923.

Furthermore, they informed the Secre

tary that property not actually mentioned in the decree
had been taken, and that this was clearly a violation.
Finally, perhaps taking a cue from the British, the
companies felt that since, in their own minds, there
had been no valid expropriation, then the United States
would have to protest against the sale to other governpp

ments as there would be no valid title.
Perhaps this letter, to their own Secretary of
State, is indicative of the frustration often felt by
Cdrdenas.

In this case, the companies had the audacity

to try to tell the U.S. Secretary of State just how to
handle his job, even to the point of indicating that
perhaps he had not been clear in what the companies felt
he should have said in his announcement of March 30th.
pp

Oil companies, letter, to U.S. Secretary of State,
April 8, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3386, RG 59.
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Mexican officials had given assurance that the companies
would receive compensation for their properties, but it
is obvious from the letter that either they did not be
lieve Cdrdenas, or that they didn't want the State De
partment to believe him.
Mexico offered to set aside 20% of the amount re
ceived from sales abroad to pay the oil companies, but
it was pointed out that this amount would total only
about $3,680,000 a year, while interest at 4% on the
original value of the properties as set by the companies
at $200*000,000 alone would be $8,000,000 a year.^
Finally, the Secretary of the Treasury and Public Credit,
Bduardo Sudrez, the Secretary of the Rational Economy,
Efran Buenrostro, and a commission appointed by Cdrde
nas reached the conclusion that the emission of bondB
of national redemption was the best way to pay off the
national debt.

30

The matter of payment in cash apparently became
the major issue, although the question arises as to
whether the oil companies realized the validity of the
Mexican government's action, but alBO knew of its in
ability to pay cash immediately and used this excuse

^Division of the American Republics, U.S. State
Department, note, April 9, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3388,
ibid.
^°E1 Nacional. March 25, 1938, p. 1.
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rather than try to force the issue over the expropria
tion itself.

Undoubtedly, they were hoping that the

State Department would back them up in insisting on
immediate cash payment, and when Mexico could not com
ply with the demand, then the properties would have to
be returned.
For a time there were rumors that the government
would return the properties to their former owners, but
Cdrdenas insisted that such rumors were absurd since
the problem was merely one of a national character.
He insisted that a manner of payment would be worked
out as soon as the inventory of the properties was com
plete.^1
This question of how much the properties were
worth plagued attempts at settlement throughout the rest
of the Cdrdenas administration.

Two Mexican sources

placed the value on the expropriated properties im
mediately after the decree as being being between 100
million and 200 million pesos,^ while the companies
originally had expressed a figure around $200 million
dollars.

While the Mexican government was considering

^Josephus Daniels, telegram, to U.S. Secretary
of State, July 6, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/4334, RG 59.
^Division of the American Republics, U.S. State
Department, memorandum, April 6, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/.
3441, ibid.
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only the basic value of the above-surface properties,
the companies were Jbasing their evaluation on not only
their existing properties, but future profits they might
have extracted from their wells.
A short time after the expropriation, the companies
agreed with the Mexican government to participate in an
inventory of goods in order to determine some kind of
valuation.

The companies made the agreement on the con

dition that representatives of the labor syndicates not
be allowed to participate since their presence would
have created controversy.

The companies then claimed

that the Mexican government reneged on the agreement and
came up with a different plan, including the labor syn
dicate, and the conpanies refused to participate on
these terms.^

Cdrdenas instructed his Minister of

National Economy and the Minister of Finance to con
tinue with the process of evaluation without the com
panies.

The two ministers were told to proceed im

mediately, but to follow strictly the terms of the
54
Mexican Constitution and the Expropriation Law.
In light of all attempts by the companies to have

^T.R. Armstrong, letter on behalf of the oil com
panies, to R.A. Gibson, U.S. State Department, July 28,
1938, Doc. 812.6363/4595, ibid.
^Josephus Daniels, dispatch, to U.S. Department
of State, July 22, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/4459, ibid.
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the properties returned, it might be logical to assume
that they had no de.Qire to participate in an inventory.
i«

To have done so would have implied the concession on
their part of the acceptance of the act of expropriation.
Had they gone through with the inventory along with the
Mexican government, they probably would have been forced
into an early agreement.
On September 1, 1938, Cdrdenas addressed his con
gress and stated that the early oil concessions in effect
had been granted to the companies only so that they
could recover the amount of their original investments.
He claimed that the attitude of the companies had in
validated these concessions, and that the amount of
money owed by Mexico was only equal to the amount which
the companies had not yet recovered. 35 In a document
signed by Cdrdenas, the Mexican government made it
plain that it felt the concessions given to the oil com
panies only allowed for the right of extraction, but
did not confer titles of property over the wells.

This

interpretation meant that only when the oil had been ex
tracted did it become the property of those who had the
concessions.^

*^T.R. Armstrong, letter on behalf of the oil com
panies, to U.S. Secretary of State, Sept. 21, 1938, Doc.
812.6363/4783, ibid.
•'Josephus Daniels, dispatch, to U.S. Secretary
of State, Oct. 26, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/4998, ibid.

149

In effect, what the various interpretations meant
was that neither side could agree on the value of the
property, and an inventory would have been meaningless
as far as an immediate settlement was concerned.

Mexi

co obviously wanted to settle on the best terms possible
since the treasury was depleted, and the companies want
ed no settlement at all.

They wanted the return of

their properties, and nothing else.
The intransigency of the companies had been shown
as early as June 1938 when they indicated that they
would agree to only two possible alternatives:

the

return of the properties, or the immediate payment in
cash.^

Cdrdenas was not disposed to return the prop

erties, and it was obvious that the Mexican government
could not pay immediate cash, so a temporary stalemate
resulted.
In spite of an inability of both sides to come to
an agreement on the value of the property, the compan
ies continued to demand immediate compensation.

For

the most part, the U.S. government seemed ready to ac
cept the idea of expropriation, but it also demanded
immediate payment.

The Mexican government claimed that

there was no universally accepted rule which called for

37American Consulate in Monterrey, dispatch, to
U.S. Secretary of State, June 3, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/
4108, ibid.
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immediate compensation;38 Secretary Hull expressed his

opinion that no other nation in the western hemisphere
had ever advanced such a theory.

•xa

The Mexican government's contention was that it
had every intention to pay, and that this intention made
everything completely legal.

But even if Cdrdenas was

to be believed, there was some cause to have little
faith in Mexican ability to pay.

It was true that in

1935 Mexico ranked seventh in world petroleum produc
tion behind the United States, the U.S.S.R., Venezuela,
Rumania, Persia and the Dutch East Indies.^®

But what

worried many knowledgeable oil experts was that Mexico
would not be able to sustain the same levels.
Most of these fears were based on the lack of
technicians capable of taking over the big oil indus
try, and therefore it was believed that completely aside
from the matter of payment, Mexico would have difficulty
in operating the industry efficiently.

If one analyses

the problem objectively, it can be seen that even this
was the fault of the foreign oil companies since they
had failed to train Mexican technicians to do the job.
Not oniy did Mexico lack t.;e technicians to handle

58PRUS, 1938, Vol. V, p. 679.
39Ibid., p. 686.
^°E1 Nacional, Feb. 19, 1935, p. 1.
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the administration of the plants, but Mexico's economic
situation was none too stable.

Devaluation of the real

wages of the workers had started before expropriation.
In 1937 the oil companies with an eye to the future had
started withdrawing some of their funds, and from August
1937 the metallic reserves of the Bank of Mexico fell
from $194,000,000 to $110,000,000 in 1933.

Private

banks also suffered from the flight of capital.

The

Mexican peso, which had teen set since 1934 at 3.60 to
the dollar, had been devalued by the end of the year to
4.85 to the dollar.
This flight of capital in 1937 and early 1938 brings
up the question as to whether there was some kind of
conspiracy on the part of the oil companies to force the
peso downward, so that if tney were forced to pay higher
wages, those wages would be watered down to the extent
that the companies would not be paying what it appeared.
The oil companies even could have been hoping that
should Mexico decide to expropriate their holdings,
that the economic situation would deteriorate so rapid
ly that the government would be forced to return the
properties on the terms of the companies.
If the companies were hoping for an economic

^Antonio Manero, La revolucidn bancaria en
Mexico (Mexico: Talleres Graficos (3e la Nacidn, 1957),
pp. ?l9-?5?0.
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collapse, they must have thought in the first few Months
after the expropriation that this event would cone at
any time.

In Tampico, one of the centers for oil opera

tions, business, commercial and banking activities slow
ed considerably, with no loans being made by the banks.
Local stores almost immediately raised prices by as such
as

15% and

further increases were expected.

Business

and professional men seemed to think the government had
made a mistake, especially in view of the lack of local
technology.

The American Consul in Tampico felt that no

local important elements wholly supported the policy of
Cdrdenas. 42
The workers also had reason to be unhappy with the
government’s policy.

Although the regular workers had

been retained at the same wage rates as before, they were
receiving fewer social benefits and less overtime pay.
In effect, they were receiving somewhat less than before,
although up to this time it had not really affected their
standard of living.

Nevertheless, many of the workers

feared that the future would bring both payroll reduc
tions and the laying off of a number of men.

One cause

of unrest was the policy of sending men from Mexico City
42
L.S. Armstrong, memorandum from American Consul,
Tampico, to Josephus Daniels, April 4, 1938, Doc. #
812.6363/3357, KG 59.
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to fill the higher positions, rather than promoting men
from the fields to fill the positions formerly held by
41
the foreigners. J
But the men from Mexico City were not able to keep
up production, and as the peso declined and the produc
tion dropped, one question began to worry officials of
the United States and Great Britain.

Without the mar

kets in those two countries, where would Mexico sell her
oil?

It did not take much reasoning to figure out that

Japan, Italy and Germany could be possible purchasers.
Already war was becoming imminent in Europe, as Hitler
moved into Austria, and Japan was creating problems in
China.

The United States, and perhaps Great Britain to

an even larger extent, were afraid to see any oil deals
go to these countries.
But there was no doubt that Mexico would have to
come up with some plan in order to operate the industry
and to find markets.

The problems involved could be

summarised briefly as followsi

Mexico had no experience

in the petroleum businessi there were no organizations
to market oil abroadi the government could not reduce
the wages of the workers after expropriating the proper
ties because the companies had refused to pay higher
wagesi and the government could pay off the former owners.
iii

L.S. Armstrong, dispatch from American Consul in
Tampico, to U.S. Secretary of State, June 28, 1938, Doc.
812.6363/4314, ibid.

15^
Ambassador Daniels indicated that Sub-secretary of
Foreign Relations, Ramdn Beteta, informed him of a num
ber of refusals by American companies outside the oil
industry to deal with Mexico.

The ambassador recognis

ed the validity of the claim that if U.S. companies re
fused to deal with Mexico, then no one could be able to
say anything when Mexico turned toward Europe and the
jut

Far East to supply such materials.

U.S. firms did

change their attitude later, and Jesds Silva Herzog,
the director in charge of finding foreign purchasers,
did find some U.S. markets.**-*
Mexican government sources had almost immediately
indicated there would be no difficulty in selling oil
from the expropriated properties since the Mexican gov
ernment already had as many as fifty orders, including
46
some from British and Japanese sources.
These govern
ment press reports to the contrary, no real sales to
foreign markets had been concluded several weeks after
the expropriations, with the only movements out of Tampico
44
Josephus Daniels, dispatch, to U.S. Secretary of
State, November 2, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/5070 DG, ibid.
^Personal interview. Author with Jesus Silva
Herzog, L.S.U. Archives.
46
Division of the American Republics, U.S. State
Department, memorandum, April 6 , 1938, Doc. 812.6363/
3441 I/JPS. RG 59.
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being for local consumption.**^
«

Several months later, however, the Mexican govern
ment did sign a contract with W.R. Davis for $10,000,000.
The contract was for six months and Davis was to pay

kOJt

in cash and the remainder in merchandise, mostly of Gerkft
man manufacture.
Four months later, Silva Herzog had
to announce that the deals contracted through Davis had
been cancelled.

Nevertheless, Italy decided to buy 7%

of the Mexican production in exchange for tankers and
rayon. 49
7
In spite of these few contracts, Mexico was having
a difficult time selling her oil.

The government began

to urge independent operators whose properties had not
been expropriated to ship oil they held in storage.

In

that way, with the few contracts Mexico did have, the
government not only would be able to receive revenues
from the sale of oil, but could point to these companies
as having no problems in operating,

Kxcept for one

operator in the early months, the others refused the of
fer,, and made no moves to relieve the financial pressure.
47
'L.S. Armstrong, American Consul in Tampico, memo,
to Josephus Daniels, April 4, 1938, Doc. 812 .6363/3357 ,
****B1 Universal. July 7» 1938* Sect. II, p. 2.
**^lbid.. November 8 , 1939, p. 1.
^°William P. Blocker, American consul in Monterrey,
dispatch, to U.S. Secretary of State, June 3 , 1938, Doc.
812 .6363/4108 , RG 59.
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Obviously these small operators, who had been dependent
on the larger companies for much of their business(
were counting on a return of the properties to the for
mer owners, and they did not want to jeopardize any
future business they might have.

In this case, they had

more confidence in the foreign oil companies than in
the Mexican government.
The United States saw the possibility of Mexico's
selling to such countries as Germany, but recognized the
complete right of Mexico to dispose of her oil as she
saw fit.

At the same time, it was admitted that the sale

of oil to Germany would be the cause of some concern
among the soon-to-be-allied nations.^1 The Standard
Oil Company was not so anxious to grant Mexico the right
to sell her oil, and the company representative in Wash
ington wanted the State Department to instruct its mis
sions abroad to emphasize to governments considering the
purchase of Mexican oil that there would be a legal
question over the ownership of any oil they purchased.
He was informed that the missions had been instructed to
express no opinion on the subject.^2

^*E1 Nacional. January 13, 1939* p. 2.
-*2Mr. Bohannon of the Standard Oil Company and Mr.
Bursley of the Division of the American Republics, U.S.
State Department, memorandum of conversation, Oct. 12,
1938, Doc. 812.6363A935 1AM, RG 59.
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This reply was extremely significant, and had the
Mexican government known about it, Ctfrdenas probably
would have felt more sure of himself.

It indicated that

the State Department had decided that the matter really
was a national, one for Mexico, and although the United
States would still insist on fair payment for the oil
properties, the Department was not going to take the
part of the oil companies in obstructing the foreign
sales of Mexican petroleum.
In addition to this rebuff to the oil companies,
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles indicated to the
Secretary of State that he saw no reason for giving out
information to the companies on the Department's specific
policy on Mexican exports.”^

This attitude was a far cry

from the days of U.S. "Dollar Diplomacy" and indicated
that the State Department was not going to pull the oil
companies' chestnuts out of the fire.

The companies had

expected that their government would back up their de
mands for the return of their property, and when it did
not, their position was much less tenable.
Connected as closely as Mexico was with the United
States and the rest of Latin America, it would have been
in her own best interests not to sell oil to the fascist

53U.S. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles,
memorandum, to U.S. Secretary of State, October 13,
1938. Doc. 812.6363A935 LAM, ibid.
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countries.

But CArdenas recognised what it seems the

United States only recently has come to accepts

that to

deal commercially with countries of varying ideologies
does not imply a sympathy with those ideologies.

Just

because Mexico was forced to deal with the fascist-nasi
countries did not mean acceptance of their political
ideals.
Mexico had to sell her oil to someone, or else face
an economic collapse.

The country was learning how

dangerous it was to be dependent on one product, es
pecially when that product had been controlled by for
eigners.

Had the United States taken all of Mexico's

oil, there would have been few problems, but when CArdenas had to begin searching elsewhere, he ran up against
not only the wrath of the United States and Great Brit
ain, but other economic problems.
Although with some difficulty, Mexico was able to
find other markets for her oil.

The representative of

Standard Oil went to the State Department and complain
ed about foreign sales of the Mexican product.

He was

especially concerned about the Eastern States Petroleum
Company of the United States, which had made an agree
ment with Mexico to receive oil at the rate of 10,000
barrels a day, although supposedly all the oil was to
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co»e from the former British properties.
The companies did not limit themselves to protests
against the sale of Mexican oil.

They also protested

against the U.S. State Department for the manner in which
that agency was handling the problem.

For one thing,

they believed that notes of protest sent to Mexico and
alluded to in other notes from the State Department
should be made public as quickly as possible, since C&rdenas was able to use the apparent silence of the U.S.
government to convince the Mexican public that the United
States was behind his actions.

The argument was used

that the longer the State Department delayed in the pub
lication of the notes, the more embarrassing and dif
ficult it would be for the Mexican government to return
the properties.

The companies hoped that the publica

tion of the notes would influence the Mexican Supreme
Court in deciding that the expropriations could not be
sustained under Mexican law.^

The companies also point

ed out that Cardenas was under the influence of radical
elements and that the State Department must handle the
matter so that it became feasible for Cardenas to return

-^T.R. Armstrong, letter on behalf of the oil comp
anies, to U.S. Secretary of State, July 25, 1938. Doc.
812.6363A488 L/JPS, ibid.
55Ibid.

the properties.^
From the vast amount of material available ex
pressing public opinion over the controversy* it seems
obvious that the oil companies tried to play up to the
fullest the idea of radicalism in Mexico.

The comp

anies warned the State Department that the Mexican
people deserved to know the United States did not ap
prove of the Mexican government's actions.

They empha

sised that under the present scheme of "confiscation"
Mexico was heading toward catastrophe in the form of dis
order and revolution.

Extreme elements were seen as us

ing the situation to sweep Mexico into the "revolutionary
vortex" in which some European countries* especially
those such as the Soviet Union* had already become embroilled.57
In addition to exploiting the theme of radicalism*
the companies also warned the State Department of pos
sible ramifications throughout the rest of Latin Ameri
ca.

They accused CCrdenas of taking advantage of the

lack of printed protest on the part of the United States
over the expropriations.

This lack of apparent protest

allowed Latin Americans to believe that the policies of

^T.R. Armstrong, letter on behalf of the oil comp
anies* to Under Secretary of State Welles, May 9, 1938*
Doc. 812.6363A003 L/JPS, ibid.
57Ibld.
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the United States and Great Britain were different* aa
Cardenas constantly referred to British protests while
not mentioning any on the part of the United States.
According to the companies* this strategy had allowed
people of Latin America to believe that the United States
was not interested in the fate of the companies,-*® thus
implying that if the State Department did not make public
its protests that there would be wholesale expropriations
throughout Latin America.
Naturally, what the companies were after was to
create such a fear that the State Department would be
compelled to help them recover their properties.

They

prepared briefs for the State Department and wrote
articles concerning the situation.

Occasionally they

would come up with what they termed a compromise pro
posal* but the aim always was to gain control again.

The

companies once sent a proposal to the State Department
in which they suggested a long-term contract calling for
a fixed schedule of taxes and reasonable wages to the
laborers.

They also insisted that the Mexican government

pay them for the losses the companies had sustained since
the seizure of the properties*

If the government would

agree to these terms* then at the end of the contract*

-*®T.R. Armstrong* letter on behalf of the oil comp
anies* to U.S. Secretary of State* September 21* 1938*
Doc. 812.6363A?83 LAM, ibid.
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the companies would turn over the properties without ex
pecting any further remuneration.^
In September 1936 the oil companies submitted a
five-point protest which they wanted the State Depart
ment to present to Mexico.

The first point was the same

as they had been making from the beginning.

They wanted

to emphasize that Mexico could not pay the debts • and
therefore the "confiscations" were a violation of in
ternational law.

Secondly, the expropriations were

directed solely against foreign-owned properties and on
that basis also were a violation of international law.
The third point was that the expropriations were a direct
repudiation of the former Mexican Supreme Court deci
sions and of agreements between Mexico and the United
States.

Again insisting that their properties be re

turned, the companies demanded that all further sales
from the confiscated properties cease and that the prop
erties be returned until the matter was settled.

Fin

ally, the companies suggested that the United States agree
to participate in a series of conferences designed to
protect the rights of Mexican labor.

^Standard Oil Company, Present Status of the Mexi
can Oil "Expropriations" (NYi Standard Oil, 19^0), p. 67.
^°T.R. Armstrong, letter on behalf of the oil comp
anies. to U.S. Secretary of State, September 21, 1938,

Doc. 812.6363/4783 LAM, RG 59.
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In analysing thess points, only the first one might
have been considered partially valid by the Mexican gov
ernment.

Although Mexico continued to claim that there

mas no international law calling for immediate payment,
responsible officials no doubt were worried as to how
Mexico would pay for the properties even after a suit
able inventory was compiled.

The oil companies no

doubt felt they had a valid point when they claimed that
only foreign-owned properties were involved, but Carde
nas could say that the reason for the Expropriation Law
was mainly to protect the rights of the Mexican Nation
and that it was only the foreign companies that were
infringing on those rights.
Technically speaking, the expropriations did neg
ate the earlier court decisions and certain agreements
between the two countries. But the companies could not
deny that even the United States Supreme Court, in
keeping with' the changing times, had negated former de
cisions.

In addition, those earlier decisions had been

made under Mexican officials who could not always have
been said to have the best interests of their country at
heart.

Decisions had been handed down in the same man

ner that the oil companies now were accusing the present
court— for political, rather than legal, reasons.
As for ceasing the sale of oil and returning the
properties until the matter was settled, Mexico felt that

I6*f
the natter already was settled* and that oil must be sold
in order to pay the debt which was recognised by the gov
ernment.

If the government did not sell the oil* then

there would be no way to pay the companies* and then
Mexico really could be accused of confiscating rather
than expropriating.
Company officials had a further setback when a
Mexican district court denied the injunction requested by
the companies to keep the government from operating the
properties.

Mexican officials felt that this decree was

the most important legal announcement since the expro
priation decree itself, since it seemed to put an end to
the controversy.

In effect, the decision found the ex

propriation decree constitutional and ordered the comp
anies to obey all the terms.^

The following year the

Supreme Court found the Expropriation Law valid and
fixed the time for paying for these and future expro
priated properties at ten years* based on a percentage
62
of production to be fixed at a later date.

Finally, on December 1* 1939* the Supreme Court
once again ruled against the oil companies* thus ex
hausting the legal recourses available to the companies.
This action precipitated a meeting with the U.S. State

^ Bl Nacional. June 8, 1938* Sect. II, p. 7
^2Ibid.. November 16, 1939t p. !•
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State Department by the oil companies, but that agenoy
declined to act hastily in the situationAlthough
the State Department did not give up its efforts to
reach a settlement, by this time it seemed to have ac
cepted completely the tenets of the CArdenas Doctrine
in letting the Mexican courts decide the issue.
In considering the possibility of some kind of U.S.
intervention in the matter, CArdenas had further expound
ed on his doctrine and indicated that Mexico could ac
cept no formal intervention on the part of the United
States. He warned that if the government allowed some
kind of intervention by foreign powers in such matters
that it would set a precedent which would endanger the
very sovereignty of the country.

He emphasised that only

through the Law of Expropriation could his government
fulfill the tenets of the Mexican Revolution, and that
to allow foreign governments to intervene on behalf of
their citizens would annul that instrument.

6k

Therefore, although Mexico did not object to U.S.
participation to the extent of helping the companies
reach an agreement, it would have been a rejection of
CArdenas* policy to allow the United States to intervene
actively in what the Mexicans felt was strictly an internal

^B1 Universal. December 5, 1939, p# 1.
6k

CArdenas, Obras. Tomo I, p.

k07.
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problem.

For the United States to have taken part in

agreements for the protection of Mexican labor in Mexi
co would have been an attack on Mexican sovereignty.
Anti-Mexican Propaganda
Official United States intervention into the mat
ter did not seem to be as dangerous at tiroes as did non
official intervention.

This "non-official" intervention

took the form of a gigantic press campaign in the United
States against Mexico.

This campaign became so slan

derous that even Ambassador Daniels denounced it.

He

mentions both The Lamp, a publication of the Standard
Oil Company* and the Atlantic Monthly as being particu
larly guilty of misrepresentation and slander.6-* In
July 1938* the Atlantic printed a 64-page issue under
the title "The Atlantic Presents Trouble Below the Bor
der."

Daniels described it by saying that "every page

smelled of oil."66
In referring to the press campaign* a Mexican news
paper recognized that the large oil companies had been
responsible for much of the anti-Mexican propaganda.
The paper also noted that the campaign in reality was a
failure because there were also journalists in the United

6^Daniels* Shirt-sleeve Diplomat, p. 257.
66Ibid.. p. 258 .
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States who backed Mexico's rights.

This backing was

looked on as a moral victory for Mexico.^
Although Mexico might have claimed that the propa
ganda campaign had been a failure, nevertheless there
were signs of coneern.

The Mexican government even filed

a formal protest with the United States State Department
over an apparent campaign to discourage tourists from
Texas from entering Mexico.

Daniels was instructed to

inform the Mexican Foreign Ministry of the State Depart
ment's attitude toward the Mexican complaints.

The De

partment emphasised the right of free speech in the
United States and indicated that the high degree of pub
lic opinion running against Mexico at that time because
of the expropriation without compensation might further
be aggravated should any action be taken against propaganda activities.
Normally this rather evasive answer might have been
taken as evidence that the State Department was taking
sides with the oil companies against Mexico.

But in

light of the Roosevelt administration's efforts at mak
ing the Good Neighbor policy work, and the lack of in
sistent efforts by the State Department to have the

^Tb.1 Nacional. editorial, December 15, 1938, p. 3.
68

Sumner Welles, dispatch, to Josephus Daniels,
September 30, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/4701, RG 59.

168

properties returned, it seems that the United States was
merely sidestepping what could have been a very sticky
issue.
At times, the biggest problem for Mexico in this
field waB not propaganda within the United States, but
from journalists stationed inside Mexico.

One such

journalist was Prank Kluckhohn of the New York Times.

A

copy of a draft of his book, The Mexican Challenge, can
still be found in the Mexican National Archives along
with the Cardenas papers.

In this work Kluckhohn des

cribes Mexico as being praised by Hitlerites, Trotskyites and Stalinists, as well as by a few liberal North
Americans.^
Kluckhohn's articles so incensed the Mexican govern
ment that in mid-January 1939 he was detained by agents
of the Ministry of Interior and told that he must leave
Mexico.

In explaining the reasons for his expulsion,

the Department of Publicity and Propaganda accused him
of inaccuracies in his reports and of attempting to
alarm the population against the administration's poli70
cies.
On January 18, the Mexican Embassy in the U.S.

^Frank Kluckhohn, Paquete 14-1, Exp. 111/1721,
unnumbered document ("El reto mexicano"), AGN.
7°D.A.P.P. Bulletin, ibid.
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sent a letter to the Mexican president, stating that
Kluckhohn was publishing his side of the story in the
New York Times. The letter claimed that he was using
the stories to impress the American public, talking
about the lack of freedom of the press in Mexico, close
relations with Germany and other fascist countries of
Europe, and of a supposedly anti-Jewish campaign in
Mexico.71
Mexico could complain of such journalists as
Kluckhohn who took an anti-Mexican attitude, but there
were other American publications which took the side of
Mexico.

Generally, those who did so seemed to favor

Mexican action for three major reasons.

One was the

simple fact that they believed Mexico had a right to
take the action it did, and that the United States would
have to accept that action.

A second reason was one

brought about by an anti-big business attitude of those
who believed that big business in Mexico or anywhere else
took advantage of the people and earned enormous profits
at the expense of the host government when foreign in
vestment was involved.

The third reason was an effort

to protect the Good Neighbor policy, which many officials
felt had paid dividends.

The contention here was that

71
' Mexican Embassy, Washington, to the office of the
Mexican presidency, January 18, 1939, Paquete 14-1,
Exp. 111/1721, Doc. 224, ibid.
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the expropriation of private property was not a matter
which the United States should allow to affect that
policy.
Official United States Reaction
While Mexico might complain of the propaganda in
the United States, there was no denial that the official
U.S. position did not reflect a similar attitude.

Mexi

can ambassador to the United States. Francisco Castillo
Najera, personally expressed President C&rdenas' ap
preciation of the manner in which President Roosevelt
was handling the oil expropriation matter.72
The United States did not exhibit the same degree
of official condemnation of Mexico as did Great Britain,
but nevertheless, Washington wanted to resolve the prob
lem and took an active interest in the matter.

The

State Department favored a settlement by arbitration, a
proposal the Mexican government continually rejected.

In

August 1938 the Mexican Foreign Minister said that arbi
tration should be reserved for diplomatic matters that
could not otherwise be resolved, and that the present
case did not fall into that category.7-^ For Mexico,

72Division of the American Republics, U.S. State
Department, memorandum, April 6 , 1938, Doc, 812,6363/
3* m L/JPS, RG 59.
73FRUS. 1938, Vol. /, p. 683.
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the natter was strictly a domestic one and was covered
adequately by Mexican law.

To the Mexican government,

any effort at arbitration would have meant submitting
basic Mexican law to international intervention,^ and
this act clearly would have been in conflict with the
Cardenas Doctrine.
When the United States suggested arbitration, the
government party stated that the mere suggestion was
contrary to the sovereign power of Mexico and represent
ed a danger for all Latin America.

If the United States

tried to interfere into the internal affairs of other
nations in such a manner, then all nations would fear that
the United. States would try tonullify their internal
75
laws as regards to foreign capital.-'

There was another possible reason the Mexican gov
ernment might have backed off from arbitration with the
United States.

Earlier in the century the United States

had proposed arbitration of the Chamizal dispute and
Mexico had accepted.

But when the decision was reached,

the United States refused to abide by the majority vote,^
n it

Oscar Rabasa, "La cuestitfn internacional mexicanoamericana," Paquete 682, Lxp. 571.3/1, AGN.
^^Excelsior. April 9, 19^0, pp. 1,

k.

^^For a complete discussion of this dispute, see
Sheldon B. jjiss, A Century of Disagreement» The Cha»tzal
Conflict (Washington, D.C.» University Press of Washing
ton, 1965).
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Since Mexico refused to submit the matter to arbi
tration as it considered the question to be a national
one only* various other attempts were made at settlement.
In March 1939» Donald Richberg, as a representative of
the American oil companies, arrived in Mexico with the
intention of carrying on talks with President Cardenas.
Richberg believed that Mexico and the companies should
agree to a long-term contract which would allow both
parties to receive profits from production.77

The ques

tion of management came up during the talks, and in a
note to the Mexican ambassador in the United States,
Richberg stated that any idea of a board of directors
with a majority of Mexicans and a Mexican president was
out of the question and was not what the companies had in
mind. 78

Obviously what the companies, still had in mind

was a return to the status

q u o

ante, where the foreign

ers controlled all phases of the operation.
There were a series of eight conferences between
Richberg and Cardenas, but no conclusion reached.

When

Richberg returned to the United States, he announced that
Cardenas had accepted in principle the idea of collabora
tion between his government and the companies.7^ When

77B1 Universal. April 15. 1939* Sect. II, p. 3.
78FRUS. 1939. Vol. V, p. 694.

7^Donald R. Richberg, The Mexican Oil Seizure
(n.p., n.d.), p. 37.
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this proved not to be the case, Richberg concluded that
either Cardenas was not negotiating in good faith, was
unsure of the details of the negotiations as they un
folded (and when given explanations by his advisers had
changed his mind), or that his efforts were hindered by
the opposition of the strong labor groups which were
on

backing his administration.

This latter argument had

some foundation, as even one of the Mexican papers be
lieved that Cardenas and Richberg had agreed in general
terms on a settlement, but that possibly some Mexican
groups brought pressure to bear on Cardenas not to agree
Q«
to a settlement.
With the apparent failure of the Richberg talks,
the United States made a proposal in late summer 1939.
Since the chief obstacle seemed to be the question of
management, the U.S. proposal dealt primarily with this
point.

According to a memorandum of conversation by

Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, the problem
would be resolved by appointing four different boards of
directors with nine directors on each board.

In each

case the Mexican government would appoint three direct
ors and the companies three.

The remaining three would

be selected from a list compiled by both Mexico and the

80I£i£*» pp. 50-51.
***£1 Universal. June 10, 1939, Sect. II, p.

3.
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United States and would consist of nationals of other
countries.

82

The Mexican argument against this proposal, as
revealed in a memorandum of conversation between Welles
and the Mexican ambassador, was basically that Mexico
still would have the disadvantage since the persons ap
pointed would all be experts in the oil industry and
would be likely to sympathize with the three directors
appointed by the companies.83
As a counter-proposal, the Mexican government offer
ed the companies a minority representation in a new comp
any which would direct the operations while the Mexican
government controlled the distribution end. The comp
anies rejected this offer, saying that while the Mexi
can government would benefit from such an arrangement,
there were few advantages for the companies. 84

This con

clusion was not difficult to reach, yet the companies
seemed to fail to see what must have been obvious to the
Mexican government by this time. Although there were
still a number of difficulties, nevertheless Mexico had
ridden out the worst part of the storm.
The attempt at a boycott had failed and Mexico had

82FRUS.

1939. Vol. V, pp. 688-89.

83Ibid.. p. 696.
8A

£1 Universal. August 4, 1939. p. 1.
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been able to find some markets for her oil.

Although the

production was not going as smoothly as under the former
owners* nevertheless the Mexicans were learning how to
run the oil industry.

With the advent of war in Europe*

Mexico recognized that sooner or later Great Britain
would have to turn to Mexican markets for oil.

Finally*

by now Mexico knew that the United States State Depart
ment was not going to take an active role on behalf of
the companies in forcing a return of the properties.
Two years after the expropriations* the oil comp
anies* particularly Standard Oil* were blaming the State
Department for the failure to reach a settlement.

The

company accused the State Department of being too nice
and extending too much courtesy to Mexico* and said that
this attitude had played right into Mexico's hands.
Not all the companies shared this attitude of
Standard Oil, as one of them took the initiative in try
ing for an accord.

Patrick Hurley and the Sinclair in

terests separated themselves from the other oil companies
and continued working toward agreement.

In talking with

Under Secretary of State Welles in early April 1940* the
Mexican ambassador said that an agreement with Sinclair
was very near whereby Mexico would pay most of the debt

*^Ibid.. January 27, 1940* Sect. II, p. ?•
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in oil over a period of years.

86

Once this step had been taken by Sinclair and Mexi
co , the United States State Department allegedly let the
other companies know that if they did not come to some
kind of agreement of their own accord, then the State
Department would have to step in and make the deals for
them.8^ This report later was denied by the State De
partment, yet the companies might well have expected
that the United States government might take this at
titude once the first step had been made.
On November 19» 19*H# the two governments finally
concluded an agreement which ultimately led to the final
settlement of the controversy.

Ambassador Daniels calls

this date the Day of Deliverance, and recalls that he
felt it had resulted in a fair settlement of the oil
controversy.

88

The Washington agreements actually did

not mean there was full agreement on both sides, and the
matter dragged on through most of the next administration.
But even by the time Cardenas left office he knew he had
won.

He had put forth the traditionally Mexican idea

that foreigners could not appeal to their own govern
ments for financial redress, and he had made it stand up
to two fcf the most powerful governments in the world.

86PRUS, 19^0, Vol. V, pp. 1007-08.
8^Novedades. February 3, 19^1,„P* 1.
88Daniels, Shirt-sleeve Diplomat, p. 266,
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United States public opinion had treated Cardenas
kindly and had crucified himi called him a traitor, a
communist, a fascist, a nationalist and a great super
patrioti berated him and sympathized with himi treated
him with admiration and contempti called him an honest
man and a thief.

But whatever was said, nothing deterred

him once the act had been proclaimed.
Ctfrdenas* act in expropriating almost certainly
hastened the economic independence of Mexico.
is surei

One thing

Cardenas will always be remembered in Mexico

for that act.

On his death in October 1970, one of the

major Mexican newspapers saidi
L£zaro Cdrdenas is one of the builders of
modem Mexico. The one episode of the re
possession of our oil would suffice to put
him in that category.“9

^%ovedades. October 20, 1970, p.

CHAPTER VI

MEXICAN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES» PART TWO
THE QUESTIONS OP SILVER AND
TERRITORIAL RIGHTS
There can be no denial that the major application
of the CArdenas Doctrine was against the oil companies
in March 1938*

But the doctrine was more than just a

tool to force foreigners within the country to comply
with Mexican law rather than calling for help to their
own countries*

The very heart of CArdenas' policy was

"Mexico for Mexicans," and it was toward this goal that
his regime was directed. The oil issue has often over
shadowed other aspects ofboth internal and external
policy of the CArdenas administration.

But to set mat

ters straight, there weve a number of other issues be
tween the United States and Mexico which colored the years
from 1935 through 1940.
CArdenas immediately started his regime off on the
wrong foot with the United States by expropriating agrar
ian lands for his agrarian reform program.

In 1924 the

United States government had accepted a proposal by Mexi
co to issue bonds to American citizens then having claims
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due to expropriated lands in Mexico.

The Mexican govern

ment had failed in this case to uphold its end of the
agreement and had paid no interest on the few bonds
given.

The State Department felt released, therefore,

from all promises given as to the acceptance of bonds
in lieu of actual payment.*

When the Cardenas adminis

tration began expropriating additional land, the United
States was understandably concerned about the rights of
its citizens.
But Cdrdenas immediately began setting forth his
principle that foreign governments could not interfere in
Mexican internal affairs under the guise of protecting
the interests of foreigners residing in Mexico.

In the

case of the agrarian expropriations, however, there was
even less cause for complaint on the part of foreign gov
ernments, since the agrarian xeforra attacked large land
holders of all nationalities, including Mexican.

In ad

dition, the total value of all the lands was minuscule
in comparison with what the oil companies later would
claim as the amount of indemnification owed them by the

1935. Vol. IV, p. 754.
2See ibid.. 1935. Vol IV* 1936 and 1937. volumes V,
Mexico and the United States. The amount of material cov
ered in these volumes prohibits a detailed discussion
here, but can give the reader an early insight into the
Cirdenas Doctrine prior to its application to the oil
companies.
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Mexican government.
The Question of Territorial Waters
As if the question over agrarian claims wase not
enough to occupy the attention of the two governments,
Cfirdenas dared to incur more of the wrath of the United
States when he signed a decree in 1935 which committed
Mexico to the protection of her territorial water rights
out to nine nautical miles into the sea.
As had been the case with El Chamizal (the tract
of land near El Paso, Texas, which both countries for
years claimed as their own), the question of territorial
waters had its beginning in the very early years of the
20th century.
In August 1906, the United States State Department
received a telegram from the Sulf Fisheries Company
stating that one of its boats had been stopped by a
Mexican gunboat on the high seas.

The Mexican patrol

had demanded to see the Mexican fishing license, and want
ed to see the ship's cargo.

The U.S. ambassador in

Mexico, D.E. Thompson, informed the State Department that
a Mexican law of December 1902 had established a ter
ritorial limit of twenty Kilometers, and that the Mexican
government felt it could stop and inspect vessels of any
nation within that area.-^

3Ibid.. 1906, pp. 109^-95.
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Soon the company was complaining again, this time
charging that the Mexican government had given its gun
boats authority to stop all American fishing vessels
within the three-mile limit, regardless of weather con
ditions.

The complaint was in this case that Mexico was

the only country which refused to grant ships the right
to go to any available port during bad weather.

h,

The Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations denied
that any such order had been given to the gunboats.

He

said that an order had given the gunboats authority to
stop any vessels, national or foreign, which were in
Mexican territorial waters and which might have failed
to obtain the proper Mexican papers.-*
Within the next few years the Mexican government
probably would have liked to make additional attempts to
detain U.S. vessels and to establish control over what
it felt to be the territorial limits, but President Porfirio Dfaz, still in power in Mexico, was concerned with
keeping the favor of the United States.

When he was forc

ed to resign, the beginnings of the Mexican Revolution
occupied the attention of those in quest of power.

With

the United States Navy at Veracruz during parts of the
following years, the issue was pushed into the background.

^Ibid.
**Ibid.. pp. 1096-97.
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In the late 1920*s under President Obregdn, Mexico
again insisted that United States fishing vessels needed
Mexican licenses to operate along the coast.

In the next

few years there were additional incidents, mostly along
the coast of Lower California.

In 192?, several boats

out of San Diego were accused by the Mexican government
of actually catching fish in Mexican territorial waters.
The boat owners said that the fish had been caught in
United States territorial waters and refused to pay the
fines.

In August, three other boats, also out of San

Diego, were accused of fishing in Mexican waters and were
stopped by Mexican gunboats.

Two of the ships were tak

en to Snsenada, while a third made it back to San Diego
after supposedly having been rammed by the Mexican gun
boats.

According to the captain of the ship, he had ob

tained from Mexico anchorage and bait permission, and
since he had no fish on board, he believed that the ac
tion might have been in retaliation for the refusal of
the earlier boats to pay the fines.^
The main argument up to this time was whether the
U.S. vessels had the proper credentials or not and lit
tle official action had been taken.

Because of the dif

ferences between the two countries in the 1920 's and
1930's, the United States Senate ratified a treaty in

^New fork Times. August 2*1, 1927, p. 48.

183
1935 in which both countries agreed to permit vessels of

the other country to enter national territorial waters
for either rescue or salvage operations.'7
This was really just the beginning of problems in
volving territorial waters, however, since the new presi
dent of Mexico, Cirdenas, followed up this treaty by
promulgating a decree in 1935 firmly establishing the
limit of territorial waters at approximately nine nautical
miles.

Shortly after this decree was made known, the

Secretary of State in Washington instructed the American
charg£ in Mexico to tell the Mexican Foreign Office that
the United States would accept no enforcement of the lego
islation which would endanger U.S. commercial interests.
In May 1936, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Rela
tions, £duardo Kay, wrote to Ambassador Josephus Daniels
explaining that Mexico had taken into consideration in
ternational law before passing the decree.

He noted in

addition that the decree was in accord with Article V of
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which had said in part
that "the dividing line between the two Republics shall
begin in the Gulf of Mexico, three leagues from land at
the mouth of the Rio Grande."

According to Mexico, three

nautical leagues at the time of the treaty (1848) equaled

?Ibid.. August 25, 1935» Sect. II, p. 3.
8FgU£, 1936, Vol. V, pp. 758-59.
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nine nautical miles* or 16.668 kilometers* the figure
mentioned in the decree.9
The United States claimed that the article in ques
tion referred only to a boundary at a given point and
that it could not be used to establish a territorial
limit.

In addition* the United States contended that all

the territorial waters bordering Mexico was a question
totally separate from that of an international boundary.10
The position was being maintained by the United
States that there was at least an unwritten international
law that the limit of territorial waters should be three
miles.

Mexico continued to argue that there was no in

ternational law determining the exact extent of territor
ial waters* and that Mexico was justified in her claim to
the nine mile limit.
To aid in establishing this point of the non
existence of any international law limiting territorial
waters to three miles* Mexico pointed out to the State
Department a number of treaties Mexico had signed into
effect in the 19th century establishing territorial lim
its with other oountries.

In 1882* Mexico and Guatemala

had signed the Treaty on Limits* which set the jurisdic
tion of each country at exactly the same distance as

9Ibid.. p. ?60.
10Ifcid.* p. 763.
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Mexico now was claiming with the United States.

In

1888* Mexico and Ecuador had agreed on territorial lim
its exceeding this distance when they signed the Treaty
of Friendship* Commerce and Navigation and established a
twenty kilometer limit.

The same figure was mentioned

in a treaty with the Dominican Kepublic in 1890.11 Arm
ed with these treaties* the Cfirdenas government could
feel sure that the U.S. contention of an international
law providing for a three mile limit had little basis
in the relationship between the two countries.
While the United States and Mexico were discussing
the presidential decree and former treaty provisions*
the Japanese began exploring in earnest the area west
and northwest of the Yucat&i Peninsula in the area of
Campeche Bay.

This exploration made U.S. fishermen aware

of the potential wealth in the area* and the next decade
saw a tremendous increase in the number of U.S. fishing
vessels in the Bay.

No firm resolutions were made by

Mexico other than promulgating the 1935 decree* however.
Nevertheless* friction did increase as the numbers
grew* and once the issue of the oil expropriations was
out of the way* subsequent Mexican governments attempted
to resolve the problem.

But it had been the CArdenas

administration which put some teeth into the Mexican

P« 766.

186

claim of territorial rights, and although Cardenas was
too busy with other matters to give this question much
attention, it provided the Mexican government with a
basis to end the issue on terms advantageous to Mexico.

12

The Question of Silver
Naturally, the main issue that occupied C&rdenas'
time was that of the petroleum question.

But very close

ly related to that problem was another issue that caused
some friction between the United States and Mexico dur
ing his administration.

This friction was caused by

changes by the United States in its silver-buying poli
cy, a policy which directly affected Mexico's economy.

From 1521 to the end of 1935# an estimated

6,388

million fine ounces of silver with a value of 15#000
million pesos had been extracted from Mexican mines.
Out of the 328 producing mines in Mexico in 193^# fiftynine were concerned mainly with silver.

Of those fifty-

nine, twenty-four were owned by Mexicans, seven by for
eigners, and twenty-eight were jointly owned.

These

figures did not represent the ownership accurately, how
ever, as of the 210 million pesos invested in the silver
12

See New York Times. February 16, 1968, p. 9 and
U.S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy1 Cur
rent Documents. Doc. VIII-17 (1967 ), p. 657 for details
of the agreement.
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industry in 193^* 167.7 million were American, 5*6
French, only 3.5 million Mexican, with the rest dis
tributed among the Italian, Spanish and German inter
ests.1-^
As can be seen, the U.S. companies had an extreme
ly large interest in the mining industry of Mexico, and
when the oil companies started having trouble with labor
under the Cardenas government, the miners must have be
gun to worry about what would happen to their invest
ments.

They were in a somewhat different situation, how

ever, as the only real market for their product had been
the United States government.
Since 1933* the United States Treasury Department's
purchases of Mexican silver had exceeded 55,000,000 ounces
annually.

In addition to the normal amount, the Trea

sury had agreed to buy 35,000,000 ounces Mexico wanted
to sell in December 1937
An agreement had been made on January 8, 1937 for
the United States to buy 5*000,000 ounces a month (against
a total output of 7,000,000) at a price to be fixed day
by day.

In addition, the United States had agreed to

^Robert G. McGregor, Jr., "Analysis of the Mexican
Silver Industry," January 30 , 1939, Doc. 812.63^2/36
1M, RG 59.
ik
Division of the American Republics, U.S. State
Department, memorandum. May 26, 1939, Doc. 812.63^2/37
LAM, ibid.
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attempt to stabilise the Mexican peso at the rate of 3,60
the the dollar.1*’ Naturally the agreement was a dis
tinct benefit for Mexicof since it meant that almost
all the production would be bought by one purchaser.

Dur

ing 1937» when the oil companies began fighting Mexican
labor in an attempt to hold down wage increases* the
mine owners might have been worried* but there was no
sign of any real trouble.
With the agreement due to terminate at the end of
1937 * the two countries came to another agreement where

by the United States agreed to make its purchases on a
month-to-month basis.

There still was no sign of real

trouble over the issue as the Treasury Department seemed
to want to accommodate the Mexican government.

The

Mexican Secretary of the Treasury visited the U.S. Sec
retary and informed him that Mexico faced a critical
financial situation* and the silver purchases were a big
factor in alleviating this problem.

It was at this time

that the United States had agreed to the purchase of the
35 million additional ounces of Mexican silver in the
16
Federal Reserve Bank of California.
In early 1938* when there began to be rumors that
the United States would end the agreement entirely* the
Mexican government made it known through Ambassador

1^NY Heraid-Tribune. March 28, 1938, p. 10,
16FRUS. 1937, Vol. V, p. 676.
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Daniels that it felt the United States was tying the is
sue of silver to the case of petroleum, which at that
time was still before the Mexican courts.

According to

Mexican authorities, the petroleum matter was up to the
appropriate authorities in Mexico, while the buying of
silver was a matter between two governments.1^
Shortly after the oil companies had exhausted all
their legal possibilities arid Cardenas expropriated the
properties, the United States announced that it would
stop buying Mexican silver.

Before the announcement was

made public, the Secretary of State sent Ambassador
Daniels a telegram on March 26, 1938, explaining what was
about to happen.

Daniels was informed that the Treasury

Department would simply announce its decision to re
examine its financial and commercial relations with Mexi
co and therefore would have to stop buying Mexican silver for the moment. 18
In answering the Secretary's telegram, Daniels ex
pressed doubt that Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau was justified in this decision.

Daniels inform

ed his Secretary that he knew Mexico would consider it as
a reprisal, and he feared that under these circumstances
the current negotiations over the oil issue would be

^CArdenas, Qbras. Tomo I, p. 382.
18FRUS. 1938, Vol. V, p. 735.
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stifled,*^ That Mexico did consider the action as a
U.S. reprisal then was not a surprise, and that had to
be considered by the State Department in formulating its
policy in regards to the debate over the oil properties.
Possibly one of the reasons the United States
reversed its attitude in such a short period of time was
that, as Daniels points out, not only were the officials
of the Mexican government upset, but the owners of the
mines, many of them who as we have seen were Americans,
also were affected. Some of them felt they were being
punished for the misdeeds of the oil companies. 20

The

miners had not tried to go in the face of the Cirdenas
Doctrine and seek help from their own country.

Instead

they had abided by Mexican law, and now saw themselves
as possible pawns in an international struggle.
The reasons for the sudden switch in the U.S. silver
policy are complex, and even two years before the oil ex
propriations there was some agreement that the policy
had been a failure. 21 Yet the United States continued
buying silver from Mexico after that time and had signed
the 1937 agreement.

It was only after the expropriation

19

^Josephus Daniels, telegram, to U.S. Secretary of
State, March 27, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3160, RG 50. Also
see ibid.
^^Daniels, Shirt-sleeve Diplomat, p. 2^9,
21S1 Universal. April 3. 1936, Sect. II, p. 3 .
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of the oil properties that a decision suddenly was made
to 8top purchasing the Mexican silver.

The United States

government would not admit that the decision was made in
retaliation, but the timing made it seem as if the govern
ment were reacting to oil conqpany pressure.
Before the expropriations. United States Secretary
of the Treasury Morgenthau had announced that the U.S.
was buying the additional 35 million ounces of silver
to keep it from being dumped on the market, an action
which would have jeopardized the current price. 22

Yet

the same situation existed after the expropriations, and
Morgenthau must have known that the price would begin
fluctuating as soon as the United States made any kind
of announcement.

It would seem reasonable to assume,

therefore, that the sudden decision to review U.S. com
mercial relations with Mexico was an attempt on the
Treasury’s part to bolster the position of the oil comp
anies.

The resultant decision to again buy silver was

very likely a reaction against the strong Mexican pro
tests for the retaliation.
After considering the situation both economically
and politically, the United States decided that there
would be an advantage to again agreeing to silver pur
chases.
22

One very strong point for this continuation was

Ibid.. January 11, 1938, Sect. II, p. 3 .
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the need to bolster the Mexican peso in relation to the
U.S. dollar to stem the tide of declining United States
imports to Mexico.

During the first nine months of 1938*

United States imports (into Mexico) declined 35«5£ or 76
million pesos while German products imported by Mexico
increased by 2,000,000 pesos.

Although Mexican mer

chants might not have wanted to deal with Germany, Italy
and Japan instead of the United States, any reduction in
the peso would force Mexico into this action.

J

But the

government of C&rdenas already had assured officials of
the United States that Mexico did not want to sell to
the fascist nations.

2k

Nevertheless, just as in the case

of oil sales, Mexico was looking at the situation from
the standpoint of economic survival.
Cardenas assured the American Smelting and Refining
Company that he had no intention of expropriating any of
the mining properties in Mexico,2-* even after the deci
sion of the U.S. Treasury to cease buying Mexican silver.
By the first part of April, the Treasury still had not
decided exactly what to do about silver purchases, other
23
■'Robert G. McGregor, Jr., "Analysis of the Mexican
Silver Industry," Jan. 30, 1939, Doc. 812.63^2/36 IK,
HG 59.
2ZfFRUS. 1938, Vol. V, p. 728.
2^Division of the American Republics, U.S. State
Department, memorandum, April 6, 1938, Doc. 812 .6363/
Jkkl L/JPS, RG 59.
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than to complete the March purchase of Mexican silver.
At that time the Treasury officials were concerned
about how much any silver dumped on the world market
might affect the world price,

26

but they had not decid

ed what policy to follow in Mexico.
This hesitancy had another indirect effect on rela
tions between the United States and Mexico.

Because of

all the various rumors in Mexico City concerning the
silver purchases, the conversations over the agrarian
claims had slowed down considerably.^

Perhaps this was

because the silver issue was of more urgency for Carde
nas* government.

Or perhaps it was a form of retalia

tion by Mexico for what the government felt was a form
of reprisal against Mexico for the expropriations.
The State Department already had been warned that
no matter what the reasoning or how valid the reason for
ending the purchase of Mexican silver, nevertheless, the
Mexican government would consider it as a dire blow
against its economy and a direct blow against Mexico.

In

spite of the assurance of Cardenas, the Mexican govern
ment might start taking more direct reprisals than just
26

Pierre de L. Boal
of conversation, April 6,
27
'Pierre de L. Boal
of conversation, April 8,

and Lawrence Duggan, memorandum
1938, Doc. 812.6363/3^50, ibid,
and Lawrence Duggan, memorandum
1938, Doc. 812.6363/3518, ibid.

a slowdown In conversations over the agrarian claims.
The United States was well aware that Cardenas might
somehow evoke the CArdenas Doctrine and begin a program
of ejqpropriation against the American mine owners.

28

Whatever the reasoning, on April 9i 1938* Mexico receiv
ed the announcement that the United States had resumed
buying Mexican silver at a rate of 42.75 cents an ounce
on a day-to-day basis.
No doubt, the silver program of the United States
had been a tremendous advantage to Mexico, increasing em
ployment, revenues, foreign exchange and other economic
benefits.

The one danger to Mexico was that the program

might be suspended, and since the industry could be main
tained only through large-scale purchases, the economy
could suffer a severe shock.

Undoubtedly, U.S. economic

experts recognized this danger, and the official United
States' policy was caught in somewhat of a precarious
situation.

With these silver purchases suspended, the

Mexican economy could suffer a letdown from which it
might never recover in time to make any kind of payment
to the oil companies.

But with the continuance of the

28

Robert McGregor, Jr., "Analysis of the Mexican
Silver Industry," January 30, 1939# Doc. 812.6342/36 LM,

im.-

29

•'Josephus Daniels, telegram, to US Secretary of
State, April 9, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3388, ibid.
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purchases* the Roosevelt administration was bound to come
under fire from those who would accuse him of giving aid
to the enemy* so to speak.
An additional point to consider was that if the
United States ceased to purchase Mexican silver* then the
companies would operate at a loss until they were forced
just to turn the mines over to the workers* saving the
Mexican government the process of expropriating them.^0
Regardless of these points which the U.S. Treasury
must have considered in reversing its decision to stop the
purchases* there were a number of persons in the United
States who felt the first decision was the proper one.
In general there were two basic reasons why it seemed the
Treasury had made the correct decision.

The first of

these was simply from a standpoint of reprisal for what
CArdenas had done to the oil companies.

There was little

logic in this argument* simply a desire to retaliate
against the attack on U.S. business interests.
The second idea was less vituperative* but never
theless recognized some corelation between the Treasury's
decision and the expropriation of the oil companies.

This

idea simply was that the abrogation of the silver accord

■^Division of the American Republics* U.S. State
Department* memorandum* May 26, 1939* Doc. 812.63^2/37
LAM* ibid.
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would show Cardenas that the United States government was
not ready to accept at full face value his doctrine, and
that if he insisted, he would have a fight on his hands*
In addition, at the same time, it would give him an op
portunity to compromise on the oil issue without compro
mising his principle of national independence,^1 This
last argument showed a singular lack of knowledge of both
the Cardenas Doctrine and the man responsible for that
doctrine*

Cirdenas simply could not have said that Mexi

co would agree to giving back the properties if the United
States agreed to continue purchasing silver*

Not only

would it have been politically disastrous, but C&rdenas
knew that if the United States did not give in on the
point of silver, then the mines would end up reverting
to the Mexican government by default*
Just as there were voices raised praising the deci
sion of the Treasury Department, so were there voices pro
testing the hypocrisy of the move.

In general, the argu

ment was not so much that the United States was making a
bad move in stopping the purchases*

The complaint was

that the United States was taking the action at just the
time when the Mexican government would have to consider
it as a tactical retaliatory act*

For opponents of the

^For examples of this type argument, see the San
Francisco Chronicle* March 29, 1938, p. 10 and March 30,
1938, p. 1 0 * Also see the NY Herald-Tribune. March 31*
1938, p. 14.
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move, the Treasury decision once again placed the United
States in the position of practicing "dollar diplomacy"
instead of trying to live up to the Good Neighbor pollcyS32
Even members of the United States Congress spoke
out against the U.S. action.

One representative stated

that the action was contrary to the Good Neighbor policy*
while another denounced the act and said it was obvious
to him that the decision was made as a means whereby the
government could rescue the oil companies.

He tacitly

recognized the Cardenas Doctrine when he pointed out that
the companies had had access to the Mexican courts and
had left the Mexican government little choice.
There were other members of congress who continued
to be in favor of ending the agreement.

Senator John

G. Townsend* the author of one of the bills to end the
purchase of foreign silver* launched an attack on Mexico.
He said that the only reason for continuing the buying of
silver was that Mexico wanted it that way.

In his attack*

he obliquely mentioned the expropriated properties and
blasted Mexico for not paying for them.^
Thanks to persons such as Senator Townsend* the

_

P-°yi9r-Jgttrn»l,

Mar. 29* 1938* p. 6 and Lk Times. Mar. 29. 1938. p. 4.
^ Washington Post. March 30. 1938, p. 4.
^ B 1 Nacional. July 29, 1939. p. 2.
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U.S. silver policy continued to be nore a natter of whim
than definite policy.

In June 1939* the U.S. again

temporarily stopped buying silver, precipitating another
slight crisis in the Mexican economy.

The Bank of Mexico

announced that it would cease operations on the foreign
exchange market in order to conserve what reserves it
did have,33

Townsend was still trying to put an end to

the silver purchases permanently, but he claimed that his
proposed plan had nothing to do with Mexico's expropria
tions of U.S. property.

He even denied that it would

hurt Mexico's economy, as industries would continue to
buy foreign silver, principally from Mexico.

Mexican

newspaper reports to the contrary, the senator claimed
that reports from Mexico even indicated no concern over
official United States policy.3<*
In spite of what the senator said, discussions be
tween U.S. officials and Mexican officials seemed to re
veal that Mexico was always extremely concerned over that
policy.

In discussing the payment of claims for agrarian

seitures, Sub-secretary of Foreign Relations Ram£n Beteta
claimed that Cdrdenas did not want any suggestion to
arise during the discussions that the United States

33Ibid.. June 28, 1939# P* 1«
36Excelsior. April 1, 19^0, Sect. II, p. 7.

resume purchasing s i l v e r T h i s order from CArdenas
was completely in keeping with his doctrine*

Por Mexi

co to have suggested officially that the United States
resume its silver purchases in exchange for a settlement
of agrarian claims would have been a fora of interven
tion in the internal affairs of the United States*
Nevertheless* Ambassador Daniels got the impres
sion in light of what was said by the Finance Minister*
Eduardo SuArez, that the payment of claims in any sub
stantial amount would depend on U.S. resumption of sil
ver purchases.Since Mexico had expropriated the oil
properties and was having difficulty finding markets* the
silver purchases had to be important to the economy*

To

be true to his own policy* CArdenas could not make an
agreement to settle claims based strictly on the ques
tion of silver* but his Finance Minister realised that
the purchases were necessary to sustain the government
and meet at least some of Mexico's obligations*
A number of points* therefore* had been placed before
the United States as reasons for continuing the silver
policy as in previous years.

Some of these points must

have been valid* because a May 19^0 report indicates
37
•"Josephus Daniels* dispatch* to U.S. Secretary of
State, April 5. 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3358 L/JPS* RG 59.
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that in the previous year the United States had paid
out $10,700,000 to Mexico for silver.

The reason, how

ever, for the article was that the United States had
39

just voted to end purchases of foreign silver. 7 Of
ficial United States policy continued to fluctuate for
the next year and a half, although purchases of Mexican
silver did not cease completely.

Then in December 19^1»

when the Senate ratified the Washington agreements signed
in November, the United States agreed to.purchase from
Mexico 6,000,000 ounces of silver each month.
Because of the difference in overall reaction, the
silver industry was treated somewhat differently from
the oil industry.

C&rdenas undoubtedly could have used

the termination of the United States silver agreement as
an excuse to claim intervention in Mexican internal af
fairs.

But the somewhat vacillating policy of the U.S.

Treasury also gave Cardenas the opportunity to compro
mise.

Naturally, the idea that the silver industry was

not as valuable to Mexico as the oil industry must have
occurred to Cfirdenas, who had enough difficulties with
out creating more.

3?U.S, News. May 17$ 191*,0, p. l*f.
^°New York Times. December 30, 19^1, p. 8.

CHAPTER VII

MEXICO AND GREAT BRITAIN» OIL AND IMPERIALISM
While the most important facet of the relationship
between the United States and Mexico over the oil expro
priations often was the public opinion generated, the
situation between Mexico and Great Britain was differ
ent.

There never was any real danger that Mexico and

the United States might break relations over the mat
ter.*

But one of the problems facing Roosevelt fluid his

Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, was the attitude of
the British.
Immediately after the expropriations took place,
Great Britain begpui adopting a hard line and insisted
that the properties be returned to the former owners.
For Great Britain, the Cdrdenas Doctrine had no real
significance.

The British government took the stand

that the stockholders of the companies were British
citizens and that meant that the British government had

*B1 Nacional. April 2, 1938* P* 1 carried comments
of Cardenas on the U.S. attitude. He sent a message to
the U.S. ambassador, thanking the United States for its
recognition of the sovereignty of Mexico.
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to protect their interestsv regardless of the political
consequences*

Naturally, the tremendous value of the

oil properties also played a part in the British position*
This is not to say that British officials had not
tried to avoid the expropriations in the first place or
that they had not foreseen what might happen*

The Brit

ish minister in Mexico City talked with representatives
of the Aguila Oil Company on March 6, 1938, almost two
weeks before the expropriations, and had come up with a
number of suggestions for avoiding a showdown with Carde
nas.
The Mexican Federal Board of Conciliation and Arbi
tration on January 19th had insisted that the oil comp
anies comply with the decision of December 18, 1937* in
which the companies were ordered to pay an increase of
26 million pesos in wages.

The British Minister be

lieved that the government of Cardenas could convince
the labor syndicates to accept the companies* earlier
proposals since in the long run it would amount to more
than 26 million pesos.

But on the other hand, the Brit

ish official advised the companies to accept the Labor
Board’s decision and agree to spend an additional 26 mil
lion pesos in wages and benefits combined.^ Ambassador

2FRUS, 1938, Vol. V, p. 720.
3

•'Josephus Daniels, enclosure to dispatch, to U.S.
Secretary of State, March 31* 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3362,
RG 59.
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Daniels already had indicated to the companies that he
felt they should give in and pay this figure.

At one

time they had insisted that they could not pay.

Later

they agreed to pay, but objected to certain administratire clauses in the Labor Board's decision.

Ll

In the area of administrative changes, the British
minister had suggested that the companies agree to a mix
ed commission set up under the President's authority,
but he seemed to be more concerned with the financial
aspects at the time.

He further suggested that the dif

ference between the 26 million demanded in wages and the
22 million offered by the companies be spent for houses,
schools and other such benefits.

The companies already

had agreed to compromise by two million, and the British
minister believed that the additional two million could
be borrowed from the Bank of Mexico.^

It can be seen in

these suggestions that the British officials were not as
set against spending the extra money as were the officials
of the oil companies.

The official position even recog

nized the possibilities of operating under different ad
ministrative conditions from before, but the companies
remained stubborn and refused to listen to the advice.

4PRUS, 1938, Vol. V, pp. 724.25.
'’Josephus Daniels, enclosure to dispatch, to U.S.
Secretary of State, March 31, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3362 ,
RG 59.
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With the advent of the expropriations* the British
government took the part of the companies* and insisted
on the return of the properties.

Prom the very beginning

the British attitude was firmer than that of the United
States.

There were those in the United States who felt

that the British attitude in demanding the return of the
oil properties might have complicated the U.S. position*
but at the same time felt that the British were correct*
and that perhaps the bluntness of their attitude might
give Cardenas second thoughts
But Mexico, as well as other Latin American nations*
long had held to the principles of the Calvo Clause*
which as far back as 1868 had contended that foreign in
vestors could not appeal to their own government inasmuch
as they had recourse to the host nation’s courts.

The

Cardenas Doctrine had brought this idea up to date and
had nationalized it to fit Mexico's needs.

Cardenas went

one step further in proclaiming that all foreigners in
Mexico must consider themselves a3 nationals under Mexi
can law.

But the oil companies of both nations had im

mediately turned to their respective governments for what
they thought were some of their grievances.

While the

U.S. companies were given some sympathy and help from the
State Department, the United States never intervened as

^New York Herald-Tribune, editorial, April 9, 1938*
p. 12.
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actively as did Great Britain.
It should be pointed out that in Great Britain*
just as in the United States, there were groups and in
dividuals who supported the action of Mexico.

Within a

matter of days of the expropriations* there began to be
signs of this support.

In London* in the House of Com

mons* the Laborite Members of Parliament applauded the
action of Cardenas.

On the other hand* the conservative

members wanted to know if the government had taken steps
to protect British interests in Mexico;

They were told

that the British ambassador had talked with Cardenas and
warned him of the consequences* but that the problem was
only being studied by the British government.^
While the government was studying the problem* the
CTM of Mexico sent its own version with pertinent data to
the General Council of Labor Unions of England* requesto
ing support.
Within a few days the Labor Party in Great
Britain sent a proclamation to Mexico saluting the action
of the government.

This proclamation correctly predict

ed that the British government would stand firmly behind
the oil companies in their protests* and stated that the
labor movement would have to be prepared to withstand
the strong opposition.

Somewhat prematurely* the Labor

^E1 Nacional. March 24, 1938* p. 1
8Ibid.* Sect. Ill* p. 1.
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party congratulated Mexico on agreeing not to sell its
petroleum to the fascist countries.9

While receiving such support from groups in Great
Britain, Mexico still was critical of the British govern
ment , much more so than of the United States. One news
paper pointed out that Great Britain had the largest
international debt in the world, and that this debt was
practically unpayable.10 Yet Great Britain throughout
the debate insisted that Mexico pay immediately for the
expropriated properties.
In light of what is known, this insistence seems to
have been made with the prior knowledge that the Mexican
government could not comply.

In his list of proposals

made on March 6, 1938* and communicated to the Sub
secretary of Foreign Relations of Mexico, the British
minister indicated that should the companies be expro
priated, then the Mexican government should be required
to compensate for them within ten years. He even agreed
that the liability incurred by the government to the
Mexican bank for the loam he was suggesting the government
underwrite for two million pesos would rank ahead of the
liability to the companies.11 It is obvious, therefore,

9Ibid.. March 29, 1938, p. 1.
10Ibid,, May 1?, 1938, p. 5.
11Josephus Daniels, enclosure to dispatch, to U.S.
Secretary of State, Mar. 31, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3362,

RG 59.
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that before the expropriations actually occurred, the
British government recognised the right of Mexico to
spread the payments over a period of years.

The demand

for payment immediately then apparently was just an at
tempt to get Mexico to return the properties.
Background to the Problem
In 1906, the company of S. Pearson and Son, Ltd.,
obtained special privileges which led to the establishment
of £1 Aguila, the company which grew to be the largest
and most powerful in Mexico.

For twenty-nine years it

enjoyed special privileges considered later to have been
prejudicial to the national interests of Mexico.

But in

1935 * in accordance with his campaign to bring foreign

companies under Mexican law, President Cardenas signed
an administrative decree which supposedly brought £1
*

Aguila down to the level of businesses owned by Mexican
12
nationals.
A month later, the Stock Exchange in Lon
don suspended trading for the company pending a meeting
of shareholders.

The reason for this action was that the

Mexican Supreme Court, also in the spirit of CArdenas*
program for returning Mexico to the Mexicans, had just
indicated that the company might be forced to comply with

12B1 Nacional. February 5* 1935* P- 1
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Mexican labor board decisions*^

Ordinarily, this action

would not have seemed so unusual, but in light of the
leniency with which the companies had been treated for
the first quarter of a century of operation, it was a
definite threat to their special position*
The British companies at least had moral support
from the British government during these early days of
disputes.

The foreign investments in the Mexican petro

leum industry then were considered to be around $500
million (a figure later determined to be inflated), and
the British government began considering a request from
Mexico for information on the situation.

The British be-

came especially concerned when the rich MFoza Rica" field
belonging to the British company was struck in 1937*
Yet, at the same time the British government was be
coming concerned over the British investments In Mexico,
✓

the management of £1 Aguila was stressing the Mexican
character of the company*

In denying a report which ap

peared in one of the Mexican newspapers, which said that
El Aguila was a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, the
president of the company emphasized that the company had
been established in accordance with Mexican laws and
that the majority of the shares of the company were in the

13£1 Universal. March 7. 1935. Sect. II, p. 3.
lifIbid.. August 2k, 1937. Sect. II, p. 3.
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hands of the p u b l i c W h a t was not made clear was
whether the "public" to which he was referring was the
Mexican or British public.

Later the British government

made it very clear to which public it felt the oil prop
erties belonged.
The question of the nationality of the shareholders
seemed to be unimportant in November 1937 after Cdrdenaa
came to an agreement with the British company*

There

was optimism on all sides as even the Union of Petro
leum Workers and Drillers congratulated the Mexican
president for solving the problem*

They felt that the

agreement would mean not only direct benefits to the
workers* but also additional job centers* and thus more
jobs for Mexican workers in general.1*’ The honeymoon
did not last very long as before the end of the year the
company was complaining that it could not meet the de
mands of the laborers.
The demands of the workers were upheld by the Laboe
Board in December 1937* and £1 Aguila announced that it
would appeal to the Mexican Supreme Court.

The company

claimed that the Labor Board's findings were inaccurate
and that its profits in the preceding three years had

^^Novedades. August 25, 1937* pp. 1* 10.
^■^Union of Petroleum Workers and Driller, letter,
to President Cdrdenas* November 25* 1937* Paquete 4-21*
Exp. 527.1/8, Doc. 60899* AGN.
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been only $68 ,000,000 rather than the $163 ,000,000 claim
ed by the Board,

At the same time, the company denounc

ed the administrative provisions set forth by the same
decision, saying that these provisions would wreck discipline and make operations impossible. 17r As already
pointed out above, it was the problem with the adminis
trative clauses which seemed to bother the companies
more than the financial side.

Nevertheless, both Brit

ish and American oil companies began belittling the pro
fits they had made, while the Mexican government con
tinued to emphasise the years of exploitation by the
foreign investors.
When Cardenas announced the agreement reached with
£1 Aguila in November 1937, he stressed that the item of
major importance was the recognition by the foreign oil
companies of the right of the nation to the subsoil
wealth.

18

Yet in their complaints about the lack of

profits and the demands made by the workers, the comp
anies were talking as if they felt the subsoil rights
still belonged to them.

As can be seen from the high

valuations placed on the properties, the companies be
lieved that Mexico should pay even for the future oil
that the companies would have pumped out of the ground

17E1 Universal, Dec. 30, 1937, Sect. II, p. 5.

^Ibid.. January 2, 1938, p. 5»
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had they continued as owners.
The British company turned to its government after
the expropriations, just as did the American companies,
but the attitude of the British government probably kept
the company from beginning meaningful talks with Mexico
much longer than the American companies.

Because of the

hard line taken by the British government, the company
probably felt that it could hold out for more of a share
than received by the U.S.-ewned companies.
Through the American Embassy in London, the State
Department learned that the Chief of the American Depart
ment of the British Foreign Office was expressing the
hope that the United States government would not let
Mexico succeed in the expropriations.

Probably trying

to throw a scare into his U.S. counterparts to get them
to take more definitive action, the British Foreign of
ficer hinted that he believed Mexico was on the verge of
a revolution.1^ Although the British Foreign Office ob
viously agreed with the State Department over the matter
of immediate compensation, the similarity of the attitudes
ended there.
By mid-19^0 there was still no authorisation from

1%erschel V. Johnson,.London dispatch, to U.S.
Secretary of State, March 24, 1938, Doc. 812 .6363/3301
L/ttl, RG 59. This dispatch also shows the great concern
of the British over similar action in other Latin Ameri
can countries.
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either the company or the British government to anyone
20
to talk to the Mexican government about the dispute.
As late as October 19*0» there were still rumors that
El Aguila would return to operate in Mexico through ar
rangements which would give the government of Mexico
50% of the company's utilities.

21

Just as many of the

rumors surrounding the oil question, this proved to be
unfounded.
While the British companies were hoping that they
would be able to return to their former properties, they
were also depending on their government to do most of
the work for them.

The British government, in turn,

although probably appalled at the somewhat weak position
taken by the State Department, nevertheless turned to
the United States for support and cooperation.
The Breaking of Relations
On March 21, 1938, the British government wrote a
note to Eduardo Hay stating that the government of Great
Britain claimed retention of all previous rights in the
matter of petroleum.

The note said that no earlier com

plaint had been issued in the hope that the government of
Cfirdenas itself would correct the situation and return

^°B1 Universal. June 16, 19^0, p. 1.
^ Todo. October 7, 19**3» P« 6 .
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the properties to the companies.

The British were not

discussing the general right even of a government to ex
propriate property for public utility with accompanying
compensation, but claimed that the Mexican expropriations
were arbitrary.

The British also claimed that the award

by the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration was not
justified by the facts.

It was also believed that the

facts of the case did not justify such a drastic action
as expropriation, and therefore the act was totally un
justifiable, since the British could not fathom how the
expropriations served the public utility.

According to

the official note, the act was merely a political one
designed to acquire permanently the advantages of the
control of the properties.

The message concluded with

the statement that Great Britain could see no solution
other than the return of the properties. 22
In discussing the situation with the British, Cfirdenas always rejected the use of the word "arbitrary" in
connection with the oil expropriations.

He was so op

posed. to the use of the word that he personally refused
to accept a second note which utilized the same word.
For this reason, the British had to address the note to
the Minister of Foreign Kelations rather than to the

22E1 Nacional. April 12, 1938, p. 1.
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president.2^ For C&rdenag, there was nothing arbitrary
in taking what he believed really belonged to Mexico,
In answer to the British note, the Mexican govern
ment stated that in the case of SI Xguila, the company
was a Mexican enterprise (just as the president of the
company had stated), and that the British government had
no right to patronize the company and interfere in the in
ternal affairs of Mexico.

In official language, the Mexi

can government insisted that it could not recognise the
right of Great Britain, under the guise of protecting
shareholder interest in a Mexican enterprise, to inter
fere in the judicial proceedings of the Mexican courts*
The note went on to say that Mexico recognized the right
of each nation to determine its own definition of public
utility, and that the action was therefore in any case
justified.

Mexico was denying the right of the British

government to interpet the rules of expropriation of
property in Mexico, and thus was interpreting for Great
Britain the heart of the Cardenas Doctrine.

The British

government was also reminded that the Mexican people
publicly had shown their good faith and intention to pay
compensation.

In conclusion, the Mexican Foreign Minister

again emphasized that a Mexican company such as £1 Xguila

2^Pierre de L. Boal and Lawrence Duggan, memorandum
of telephone conversation, April 8 , 1938, Doc. 812,6363/
3518. RG 59.
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had no right even to seek the protection of a foreign
ok
power.
If Great Britain had not understood the Car
denas Doctrine up to this point* the Mexican note should
have made it very clear.
When Washington learned of the contents of the
Mexican note to Great Britain* officials probably were
glad they had taken a more diplomatic approach to the
matter.

Although both the United States and Great Brit

ain were in the same situation, Mexican newspapers seem
ed to think that Washington had acted a little more
realistically than had Great Britain.2^
Mexican public opinion might have thought the United
States was acting more realistically, but the British
government had its own opinions.

The government of Great

Britain refused to admit the validity of the points made
by the Mexican Foreign Minister in his note.

The British

claimed that they were not defending the company as such,
but were arguing in favor of the shareholders of the comp
any, whose nationality now was admitted as being English.

2^E1 Nacional. April 14, 1938, pp. 1, 4.
2-*El Universal. April 15, 1938, p. 1. U.S. Under
Secretary of State Sumner Welles a few days earlier had
explained to the British ambassador in Washington that
the United States saw no need in exchanging notes with
Mexico utilizing harsh words. See Sumner Welles, memo
randum of conversation with Sir Ronald .Lindsay, April 1,
1938, Doc. 812.6363/3325 L/JPS, RG 59 .
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The British admitted that in the strict sense of the word
the company was Mexican, but argued that the majority of
the shareholders were British, and that the enterprise was
essentially British.

For this reason, the government of

Great Britain felt it had the right to complain about the
expropriation, since there was an "international right"
of a foreign state to protect its interests, thus allowing
a State to intervene in behalf of its subjects.

As an

additional reason for intervention, the British question
ed whether, as Mexican claimed, there had been no denial
of justice, calling the Mexican action contrary to international law.

26

The British still could not understand

that Mexico did not even accept the right of a foreign
government to question whether there had been a denial
of justice in the Mexican courts.
While this exchange of notes was taking place, the
English Legation in Mexico City let it be known publicly
that the best reply Mexico could make to the British
notes was simply to return the properties to their former owners. 27' Mexico*s next answer was not what the
British Legation desired.
In its answer, Mexico claimed that the British had
admitted in their note that the company was Mexican in

26B1 Naclonal. April 22, 1938, pp. 1 , 5 .
2?Novedades. April 26 , 1938, p. 1.
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spite of the British stockholders, and that because the
company was Mexican, there was absolutely no basis for
intervention.

Furthermore, Mexico did not consider the

stockholder as a co-proprietor of social goods, and he
was considered only to have certain rights in the dis
solution or liquidation of the company.

Also, the note

went on to say, there would be no loss to British subjects since they would be compensated by Mexico. 28
Mexico then indicated that Mexican law did not per
mit handing over of subsoil rights to any company, and
that any foreigner involved in Mexico must consider him
self the same as any Mexican, again alluding to what was
to become the Cardenas Doctrine.

In so doing, the in

dividual gives up his right to invoke the protection of
his government.

Furthermore, the Mexican government

again rejectedjthe idea of any denial of justice to the
companies, saying that they still had recourse to the
Mexican courts, and that no government could claim the
right of intervention while its nationals still had not
exhausted the judicial processes of the host nation.29
Up to this time the notes from Great Britain had
been considered rude,-^0 but there still was opportunity

28E1 Nacional. April 27 , 1938, p. 1.
29U>id.
3°Ibid.. May 6 , 1938, p. 8 .
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for the two governments to settle their dispute.

Then

in Hay 1938 the British government asked for immediate
payment of an annual debt that Hexico had failed to pay
when due in January.

The British claimed that a similar

debt owed to the United States had been paid promptly.
The demand also noted the expropriation, and in addi
tion to listing Mexican debts, added that the cost of
the oil properties would greatly increase the amount.^1
Mexico had listened to enough from Great Britain.
This last note was am insult that the Mexican government
could not ignore,-^2 In referring to the British note
demanding the immediate payment of the Mexican debt, the
Minister of Foreign Relations presented a check to Great
Britain for $361,737*17•

At the same time, Mexico said

that it felt there was no alternative except to close its
Legation in London.

The Foreign Minister added that

Mexican financial conditions were no affair of the British government.

33

In handing over the check for the

•^Herachel V. Johnson, London dispatch, to U.S.
Secretary of State, May 19, 1938, Doc. 712.4/75 L/JPS,
RG 59 (original sourcei Parliamentary Debates, House of
Commons, London, May 16, 1938).
•^Personal interview.
Hersog. L.S.U. Archives.

Author with Jestfs Silva

•^Bl Nacional. May 14, 1938, p. 1. Clement Attlee
and others expressed similar views when asking the British
Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs if the U.S. ever had
questioned Great Britain's internal debt. See Parlia
mentary Debates, House of Commons, London, May 16, 1938.
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annual Indemnity and at the same time informing Great
Britain of the break in relations, Mexico reminded the
British that even the most powerful governments were
34

not always up-to-date in the payments of their debts.^
Cirdenas noted the breaking of relations simply by stat
ing that the British government had gone beyond the
3 *5
limits of tolerance for Mexico. J
On preparing to leave Mexico, Owen St. Claire
O'Malley, the British minister, stated that he believed
there was no anti-British feeling in Mexico.

The news

of the break in London was published without any real
outcry on the part of the British p r e s s , a n d the
Mexican minister in London stated that the situation was
more like a suspension in relations than a break.^
Although there might not have been a public out
cry in London, it was noted that for the first time in
one hundred years a foreign power had broken relations
with England.

The British claimed they were not being

vindictive in asking for the payment of debts, but that
there had been no other solution.

The government of

3ifEl Universal. May 14, 1938, Sect. II, p. 3.
■^C^rdenas, Obraa. Tomo I, p. 394.
^^Herschel V. Johnson, London dispatch, to U.S.
Secretary of State, May 19, 1938, Doc. 712.4/75 L/JPS,
RG 59.
3?E1 Universal. May 15, 1938, Sect. II, p. 2.

9

220

Great Britain expressed regret over the breaking of relationSf and hoped it would be only a temporary suspension.
This was believed to be the case since the Mexican Con
sul General remained in London* although O'Malley had
received orders from his government to leave Mexico.38
According to sources in Great Britain, it would be
up to the initiative of Mexico to resume relations, but
that full payment of debts would be needed before the re
sumption of full relations.

At the same time there was

concern in Washington over the split.

Especially trouble

some was the idea that the United States might be called
on to act as intermediary.39 Although the British repre
sentative in Washington talked with his U.S. counter
parts over the situation, there was no immediate official
request made public for the United States to act on be
half of Great Britain.
Rather than entrust their affairs to the United
States, the British almost immediately ordered the Con
sul General of the British Consulate in New York to go
to Mexico as a representative of the British govemment.

Zj>0

At the same time, the Minister of Denmark in

Mexico was asked to take charge of the British interests

38B1 Nacional. May 15, 1938, p. 5.
39I_bid.. May 16, 1938, p. 5.
Ln

El Universal. May 25, 1938, p. 1.
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in the Mexican capital.

2li

This did not mean that Great Britain was not inter42
ested in United States cooperation in the matter.
Dur
ing the next several years, the British government was
very concerned with just what the United States was doing
over the petroleum issue.

When the United States start

ed suggesting arbitration, the British government was
first worried that the United States would succeed in
getting Mexico to agree to the suggestion, then concern
ed that the British would not be included.
In discussing the matter of arbitration, the Brit
ish ambassador to the United States wanted the U,S, to
include in any proposal for arbitration the question of
the British properties also, and for the two governments
to agree on the terms.

He was told by the State Depart

ment that the United States could not agree to include
the British properties, and that there could be no agree
ment to a joint United States-Great Britain proposal for
the arbitsation.

At the time, the main reason given was

^Ibid.. May 26, 1938, p. 1.
42
In fact, Great Britain did approach the United
States about assuming representation of British interests
in Mexico. The British ambassador to the United States
was told that the State Department believed it could be
more helpful if it did not become the British representa
tive, thus having to speak for both U.S. and British in
terests. See Sumner Welles, memorandum of conversation
with Sir Ronald Lindsay, June 1, 1938, Doc. 712.4/81 i,
RG 59.

222

that the United States wanted to avoid having opponents
accuse the two governments of imperialistic motives.
Although this might have been a realistic reason for
turning down the British proposal, apparently the dif
ference in attitude toward the problem was the deciding
factor.
Great Britain indicated this wide difference in
opinion when pointing out what would be acceptable terms
for arbitration.

The British ambassador to the United

States indicated that the only way his government would
agree to arbitration would be that if the tribunal select
ed decided the only practical solution was the return of
the properties, then this action would be acceptable
under the terms of the convention.
this attitude was twofold.

The problem with

First, the United States had

not invited. Great Britain to participate in arbitration.
Secondly, it should have been obvious by that time that
Mexico was not going to consider any idea which enter
tained the thought of returning the properties.
The British were not deterred, however, by the cold
United States attitude toward a joint proposal.

Through

the British Embassy in Washington, the British government
insisted that any separation of the two cases would weak
en both and would be considered as a victory by Mexico.

^FRUS, 1940, Vol. V, pp. 982-84.
^Ibid.. pp. 988 -89 .
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It was pointed out also that the friendly relations of
the various companies would be in danger, especially
if the separation encouraged the Mexican government to
deal separately with each company.

J

What the British

were saying was that the British government did not want
to see the American companies receive any kind of compen
sation at the expense of the British companies.
In putting an end to this debate, Under Secretary
of State Welles made it clear to the British ambassador
that the United States recognized there was no "united
front" between his government and Great Britain in this
case.

Welles emphasized that he knew the British were

only interested in having the properties returned, while
the United States had never questioned Mexico's right
46
to expropriate the properties.
The Chamberlain government in Great Britain never
really seemed to realize this position with any clarity.
In fairness to Great Britain, it should be realized that
the situation facing that country was slightly different
at the time from that facing the United States.

Great

Britain was dependent on outside sources for petroleum,
and was especially worried about repercussions in other
countries, not only in Latin America, but in countries

^5Ibid.. pp. 991 .
46
Ibid.. p . 9 9 5 .
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such as Iran and Iraq.

For Great Britain, oil was of
U>7

vital interest to her national defense. ' In addition
to this reasoning, Chamberlain probably looked on Carde
nas as directing a communist-style government, and he
didn’t want what he considered as British oil supporting
such a regime.
No matter what his reasoning, Chamberlain decided
to stick to that policy.

He announced before the House

of Commons in July 1938 that his government was not
ready to make any proposals to Mexico regarding the pos
sibility of the revival of relations.

CSrdenas hinted

that he would not object to the renewal of relations if
Great Britain would make an unconditional proposal for
such renewal.

Britain would make no such proposal ackfl
cording to Chamberlain.
After this refusal, Mexico
indicated that it would not make the first move toward
a resumption of relations, but that it would be up to
Chamberlain to initiate the action.^
For approximately the next two years Great Britain
was to continue to tie the question of the oil proper
ties to the renewal of relations.

In November 1938, in

answer to a question in the House of Commons on the

47 Ibld.. 1939 , Vol. V, p. 718.
ilA

JB1 Universal. July 26, 1938, p. 1.

ho

yNovedades. July 30* 1938, p. 4.
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Mexican situation, the British Under Secretary of Foreign
Relations said that in view of the Mexican attitude tow
ard British properties, the government could not consid
er the renewal of diplomatic relations.**0

Six months

later, the House of Commons was told that the British
government considered the re-establishment of relations
to be in the best interests of British subjects, but that
the policy of the British government could not change un
til Mexico had reconsidered her attitude toward the ex
propriated propertie s•***
What the British meant by a change in Mexican at
titude was that the Mexican government would agree to
British proposals.

By late 1939 the British, in their

own minds, had compromised somewhat, and were willing to
see a partnership between the Mexican government and the
oil companies.

The two "partners" would split profits

while management would be in the hands of neutral par
ties.

Cardenas and his advisers could plainly see that

this suggestion still carried more benefits for the comp
anies than for Mexico.

Under the existing conditions,

Mexico didn’t have to split the profits with anyone. In

**°B1 Universal. November 3# 1938* P» 2.
^Herschel V, Johnson, London dispatch, to U.S.
Secretary of State, May 10, 1939» Doc. 712.4/83 DG,
RG 59.
52FRUS. 1939, Vol. V., pp. 709-10.
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addition* one of the key issues was that of control* and
Cdrdenas jealously guarded Mexico's right to control her
own industries.
When the Mexican Supreme Court on December 2* 1939
handed down a decision (a decision the British government
called a farse), the British complained to the United
States State Department that this action ended the
chances of the companies to receive legal redress in
Mexico.

The British suggested that the only possible

agreement could be through a long-term lease since Mexico
simply could not pay.

They also used the old argument

that Mexico was incapable of efficiently running the prop
erties.^

The British arguments impressed neither the

State Department nor the Mexican authorities* and there
fore the two governments were at an impasse in regards to
their renewal of relations.
One more year passed before the two governments
seemed to get serious over the resumption of relations.
In May 1940 Minister of Foreign Relations Eduardo Hay
was interviewed after it was rumored that Chamberlain's
government was interested in ending the oil dispute.

Hay

said that Mexico also wanted to end the quarrel if a just
solution could be found.^ Note should be taken of the

53Ibld.. pp. 715-18.
^ *B1 Nacional. May 4, 1940, p. 1.
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datei military problems besetting Great Britain at this
time began overshadowing the political and even the eco
nomic problem of individual English enterprises.
The military reason for England's desire to come to
an accord with Mexico was substantiated when it was re
ported that Great Britain, toward the end of May 19^0, in
an attempt to develop a military force to defeat Germanyt
was ready to try to re-establish relations with Mexico.
One of the reasons* as was obvious by this time* was to
reduce the possibility that Germany would acquire petro
leum from Mexico.^
Yet the British had said earlier that the outbreak
of war made it more necessary than ever not to oondone the
expropriations.

The British government felt that the war

made conditions for settlement even more propitious* and
had suggested that the United States use its influence
Mexico night not have wanted to sell petroleum to Ger
many* but C&rdenas was not so concerned about the war at
that time that his nationalization program could be aban
doned.
But by June 19^0 the situation seemed to have become
even more critical for Great Britain, and the British gov
ernment seemed to be considering compromising even more.

55Ihid.. May 26, 19^0, p. 3.
56FRUS. 1939. Vol. V, p. 707.
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The British Under Secretary for Foreign Relations stated
before Parliament that it mas desirable to straighten out
the problem with Mexico, this time admitting that petro
leum was becoming very important.^7

It looked as if the

problem was almost settled when Mexico started speaking
of the possibility of ending the problem and emphasised
that relations really had not been broken, but suspended,
and that consuls of both countries had been acting in the
interests of the two governments.'*®
In spite of the stated desires of both countries to
renew relations, nothing was done toward this end in 194-0.
Perhaps it was because Great Britain had so insulted Mexi
co that the Cdrdenas administration simply would have
lost face had it agreed to a resumption of relations.

It

could also have been attributed to the opening up of a
few markets for Mexico, so that Cdrdenas was not so
dependent on contracts from British firms.
Toward the end of the summer of 1941, after CArdenas
had left office, the world situation was even worse, and
Mexico had to be aware of the problems facing Great Brit
ain.

In August, a number of senators approached Ezequiel

Padilla, the new minister of Foreign Relations, about the
renewal of relations with Great Britain.

57*1 Nacional. June 13, 1940, p. 2.
^®Ibld.. June 14, 1940, p. 1.
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was that it was incongruent that there were no friendly
relations between two democratic countries in such ter
rible t i n e s . L e s s than one month later, a group of
senators and deputies called for the immediate renewal
of relations with Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., stat
ing that these two nations were leading the fight against
the fascist forces*
Whether because of the petitions of various Mexi
cans, the worsening world situation, or just the fact that
the Cdrdenas government was no longer in power, relations
were renamed with Great Britain, as the Mexican Minister
of Foreign Relations announced on October 21 , 1941 that
through mutual agreement the two governments had resumed
diplomatic relations*^

The news of the renewal was
62
warmly received in Washington,
mainly because it in
dicated a fora of solidarity of Mexico with the democrat
ic nations against the Axis*

The resumption of diplomat

ic ties, however, did not mean a settlement of the oil
controversy.

^Novedades. August 10 , 1941, p. 1*
^°la Vos. Sept. 1, 1941, p. 6 . Private citizens
also added their voices to the pleas for resumption of
relations with these two countries* See ibid.. Sept. 8 ,
1941, p. 6 .
^ Novsdadea. October 22, 1941, p. 1.
62Ibid.. October 23, 19^1» P* 1.
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.MeXirai.QU
The road to the resumption of normal relations mas
not very smooth.

First, there had been simply the prob

lem of the expropriations themselves, and the hard at
titude of the British government.

But this was net the

only question that faced the two governments during the
time of broken relations.

When Mexico started looking

for buyers for her oil, the British decided that it was
in the best interests of both the companies and the Brit
ish government to try to close off the potential markets.
Less than one month after the expropriations, the
British Under Secretary of Poreign Relations announced
the British government's opposition to any part taken by
British citizens or companies in the purchase of oil
produced from expropriated British property.

Some Brit

ish interests had begun negotiating with Mexico to pur
chase all of its oil exports.

The British government in

structed its minister to try to block the deal in spite
of assurances from the British firm that should war break
out, all the oil would go to Great Britain.^

This at

tempt to block private contracts started rumors of an
embargo on Mexican oil.

But Mexico must have felt at

•^Pierre de L. Boal and Lawrence Duggan, memorandum
of telephone conversation, kpril 8, 1938* Doc. 812.6363/
3518, RG 59.
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the time that petroleum was so valuable to British secur
ity that the government would fear trying to set any kind
of formal ban.

Unfortunately for Mexico, the rumors soon

proved to have some basis in fact.
Shortly after the rumors of a ban had been denied,
an official statement by Prime Minister Chamberlain was
read to the House of Commons which stated that no oil
from Mexico would be bought by the British government un
til a satisfactory solution to the problem had been arranged.

6k

In retaliation, a group of Mexican senators

passed a resolution stating that since Great Britain had
declared a boycott against Mexican oil, Mexico would not
sell any oil to the British government then or in the
future, even if the policy were changed and Mexico re
ceived a request for permission to buy oil.^

Since the

British government had just stated that it would not buy
Mexican oil, this resolution was more of a defense of the
dignity of Mexico than anything else.
The boycott soon became portentious for Mexico.

In

August 1938 El Xguila petitioned before the court in The
Hague to be allowed to place an embargo on Mexican oil
in a tanker in the port of Rotterdam. ^

The company

^ 1 Nacional. April 30, 1938, p. 1
65Ibld.. May 12, 1938, p. 1.

^^Novedades. August 19* 1938, p. 1.
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went ahead and seised the oil* protesting that the oil
shipped to the Netherlands actually belonged to the
British company.

The Dutch court* however* decided

against the company* saying that it had not proved that
the seised oil had come from its property.**?
The decision was a welcome one for Mexico* since the
boycott by England and the cool attitude of the United
States had sent the Mexican economy into a tailspin.

Even

without the problems of trying to learn how to do the
technical aspects of the job, tasks previously done by
the British and Americans, Mexico in the early days was
hard-pressed to find world markets.
The decision did not deter the British, however.
In Dordrecht, The Netherlands* the company again seized
250 tons of gasoline shipped from Mexico, and again
petitioned a Dutch court* asking that a decision be made
as to whether the oil really belonged to the company. 68
This time the Mexican government lost the battle.
After having its right to seize Mexican oil upheld
in Belgium and The Netherlands* the British company seis
ed some 12,900 tons of petroleum shipped to Le Havre,
Prance* and in October 1938 brought up the first court
69
case in that country. 7 The initial decision by the court

**?E1 Universal. Aug. 24, 1938, Sect. II, p. 2.
68Ibid.. Aug. 27, 1938, Sect. II, p.

5.

69Ibid.. Oct. 12, 1938, Sect. II, p. 3.
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was that the company had the right to seize Mexican
petroleum as it apparently legally still belonged to the
companies.

The Mexican government asked the court to

decide on the legality of the British embargo and to have
it lifted.?0

The decision of the court automatically

denied this petition, and Mexico seemed to have untold
riches which it could not sell.
But after the provisional court order allowed the
seizure of the Mexican oil in October 1938, the civil
court in Le Havre in July of the next year reversed this
decision.?1

The new case involved the tf.R. Davis comp-

anyf which was concerned with obtaining German contracts
for Mexican oil after Mexico failed to find markets in
the democratic countries.

In July 1939* the court deci

sion was in favor of Davis and the French importers of
Mexican oil.

The court claimed that £1 Iguila could not

really prove the oil belonged to the company.

In addi

tion , the court decided that the company must pay damages
both to Davis and the French importers.?2
The decision of the court was announced immediately
in Mexico by the Minister of Foreign Relations* who said
that the British company would be responsible for damages

?°Ibld.. Oct. 29* 1938, p. 1.
71Ibid.. July 23, 1939, Sect. II, p. 5.
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and losses incurred by Mexico in the confiscation of the
oil shipment.

He felt that the decision not only gave

more international validity to Mexico*s right to expro
priate the properties, but also opened the French aarket
for Mexican oil,?^ giving Mexico a market that came at
an appropriate time*
Davis, mho was still acting as an agent for the mar
keting of Mexican oil, indicated the importance of Prench
and other ports in October of the same year when he com
plained of further British seizures.

He protested that

the British had seised an additional 32,000 tons of petro
leum belonging to his company and bought from Mexico.
The oil had been shipped to Scandinavian countries in
three ships contracted by Davis.

He indicated at the

same time that he held contracts for large quantities of
Mexican oil, but that it was practically impossible to
sell it to European nations because of the opposition of
the British.

He wanted to sell the oil to Italy, but was

afraid that the British would confiscate the oil when the
ships passed Gibraltar.?**
Even the aarket in France proved to be an illusory
one.

In November 1939 it was reported that France was

ready to make a large deal with Mexico for petroleum, but

73B1 Nacional. July 23, 1939* p. 1.
?**£! Universal. October 10, 1939* Sect. II, p. 3.
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that British protests supposedly ruined the deal.

Because

of such failures, it was believed that perhaps the United
States would be called on to help Mexico solve the prob
lem of the British embargos.^
The United States was not involved officially in
trying to end this particular phase of the problem, and
Mexico continued to have problems marketing the oil.

It

was only after the failure to find other markets, a
situation caused mainly by the British embargo, that
Mexico seriously turned toward Germany, Italy and Japan.
On the problem of international markets, Jesds
Silva Herzog, who became the director of distribution,
indicated that the loss of some German contracts during
the time of the British embargo had really endangered the
Mexican oil program.

In addition, although Mexico had

found a market for a time in Italy,when that country en
tered the war on the side of Germany, another important
market had been lost.^
With the entry of Italy into the war, however, the
situation changed somewhat.

It is true that the market

was lost to Mexico, but the attitude of Great Britain al
so changed slightly.

Foreign Minister Hay annnounced that

Mexico was ready to negotiate with Great Britain over

^^Ibid.. November 6, 1939. Sect. II, p. 4.
^Novedades. August 6, 19^0, pp. 1, 10.

236

the petroleum issue, after the news was published that
Neville Chamberlain's government had stated it would pre
fer to negotiate with Mexico rather than see Mexican oil
shipped to Italy and then re-shipped to Germany,77

Al

though Britain couldn't seem to understand the Cardenas
Doctrine, she could understand the exigencies of war.
Nevertheless, the British government at that time
still was not concerned enough about its own situation to
push for a settlement with the C&rdenas government.

No

doubt, the British realized that within a few months
Cfrdenas would be out of office, and they probably felt
that his successor would not be faced with the same polit
ical problems in settling the dispute.

In the meantime,

Great Britain continued to refuse to deal with Mexico
and hindered Mexican efforts to make the new nationalized
industry productive•

77 Ibid.. May 4, 1940, p. 1.

CHAPTER VIII

LAZAJRO CARDENAS. J8IDER STATESMAN. OF MEXICO

Cardenas did not disappear completely from the
political scene when he finished his term of office* but
to say he was a dynamic figure in determining Mexican
foreign policy would be to give him too much credit.
Perhaps his greatest contribution to Mexico during the
1940*8 and 1950*s was his divorce from active partici
pation in the affairs of Mexican politics.

This lack

of an attempt to influence affairs was something rela
tively new for ex-presidents of Mexico.
When the new government announced its plans to
modify Article 3 of the constitution, Cardenas admit
ted he did not like the modifications since they would
aid the ambitions of the clergy.1 But he did nothing
to try to force the new president to change his plans,
and indication that Cardenas really meant to stay out
of active politics. As will be seen below, Cdrdenas was

^Ldzaro Cdrdenas, Obraai

I-Aountes 1941-1956.

Tomo II (Mexicoi Universidad Nacional Auttfnoma deMexi
co, 1973), PP. 18-19.
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not always pleased with his successor's relations with
the United States* but again he did not exert pressure
to have the new government adhere to his personal wishes.
Cdrdenas himself tried to strengthen relations be
tween Mexico and the United States during the last few
months in office.

He worked out the details for resolv

ing all outstanding problems between the two nations.
The first question was the total amount of claims and
counterclaims.

Cirdenas refused to oblige Mexico to make

agreements beyound its capacity to pay since involuntary
suspension of payments would have been prejudicial. In
\
addition* he worked out agreements to stabilize Mexican
currency through a loan of $30 million dollars* while at
the same time the United States agreed to raise the import
quota for Mexican petroleum.

Mexico meanwhile was able

to negotiate separately with each company over the expro
priations.

Another source of irritation during his ad

ministration had been the silver-buying policy* and this
question also was more or less resolved before he left of
fice.

A question not resolved but discussed was that of

the problem of international rivers between the two neigh
bors.

Cdrdenas believed that all these questions needed

to be studied together* and felt that by bringing them up
his administration served as a transition from a period
of differences to one full of possibilities of mutual
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friendship.2
After discussing these questions with the United
States and leaving office, Cardenas tried to fade into
the background.

But his youth and popularity kept him

from becoming totally obscure politically.

In spite of

not putting any pressure on his successors, CArdenas was
constantly sought out for his opinions.

3

Nevertheless,

while he might have been important to Mexico, his actions
attracted little international attention until his stand
during the Cuban-United States conflict in the i960 's.
This is not to say that he failed to have direct
dealings with countries outside Mexico in the intervening
years.

When Cardenas heard the declaration of war by the

United States on Japan in late 1941, he indicated he hop
ed Mexico would not follow other nations in doing the
same, although he recognized the need to collaborate with
the democratic countries.

Nevertheless, he sent a mes

sage to the Mexican president offering his services if
needed.

Camacho immediately called and asked him to come

to Mexico City from Jiquilpan.

n,

When CArdenas finished

2Ibid.. pp. 13-14.
3

Ibid. There are so many instances throughout the
immediate years following his retirement that it would be
impossible to list them all. All of volume II is evidence
of this close connection with national leaders.
4 Ibld.. pp. 52-53.

his term of office, he expressed the desire to become
just a private citisen, but he felt he had to serve when
called to service by the new president.

Avila Caaacho

informed C&rdenas of this desire in December 1941, and
in early January of the next year Cdrdenas took up his
new responsibility as commander of the Pacific Military
Region.^ During the next several months C&rdenas again
found himself confronted by what he termed intervention
by the United States in Mexican affairs.
Within a few weeks of taking office, Cfrdenas talk
ed with the conaander of the 4th U.S. army, who present
ed a defense plan to him.

On studying the plan, Cdrde-

naa realised that the United States was proposing that
U.S. forces participate in defense operations of Mexico.
Cdrdenas personally rejected the plan since it not only
would have damaged Mexican sovereignty, but aade Mexico
seen to be an inferior country.^ He rejected any fora
of United States intervention in the oil dispute while he
was president, and now as a military officer he Rejected
any idea of U.S. troops on Mexican territory.
When told by the U.S. commander several months later
that he had been instructed to place radar equipment in
Baja California and to staff the stations with U.S. per

sonnel, Cdrdenas informed him that Mexico was capable of

^Ibid.. pp. 64-66,
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handling such installations* and that as far as he knew
his orders were to have Mexicans staff all installations
within the territory.^

On May 16* 1942* however* he

learned that the Mexican-United States Joint Defense Com
mission had come to an agreement on U.S. troops' entering
Mexico.

He felt this agreement represented more of a

threat to Mexican sovereignty than any act during his
D
presidency.
His attitude over this issue indicates two
things about the former president.

First* it shows that

it was not only the CArdenas Doctrine he was upholding as
president against the oil companies* but also a deep rerentment of any form of foreign control.

More important

ly* from a strictly political standpoint* was the failure
in spite of this attitude either to try to force Xvila
Camacho to follow Cardenas' desires or to resign.
This latter point is emphasised in the attitude of
Cardenas when the president called him to Mexico in May
1942 to inform him that Mexico would have to declare war
on the Axis.

Although expressing his concern at such a

secision* Cardenas also reiterated that he remained at
the orAAvs of his government.^

The president might not

have agreed with CArdenas* ideas on maintaining a position

7U2JL£L. . p. 77.
8Ibid.. p. 82.
^Ibid.. p. 04.
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of neutrality, but he recognised the value of such a man
in a war-time government.

On September 11, 19k2, Carde

nas was named Secretary of National Defense,10 a position
he held for the rest of the war years.
No sooner did Cardenas take over as the Defense
Secretary when he again faced the theoretical threat of
United States' intervention in Mexican internal affairs.
The United State8 began suggesting in late 19^2 that the
railroad system in Mexico needed overhauling with the aid
and supervision of U.S. technicians.

Cdrdenas argued

against active participation by the United States in the
administration of the project.11 CSrdenas, therefore,
was taking a much narrower view of intervention than the
government of his successor.
Probably a combination of these problems with the
United States and a winding down of the war caused Carde
nas to ask in October 19^ that he be relieved of his
post.

His official reasoning was that in the political

campaign about to begin certain elements might try to use
him and his political background to cause the president
problems if he remained as Secretary of National De
fense.12

Only in August 19^5 after the ending of the war

10Ibid.. p. 89.
11Ibld.i pp. 94-95.
12Ibid.. p. 132 .
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was his resignation accepted.1^
On leaving office as Secretary of National Defense,
Cdrdenas looked back with pleasure on his days in the
Pacific Military Region and the constant refusal to al
low U.S. troops to enter Mexico to do what he knew Mexi
cans could do.

In sunning up his country's contributions

to the war, he proudly emphasized the building of air
strips, participation of Squadron 201 in Pacific Opera
tions, the active service of thousands of Mexican resi
dents in the United States, and the service of braceros
(Mexican farm labor) in the United States.1** It is a
little odd that he would single out the contribution of
the braceroa since he opposed their entrance into the
United States and continued to do so for years.^
In spite of his conflicts with the United States,
during the 1940's C&rdenas was more involved in national
politics than in international affairs.

After he left

his cabinet post when the war ended, Cdrdenas was again
called to national service by Miguel Alemdn, this time as
Executive Committee Member of an agricultural board.
Finally Cdrdenas was able to do officially what he wanted

13Ibid.. p. 185.
1/fIbid.. p. 186,
*^Por example, see ibid.. p. 20?.
^Todo. June 5, 1947, p. 5.
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to do when he left the presidency-- work with an held
the rural Mexican laborers.
During this period of time, C&rdenas insisted that
he was nothing but a private citizen and that what he
said had no importance on the affairs of the Mexican
government.

He stated that he was only a patriotic citi

zen serving the country and that he was a loyal servant
of the Mexican president.

17

'

One of the reasons he began

making such statements was that during Alemdn's admin
istration, he was accused of intervening in the affairs
of his home state, Michoac&n, where his brother was
elected governor. id There is no evidence to indicate
the truth of the accusation, and Gdrdenas denied it
publicly.

Ex-presidents had intervened so often in

Mexican politics that maybe the newspapers just expected
C£rdenas to follow the same pattern.
But there was definitely more to the attacks by the
press than just tradition.

Almost any regime following

Cfrdenas would have appeared to swing toward the Right.
Therefore, all the rightists who had felt neglected under
Cdrdenas now had a chance to voice protests against him.
One problem he faced was his attitude toward the
United States.

Cdrdenas recognized the problem himself,

summing up in 1946 the reasons he appeared to be anti-U.S.

^ Ibid.. November 11, 1948, p. 7.
^ I b i d .. November 24, 1949, p. 5.
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(although he insisted he was not).

The main reasons for

this apparent antipathy were t 1) his attitude in trying
to keep out U.S. troops during the wari 2) his opposition
to the braeero program and 3) his condemnation of the
United States' campaign against the Soviet U n i o n . C a r 
denas fails to mention one of the most important reasons
for his differences with the United States— the expro
priation of the oil companies while he was president.
In contrast with his friendship with Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Cardenas called Harry S. Truman a war criminal
for having dropped the atomic bomb on Japan when that
country already was defeated.

20

This attitude is com

pletely understandable in light of the stand Cardenas
took during the war against all bombing of open cities.
In spite of being a revolutionary general, Cardenas be
came one of the world's leading proponents of peace.
Because of his stand for peace, and because he had
become an internationally-recognized figure, Cardenas
was sought out for a position by the United Nations in
1948.

In that year Ambassador Lu£s Quintanilla inform

ed the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations that the UN
Committee on Nutrition and Agriculture wanted Cfirdenas
to serve as committee chairman.

Cardenas replied that he

^CSrdenas, Obras. Tomo II, p. 207.
20Ibid.. p.

235.

«
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knew neither the United States nor

Great

Britain would

want him in the position,

and that since

it

real autonomy, he did not

want the job. He stated that

his ideas were completely

alien to those

of

lackedany

Trumanand

the United States and of Great Britain, and that those
two nations had too much power to intervene in the UN.

21

■*n

This antipathy toward the capitalistic nations was
not as important at home as other attitudes that C&rdenas
began expounding.

His fights with the United States and

Great Britain had been to Mexico's benefit.

But it was

his attitude toward the communist nations that caused cer
tain elements of the press to come out against him.
During his administration, such legislation as his
socialist education was responsible for C£rdenas* being
called a radical, but at least he had not renewed relations
with the Soviet Union.

After he left office, however,

this failure obviously was seen as a belief on his part
that it would have infringed on Mexico's integrity rather
than from any policy standpoint in regard to communism.
On the anniversary of the Russian Revolution in Nov
ember 1943* C£rdenas applauded the victories of the Red
Soviet Army against Germany.

He indicated that the army's

strength was in its patriotism and the social organization
of the country.22 Although the Rightists might not have

21Ibid.. pp. 266-67.
22Ibid.. p. 112.
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liked the consents, theoretically Mexico was one of the
Soviet Union's allies* so no one could condesn very
strongly Cdrdenas* feelings toward that country.
But three years later Cfrdenas was accused openly*
along with Lombardo Toledano, of being responsible for
consunist infiltration in Mexico.

While denying that

responsibility* C&rdenas admitted that he always had
been in sympathy with a social system such as commun
ism.2^

Ctfrdenas did not say that he had been in sym

pathy with Soviet-style communism as practiced by Joseph
Stalin* but obviously he had softened his opinion after
his denunciation seemingly directed at the Soviet Union
for the death of Leon Trotsky in Mexico.
There were those in Mexico in the 1950's who be
lieved that Cirdenas had gone over completely to the com
munist camp.

In 1950* Lufs N. Morones* the former head

of labor under Calles* stated that he had a copy of a
document from the Mexican Communist party to the Cominform in which Valentfn Campa spoke of a communist congress
in Guatemala and of Cardenas as leader of the communists
in Mexico.

ok

Within a few more years* Cardenas was being

singled out as the supreme chief of the communists in

23Ibid.. p. 208.
2k
Todo. March 23, 1950* p. 7.

248

Mexico.2^
Cardenas' denunciations of the United States and
the United Nations during the Korean conflict added fuel
for such attacks from the Right in Mexico.

He was ex

tremely critical of the intervention of the United States
and immediately began attracting adverse comment in that
part of the Mexican press favorable to the United States.

26

As is often the case with an idealist such as CArdenas•
he sometimes ignored the faults of the opposing side of
an issue.

In the case of the Korean War, he never once

mentions the entrance of Chinese "volunteers" into the
conflict, but always talks only *f the North Korean army
and its successes over the allies.
Cardenas' association with the communists concerned
a number of persons after he left office.

Supposedly he

received a confidential letter from Henry A. Wallace, for
mer vice-president of the United States whom CArdenas con
sidered as a friend of Mexico, urging him to abandon the
communists and declare him as anti-communist.2^ CArdenas
does not mention the letter, and considering the political
similarity in ideals of Wallace and CArdenas, it it likely
that the Rightist press at least took great liberties with

25Ibid.. July 22, 1954, P. 10.
26

CArdenas, Obras. Tomo II, pp. 398-42?.

2?Tpdo. August 10, 1950, p. 7.
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the contents of the letter if it existed.
One conceivable explanation of the Rightist attacks
on Cfrdenas is that Miguel Alem&i was considering an at
tempt at re-election as president at that time, and his
supporters might well have considered an attack on Carde
nas as advantageous to the campaign since he always was
strongly against any re-election.
In September 1952* Alemfin wanted to know the
opinion of CArdenas on this subject* and sent a represen
tative to query him.

C&rdenas warned that anyone ad

vising re-election was a false friend* and that Alem&i
28
should not listen.
Aleman followed the advice, and
Adolfo Rufz Cortines was elected president.

But toward

the end of his administration, there were rumors that
supporters of AleraAn again would try to get him re-elected
and that Cardenas would be the opponent.2? Cardenas put
an end to these rumors by stating that he believed in the
principle of no re-election, and would not try to change
it .3° This was the second time CArdenas ended rumors of
his candidacy for president, the other being in the years
of his own term of office.
It is possible that CArdenas might not have been
28
Cardenas, Obraa. Tomo II, p. 440.
29jueves de Bxcelaior. June 16, 1955* p. 35«
3°Ibld.. June 30, 1955. p. 1.
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re-elected even if he had decided to run again, since in
the 1950*s he was identified more and more by the Mexican
press as being part of the extreme left.

He remained

popular with the common man, but the press attacks un
doubtedly diminished his political power.
The press could point to February 1956, when he
received the Stalin International Peace Prise in a
ceremony arranged by the Mexican Movement for Peace ,3*
as an example of his association with the Left.

Up to

this time Cardenas had attracted relatively little in
ternational attention with his actions after leaving the
presidency, and the prise likely was given to capitalise
on his popularity among the workers of Latin America.
Two years after receiving the prize, CArdenas unexplicably started taking a more active interest in in
ternational affairs.

Late in 1958* He began talking with

representatives of the House of Krupp of Germany about
going to Europe and inspecting some of their industrial
32
installations.
As the trip began taking shape, a num
ber of foreign representatives issued invitations to
the former president to visit their countries.
On October 8 , 1958, the Soviet ambassador extended

^ Bl Nacional. February 26, 1956, p. 3.
^2LAzaro CArdenas, Obrasi I^Apuntes 1957-1966. Tomo
III (MAxicoi Universidad Nacional Aut&ioma de Mexico,

1973). PP. 49-50.
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an official invitation to visit the Soviet Union.

The

U.S. ambassador, knowing that CArdenas would be travel
ing by train across the United States to his port of
embarcation in New York, told him that he had informed
all proper authorities to extend any aid needed.

Am

bassadors of France, Switzerland, Yugoslavia and the
minister of Czechoslovakia also issued formal invitations
to CArdenas ,33
CArdenas informed the Mexican government that he
would visit France, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, the
U.S.S.R. and the Republic of China to see for himself
3k
the development of those countries.
In addition to
those named, he also visited Belgium, The Netherlands,
Austria, Switzerland, Poland, Hong Kong and Japan.^5 On
November 29, 1958* CArdenas talked with Nikita Khrushchev in Moscow,

and aftervisiting Europe, arrivedin

China in late January 1959. He wasgreatlyimpressed

with

the living standard there and felt that the work of the
Chinese was an example to the world.37

Other than this,

CArdenas made very few comments in his own diary about the

33Ibid.. pp. 50-51.
3^Ibid.. p. 52 .
3^Ibid.. pp. 51-92.
36Ibld.. p. 65 .
37Ibid.. p. 84.
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political atmosphere in any of these countries.
Upon his return from the trip that took approxi
mately four months, Cardenas visited President Adolfo
LApez Mateos, who had taken office while CArdenas was
out of the country.

CArdenas informed him of what he

had seen and LApez Mateos seemed mostly interested in
the comments on the Krupp installations as that company
was studying plans to establish a steel factory in
MichoacAh.^

Probably mostly because of these plans,

the president had offered CArdenas a sum of $30,000 to
pay for the trip before he left.

CArdenas refused the

offer, leaving the money with a friend until his return.
After returning to Mexico, CArdenas, on March 20, 1959*
gave the money back to LApez Mateos.^

CArdenas not

only did not want to become indebted to the Mexican gov
ernment, but as events proved, his political ideals were
not the same as those of the new president.
Almost immediately upon his return, CArdenas was
accused of having ideals not only different from LApez
Mateos, but oontrary to Mexican policy.

As these charges

of having a radical ideology and of being anti-Mexico
began appearing, CArdenas put the blame on his consider
able number of enemies, paid writers and those men who
attached themselves to others in power.

3aibld.. pp. 92-93.
39Ibid.. PP* 99-100.

He compared the

Chinese and Mexican revolutions* saying they both sought
to destroy the economic and political oligarchies and to
turn over land to the peasants.

In mentioning two other

major revolutions* Cardenas emphasised that the progress
made in the Soviet Union since 1917 was undeniable* and
that already Cuba had started on agrarian reform.

Car

denas' conclusion was that the road being followed by the
socialist countries someday would mean the end of capital
ism* a system which hindered the development of the unUo
developed countries.
These conclusions displeased
those on the Right who were attacking Cardenas* and the
attacks became stronger as he became more deeply in
volved in movements against the United States.
L5pez Mateos and his government seemed to be caught
in between the capitalist countries and the socialist
nations.

For a time it seemed that Khrushchev might be

invited to Mexico* and event which would have caused
consternation in the United States.

Although not invit

ed* he did send a message to Mexico stressing that the
Soviets would do everything possible to strengthen rela2ii

tions between the two countries.

The message might have

pleased Ctfrdenaa, but it was difficult for Ltfpez Mateos
to forget the proximity of the United States* although to

40Ibid.. pp. 100-03 .
/Li

Pravda. October

27, i960, p. 1.
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his credit his country often stood against the United
States in the Organisation of American States (OAS).
When the American nations began preparing for the
conference of foreign ministers at San Jos£, Costa Rica,
in August I960, Mexico was among a small but powerful
group which exerted pressure on the United States to
soften its line toward Cuba.

iLO

The conference was held

from August 22 through 29, and a final declaration gener
ally directed against Cuba was signed on the last day of
the meetings.

It condemned the threat of intervention

from outside, and agreed that all states in the hemisphere
were under obligation to rejection intervention.

The

declaration stated that totalitarianism was incompatible
with political systems in the hemisphere, and that all
member states were held to be under obligation to adhere
to the principles set forth in the inter-American system.
In signing the declaration, the Mexican delegate qualified
his vote by saying that it could in no way be considered
as a threat against Cuba, which received the full sup
port of the Mexican government.^
The Left in Mexico took the signing as a direct blow
42

Paul Kennedy, NY Times. Aug. 14, I960, p. 18.
43
^Department of State, American Foreign Pollcvi
Current Documents, i960 (Washington, D.C.i Government
Printing Office, 1964), pp. 219-20,
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against Cuba,

k/i

and according to the political ideals of

CArdenas, it was a blow against the Mexican Revolution*
CArdenas had not been extremely outspoken on Mexican
foreign policy in the administrations which followed his,
but the conflict between the United States and Cuba gave
him an opportunity to voice his international opinions.
In referring to accusations of his own communist
tendencies, Cardenas* replies sometimes were vague.

Once,

when asked if he were a communist, he turned the question
around and asked the definition of communism.

He com

plained that it was not what the anti-communist propa
gandists said it was, and that he had been impressed with
the spirit of the people of the Soviet Union and China.
He added that he could not see how anyone could be against
systems which tried to help the masses.^
CArdenas commented that many persons feared that if
communism were established in Mexico, there would be no
freedom.

All this propaganda he said was a lie.

He added

that although he was not proposing communism for Mexico,
he believed that it was a theory which led to economic
emancipation.^

Since the CArdenas Doctrine essentially

was based on economic emancipation, it is only natural
hii.
Editorial, Polltica. Vol. I (Sept. 1, I960), p. 2,
^Biempre1. March 8, 1961, p. 26.
46 *
Cardenas, Ideario politico, pp. 97-98.
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that Cardenas would turn to any doctrine which seemed to
promise the attainment of this objective.
CArdenas called on the United States to analyse
its economic policy and the reasons Cuba had been forced
to go outside the hemisphere to look for markets.

He

blamed both the United States and other American repub
lics for not supporting the Cuban revolution, and claim
ed that if the American nations had shown enough solid
arity to avoid an economic breakdown in Cuba, then that
country would not have had to look elsewhere for help.^
Because of his support for Cuba, Cardenas was
chosen as president of the Latin American Conference for
National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation and Peace.
The Mexican conference took place during March 5-8, 1961.
CArdenas says that the news of the conference was sent
to Novedades and Excelsior as paid advertisements, but
these two papers refssed publication.

Only La Prensa

in Mexico City took note of the conference.

IlO

The Soviet press was not as reticent, and ran a num
ber of articles on the conference.

According to Pravda.

it was an indication of Latin American solidarity.

N.S.

Khrushchev sent his congratulations to the leaders of the
conference, and CArdenas expressed the gratitude of the

^ Ibid.. p. 289.
hfl
CArdenas, Obras. fomo III, p. 186.

delegates to the people of the Soviet Union.^

On the

surface* this act seemed far different from the actions
of Cardenas the president in granting exile to Trotsky
and refusing to renew relations with the Soviet Union.
But in terms of the conference, Cdrdenas had not
changed his policy at all. On speaking at the congress,
he attributed to it the exact same goals as the Cardenas
Doctrine.

He emphasised that all too often foreigners

received more consideration than nationals, and this
condition needed to be changed if Latin America was to
have sovereignty and independence.^0
Ctfrdenas was accused of being a traitor to his
country for having participated in the conference.

He

complained that it was the press which was not being
patriotic since it would not publish any articles on the
proceedings, but instead published anti-communist arti
cles by the U.S. ambassador.

The conference, according

to Ctfrdenas, was composed of various social organizations
and parties of wiedly-varying political ideas, mainly
designed to discuss problems of each country.

One of

the themes was the discussion of how to regain natural
resources from the hands of foreigners.

p.

1.

**9Prayda. March 7, 1961, p.
^°C£rdenas, Obraa. l'omo III, p.

C&rdenas accused

March 17, 1961,

239,
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the foreign companies of launching a campaign against the
conference as soon as they learned of this point.-*1 The
CArdenas Doctrine had survived from the time of his presi
dency, and this time was being applied on a larger scale.
One country which definitely did not support the
ideas of Cdrdenas was Guatemala.

In April 1961, Presi

dent Miguel Ydfgoras claimed that Guatemala had the right
to allow foreign troops to train on its soil, and in the
case of an attack by Cuba, he would not hesitate to use
those troops.

He added that his country had no intention

of attacking another c o u n t r y . O n e of the reasons for
this statement came out the next month, when the govern
ment of Guatemala supposedly made a formal protest to
Mexico in the face of what it felt was threat of invasion
from land in Mexico owned by Cdrdenas.

Ydfgoras warned

there might be an invasion of Guatemala, £1 Salvador,
Honduras and Nicaragua.

The Mexican government denied

that any formal protest ever was made.^
But Mexico could not deny the next protest of the
Guatemalan government.

This time the government sent a

radiogram to the General Secretariat of the OAS claiming
that communist troops were being trained on land owned by

51lbid.. pp. 192-93.
-*2La Prenaa. April 12, 1961, p. 4.
53Ibid.. May 31, I 96I , p.

3.
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C£rdenas.

Mexico denied the charge and requested that an

investigation be Bade.

A committee met, but without

making the inspection decided that Mexico was not doing
anything wrong. ^

Cardenas then suggested to Ldpez Mateos

that he take a position in Grijalva instead of one offer
ed in the north, as an act of confidence and in answer
to the intrigues of Ydfgoras.-’-’ Ldpez Mateos refused,
perhaps remembering that Castro once used Yucat&i as a
training area, and realizing the close friendship Carde
nas felt with Castro.
CArdenas first met Fidel Castro Ruz on September 2,
1956, and characterized him as being a young intellectual
with a violent temper. ^

When CArdenas learned in 1959

of the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista, his relationship
with Castro still was not as close as it later became.
At the time of the overthrow, he conmented that he hoped
it did not mean just a change of those in power and that
the new program would justify the blood spilled.^
The relationship between Castro and Cardenas seems
to have started becoming closer when CArdenas traveled to

^OAS, Annual Report of the Secretary General to the
Council of the Organization (Washington. D.C.i Pan Ameri
can Union, 1961), p. 6.
^CArdenas, Obraa. Tomo III, p. 243.
56Ibid.. Tomo II, p. 647.
■^Ibid.. Tomo III, p. 75.
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Cuba on July 26, 1959 to visit agricultural areas.**8 Then
when the April 1961 invasion took place, the hatred of
CArdenas for any kind of foreign intervention made it
natural for him to take up the Cuban cause.
After the invasion, CArdenas stated that the Cuban
cause was ideologically the same as that of Mexico, and
that Latin American countries could not remain indifferent
to this attack.

He advised President John F. Kennedy to

carry his battle against communism to the Soviet Union,
not to Latin America where the countries already had suf
fered from the consequences of the Cold War.**9 CArdenas
agreed that revolutions should be neither imported nor
exported,^0 but there was never any doubt that the Cuban
Revolution had sprung from local uprisings rather than
being caused by foreign ideologies.
Immediately after news of the attempted invasion,
CArdenas announced his intention to fly to Cuba, saying,
however, that the purpose of the trip was not to help
against the invaders, but rather simply to spend two
weeks visiting the agricultural areas to study their systern of development.

61

Not even CArdenas could have believ

ed that this excuse would be accepted by his own government

58Ibid.. p. 110.
59Ibid.. p. 211.
8°CArdenas, Ideario politico, pp. 33-3*K
8lExcelsior. April 18, 1961, pp. 1, 9.
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and nuch less by the rest of the world.
Supposedly, bad weather cancelled CArdenas' flight
62
to Havana,
but sources close to the situation claim
that the government of LApez Mateos prohibited the flight
because they did not want to take the chance that the ex
president might be killed in a foreign revolution.^
This explanation is much more logical in light of sub
sequent conversations held between LApez Mateos and CArdenas.
On April 27* CArdenas met with two friends to
formulate ideas on Cuba to be presented to L6pez Mateos.
One question was whether the Cuban government wanted to
end the conflict with the United States, and if so, what
conditions were necessary to do so.

In addition, CArdenas

wanted to ask Castro which governments might be accept
able as intermediaries, at the same time stressing that
there would be no intervention in the internal affairs
of Cuba.

CArdenas believed he and his two friends could

go to Cuba as a private commission to present the ideas
to Castro.

LApez Mateos stressed his concern of the dan

gers involved if CArdenas went to Cuba, especially since
normal air service was suspended.

The president also

brought up the idea that the communists were using the

^2La Prensa. April 18, I96 I, p. 3.
^Personal interview.
Herzog. L.S.U. Archives.

Author with Jestfs Silva
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name of Cfirdenas, but this accusation was denied as
64
propaganda from the United States.
Lopez Mateos
nevertheless was inflexible on the matter, and C&rdenas
was unable to present his ideas to Cuba.
Instead of going to Cuba, he expressed himself on
the subject to the United States ambassador to Mexico,
Thomas C. Mann, a few months after the affair had settled
down somewhat.

The conversation turned to Cuba, which,

according to Mann, had turned completely to communism.
C£rdenas indicated that not only was this act no danger
to the United States, but that it was occasioned by the
lack of friendship and aid from the United States.

Mann

replied that Cuba had insulted the United States, but
C&rdenas retorted that this insult came only after several
U.S. senators started talking of occupation of Cuba.

On

being asked if he thought the United States might renew
relations with Castro, Mann answered that Cuba would have
to cease being a satellite of the Soviet Union.

Cdrdenas

pointed out that even as a Soviet satellite, there warn no
way Cuba could prepare itself to attack a country as large
and powerful as the United States.^

Cardenas was only

pointing out what was obvious, but often his manner of
doing so caused international friction.
64 -

Cdrdenas, Obras. Tomo III, pp. 2 1 2 -2 1 5 .

65Ibld.. p p . 2 3 6 -3 7 .
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This problem was partly resolved when LApez Mateos
appointed Cardenas to a position within the government
in Deceaber 1961 . The move came at a very good time,
as LApez Mateos appointed all the ex-presidents to posi
tions during a time when Mexico's relationship with Cuba
was attracting a large amount of attention in the foreign
press.
As early as March 23. 1959* LApez Matess suggested
that CArdenas take charge of the Commission of
sas.^

r£o

Bal

Again a few months later, CArdenas was reminded

of the offer, and he asked for time to think about it.**7
CArdenas served during partB of three other administra
tions » and LApez Mateos probably believed that more work
would take CArdenas' mind off foreign affairs.

The pre

occupation of CArdenas in this area could have endanger
ed the Mexican government.
If LApez Mateos feared this danger» it seemed to be
a well-founded fear when he talked again with CArdenas
in May i960 and again indicated his desire that CArdenas
take the position in Rio Balsas.

CArdenas informed the

president that he now was a representative of the World
Congress of Peace, and that probably he would have to
travel to Surope and Latin America during the year in this

66Ibid.. p. 100.
67Ibid.. p. 109.
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capacity.

At that time the president indicated that the

international duties of CArdenas would be no obstacle to
his official position.

68

The amount of time CArdenas

applied to domestic problems in a similar position earlier
seemed to indicate to LApez Mateos that once he was again
working he would leave foreign relations to the president.
When CArdenas presented his plan to go to Cuba and
try to arrange for an intermediary between that country
and the United States. Lopes Mateos again reminded him of
the position.

Indicating even more concern to get CAr

denas interested in domestic affairs, the president even
suggested he take over as head of the PRI, a position
CArdenas completely refused, saying he was unqualified
for political reasons.

Finally. CArdenas himself sug

gested that if all ex-presidents were put into secondary
positions, he would agree to serve on the Commission of
Rfo Balsas or any other position.

He even offered to talk

with several of the ex-presidents himself, although LApez
6q
Mateos made no committment at the time.
After this in
terview. CArdenas admitted privately that the main reason
he had delayed in accepting a position with the government
was his feeling of conflict with LApez Mateos over the
case of a number of railroad leaders and supporters in

68Ibid.. pp. 148-49.
69Ibid.. pp. 215-16.
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prison*

CArdenas believed L<Spez Mateos was misinformed

over the issue ,7° and he continued to fight until the
end of Ldpez Mateos' term to have the men released*
The issue over the political prisoners was not the
only conflict between the two men.

Although CArdenas

could not comp&ain too much in January 1962 when at the
Punte del Este conference in Uruguay the Mexican delegate
abstained from the voting which expelled Cuba from the
QAS,7* the abstention did not necessarily mean that CArdenas was convinced the Mexican government was doing
everything possible to support the sovereignty of Cuba.
CArdenas preferred that Mexico take positive action
to show the United States that it could not intervene in
the affairs of other nations.

He became involved in the

National Liberation Movement which grew out of the first
Latin American Conference for National Sovereignty, Eco
nomic Emancipation and Peace.

CArdenas informed L6pes

Mateos that this movement was not a political party, but
had grown out of that conference with movements being

7°Ibid.. p. 222.
^Department of State, American Foreign Policvi
Current Documents. 1962 (Washington, D.C.i Government
Printing Office, 1966), p. 330. Also see OAS Documents,
1962, OSA/Ser. G/lII/C-sa-33(l) and Uni6n Panamericana,
Tr& W o toteJaiMrjjgiag de ^ ig tfn c ja regXprog&i ap n eaclones. Tomo II. 1960-1964 (Washington. D.C.iUni6n Panamericana, 1964), p. 67 .
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in each country*

LApez Mateos was assured that the aove

aent was acting strictly within the constitution• and was
in no way against the present adainistration.72 The
aoveaent (the MIN) was fighting for the ideals of the
Mexican Revolution according to CArdenas in the areas of
politics, culture, economy and justice.

Nevertheless,

the government harrassed the MLN, and Cardenas recog
nised a personal antipathy for the aoveaent in the presi
dent.^

Undoubtedly, Cardenas hiaself would have felt

a certain antipathy during his own presidency toward
any international aoveaent* s trying to tell hia how to
handle his foreign affairs.
Neither did CArdenas care for the way the govern-,
aent handled the Kennedy visit in late June 1962.

Presi

dent Kennedy received an extremely warm welcoae froa the
Mexican people, and la Prensa indicated that the reaction
was an indication of the true feelings of Mexico toward
the United States.7** But CArdenas accused the govemaent of taking special pains to aake sure nothing happen
ed to spoil the visit.

He stated that "cosaunistB" and

”anti-iaperialists" were rounded up and put in jail, only
to be released after President Kennedy returned to the

72CArdenas, Obraa. Tomo III, p. 255 .
73Ibid.. pp. 2W-46.
Editorial, La Prensa. June 30, 1962, p. 8.
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United States.^

There is no doubt that the Mexican

government could have rounded up a number of trouble
makers before the visit, but Cardenas had become so emo
tionally involved in the struggle against the United
States that he might well have overlooked that perhaps
the majority of the Mexican people did support the Ken
nedy administration*
Cardenas released more invective against Kennedy
when in October 1962 the United States' president declar
ed a blockade of Cuba.

According to Cdrdenas, this was

an act which indicated U.S. lack of consideration for the
sovereignty of other countries, in addition to being an
illegal act.^

Almost immediately, however, the other

States belonging to the OAS supported U.S. action in
Cuba.
Mexico supported the OAS action also as the member
states called for the dismantling of all offensive mis77
siles placed in Cuba.' Mexican concern at giving the
United States carte blance to act against Cuba forced the
Mexican delegate to abstain on some parts of the resolu
tion in spite of overall Mexican support.

The government

^Ctfrdenas, Obras. Tomo III, pp. 280-81.
76.
76U2i£»* P. 290.
77/OAS, Annual Report-of— the Secretary General to the
Council of the Organisation. 1962 (Washington. D.C.iPan
American Union, 1962), pp. 3-^.
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of l£pez Mateoa further incensed the Left in Mexico when
this action was followed by a public release of a letter
sent by the president to both Cuba and the United States,
expressing concern over the situation.

In his letter to

Cuba, he put Mexico on the side of the United States by
declaring that his government must condemn the establish
ment of such destructive weapons on Cuban territory
To be true to his own doctrine, Cardenas could not
justify Cuban action on this issue either, in spite of his
differences with L6pez Mateos.

He again emphasized that

the United States* boycott of Cuba could have destroyed
that country economically had not Castro been able to find
an alternative.^

But Cardenas, once again exhibiting a

nationalistic spirit, indicated that neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union could control the destiny of
the world.

He said that both nations would better serve

mankind if they would withdraw all their bases frsm all
foreign territories.

80

When he stated that the people of

Latin America wanted neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union to intervene in affairs of the Latin American
countries,

81

he was without a doubt expressing the true

Excelsior. October 30, 1962* pp. 1, 15 ,
^Cirdenas, Idaario politico, pp. 286 -89 .
80

Cardenas, Obras. Tomo III, pp. 290-91.

^*La Prensa. April 19, 1961, p. 16.
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sentiments of the vast majority of not only Mexicans* but
all Latin Americans.
His outspoken complaints about the intervention from
the United States in the Cuban crisis were the last real
statements on foreign policy which might have been con
sidered dangerouB to the Mexican government.

He did com

plain in 1966 when Lyndon B. Johnson scheduled a trip to
Mexico.

C&rdenas claimed that it was not an honor for

the country to have to entertain a bad leader who used
his country's power to meddle in the affairs of smaller
nations.

The visit for Cardenas was a political move to

make it apparent that Mexico supported the militaristic
actions of the United States.

82

Xxcept for such occasion

al remarks* however* Cardenas faded from the foreign af
fairs scene until his death in 1970 * when he was again
eulogised as the man who gave Mexico economic independence
from the United States and Great Britain.

82

Cardenas* Obras. Tomo III* p. 5^2.

CHAPTER IX

AMALXSIS OP THE CfaDENAS APHCTISTRATIOH
The Mexican people in the yeara of President
Cardenas (193^-19^0) made great progress in
the struggle for democratization and unifi
cation of the national sovereignty of their
homeland.1
The above quotation was not taken from the writing
of some Mexican patriot, but from a history of Soviet
Foreign Relations.

Many Mexicans would agree with the

sentiment of the statement, but the source might lead to
the impression that President CArdenas was a friend of the
Soviet Union,

An excerpt from Pravda in 19^0, however,

might better illustrate the thinking of the Soviets dur
ing the CArdenas years.

Denouncing the influence of the

United States on CArdenas, the article said that declara
tions made by the Mexican president indicated that he was
about to embark on an offensive against the Popular Front
parties of Mexico.

2

By the time of this article, CArdenas had served

^khtamzian, Istoriia, p. 365.
Excelsior (quoted from Pravda). Feb. 23, 19^0, p.l.
270
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practically his entire term.

Thus* he had already expro

priated the oil properties* demonstrating to the United
States just how little influence its power had on his
policies.

In reviewing the objectives and accopplishments

of his regime, those expropriations rank as one of the
most important.

C&rdenas had difficulties with the two

major countries involved* but since that time Mexico has
made greater economic progress than previously.

There is

no way to state definitively that the expropriation end
ed Mexico's economic problems and started the country on
the road to progress.

In fact* for a time, the oil in

dustry was a political and economic liability.

Yet*

since then, no foreign companies have tried to avoid Mexi
can law by appealing directly to their own governments.
If Cardenas accomplished nothing else during his adminis
tration, the effective enforcement of this portion of his
policy could have qualified him as an economic liberator
of Mexico.

Because CMrdenas, both during his administra

tion and in later years* was so concerned with this idea
of economic independence* he undoubtedly would have been
happy to be remembered in this manner.
While the oil component of his economic policy was
the most dramatic because of the countries and amount of
money involved, Cirdenas did not limit himself just to
that aspect.

Still in the economic sphere, Cdrdenas'

decree establishing Mexican territorial waters at nine
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nautical miles also indicated freedom from the influence
of the United States, and liberation from the inhibiting
fear of that powerful neighbor, a new policy for 20th
century Mexican leaders.
When the United States Treasury policy on silver
purchases changed, C£rdenas did not attempt to follow a
similar policy of retaliation.

From all indications, it

appeared that the United States was tying the silver is
sue to the oil debate and telling Mexico tacitly that
if Cardenas wanted the Treasury to continue buying silver,
he would have to be reasonable over the oil issue.

But

CArdenas didn't attempt to retaliate in a like manner.
The United States was still very interested in settling
agrarian claims, but CArdenas. informed his subordinates
that they should not tie the silver issue to that of the
agrarian claims (see chapter VI above).
In retrospect, one must also credit the United
States with a good deal of patience with Mexico during
the CArdenas years.

At the 7th International Conference

of American States at Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1933, Secre
tary of State Hull had agreed to absolute non-intervention
on the part of the United States in both internal and ex
ternal affairs of other countries.*^ The United States
in general followed this policy in dealing with Mexico,

^Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 737.
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and allowed Cardenas to pursue his policy of nationalisa
tion.
Perhaps it was just this knowledge that the United
States would not force Mexico into doing something
against her will that gave Cardenas the courage to start
Msxico on the road to economic independence.

Ramdn Beteta

indicated that his government acknowledged the fact that
the United States probably could force Mexico into doing
anything, even to the point of returning the oil proper
ties.

But he also pointed out at the same time that this

act would mean the overthrow of Cardenas, political and
economic chaos, and the end of the Good Neighbor policy.

Jl

Fortunately for both countries, the United States did not
attempt to use force to aid the oil companies, and the
lack of coercion gave CArdenas a chance to prove that his
policies were best for Mexico.
In further refuting the idea that Cardenas was un
duly influenced by outside forces, one need look only at
the case of the Spanish civil war.

Not only did CArdenas

follow a policy completely independent from the United
State8, but his government along of all the Latin American
republics supported the Spanish Republican government.

L

Chief, Division of the American Republics, U.S.
State Department, memorandum of conversation with RamAn
Beteta, June 19, 1939# Doc. 812.6363/3862, RO 59.
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In the case of Spain* Ctfrdenas first used flexible Mexi
can foreign policy to determine that aid to the Loyal
ists was not considered as a form of intervention* then
used the Sstrad Doctrine in reverse to refuse to grant
Franco's government recognition.

Cardenas might have

been accused of a lot of things* but no one could say
that he blindly followed anyone else's policy.
The major accusation against the C£rdenas regime
would seem to be that it was "radical*" if not complete
ly communistic.

But in analysing his administration* one

must keep in mind that the United States and the Soviet
Union were not yet allies during the Cdrdenas years.

The

two nations had resumed diplomatic relations in 1933* but
this act did not make them friends.

Although the Carde

nas years came before the McCarthy purges of the 1950's*
there was still animosity and lack of understanding in
the United States toward the Soviet Union.

Therefore*

when some journalist accused Cdrdenas' administration of
being "communistic*" chances were in many cases he really
wasn't even sure of the meaning of the word.

The idea

seemed to be to brand anyone as communist who did not
believe exactly the same things as the United States gov
ernment and big business combined.

Thus* when Cardenas

dared to oppose big business* his regime automatically
received the label of "radical."
When Cardenas was forced to turn to countries such
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as Germany, Italy and Japan for oil markets because the
democratic nations refused to buy the Mexican product,
his regime then became fascist to those who had to put
a label on his politics.

In 1935# the United States had

agreed to grant most-favored-nation status to the Soviet
Union, provided the Soviets purchase $30 ,000,000 worth
of goods in 1935*^ No one was trying to label the United
States as being communistic because of this commercial
agreement, yet Mexico was fascist because she was selling
oil to the only countries which would buy it.
The labels on the Cardenas administration continued
to fluctuate according to the political bent of the ac
cuser

and the period of time.

When Mexico sold products

to the fascist countries, Cardenas was a fascist leading
Mexico into a period of reaction.

When he was aiding the

Spanish Republicans or the labor groups within Mexico,
or just allowing the CPM to operate without harrassment,
he was a communist.
But even in 1937 the communists in Mexico were ad
mitting that the Cfrdenas government was not really even
sociali8tio, and that there was no dictatorship of the
proletariat.

The democratic and anti-imperialistic poli

cy of Ctfrdenas did, however, give them hope that the Mexi
can Revolution could be turned into a socialist one.

^gRUS. Soviet Union. 1933-39. p. 197.

276

Nevertheless, Hem£n Laborde stated at the time that the
CFM could not be considered as Cardenistas, but as com
munists in the service of the World Revolution.^ That
he could say this publicly indicates the amount of free
dom the CfM had under Cdrdenas.

The only purges of com

munists under his regime were the purges initiated by
the communists themselves.

These purges were usually a

result of disagreements over Soviet foreign policy, but
Cdrdenas seemed to recognize that the limited membership
of the CFM need not be taken seriously by his government.
The CFM itself seemed to recognize that Cdrdenas
was not taking the communists within Mexico very serious
ly, and by 1940 the party had all but given up hope of
bringing a socialist revolution about through the Carde
nas government.

By July of that year, communist-led lab

or groups were in open revolt against the regime, and the
CFM was calling for increased agitation in opposition to
moderate government policies.

Details of secret CFM

meetings revealed that the communists were to try to stall
Mexico's cooperation with other Latin American governments
and to precipitate a civil war in Mexico.

Supposedly this

last objective was for the purpose of bring about U.S.
intervention in Mexico, thus limiting American aid to

^Victor Alba, Historla del movimiento obrero en
America latina (Mexico* Libreros Mexicanos Unidos, 1964),
p. 212.

2?7

Great Britain.7 Needless to sayf if the CPM did think
itself capable of engaging in such an ambitious task, the
chances for success were minimal.

More than likely, the

Soviet policy might have called for the party to attempt
disrupting activities* but even the Soviets must have
known that the small membership had little chance to
accomplish such goals.
CKrdenas also tried to make sure that neither the
Soviets nor any other communist groups tried to enter
Mexico to help the party carry out objectives formulated
outside the republic.

As early as 1936 the Cfrdenas

government had prohibited the entrance into the country
o
of groups of militants* such as communists.
There prob
ably was no immediate effect on the CFM and the main con
cern should have been with those already in the country.
The press would have preferred a crackdown on all
CFM activity* but at that early date Cardenas still be
lieved that internal groups constituted no danger to Mexi
co.

Cardenas always seemed to believe that internal

groups* no matter how opposed to his regime they might be,
could be handled and tolerated.

On the other hand* ex

ternal groups always seemed to represent potential danger.

7Betty Kirk, Covering the Mexican Front (Normani
University of Oklahoma Press, 1942), pp. 89-90.
®g*££lsifl£, January 28, 1936, p. 1.
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This danger did not keep Cardenas from opening the doors
of Mexico to political exiles* however.
Within just a few months of his election* Cardenas
was already being accused of having communist-inspired
policies* although up to that point he certainly had
done nothing compared with what was to come in the next
few years.

But Cfrdenas felt compelled to dispel this

notion* and declared in a speech that his policies were
not communist-inspired* nor was he himself a communist.
He stated that he believed that in the case of labor*
the strike was a necessary weapon in the fight for social
justice* but he gave his full guarantee for the rights of
private enterprise at the same time.9 Cardenas later was
accused of allowing syndicalism to develop to such an ex
tent that the functioning of his own government was in
peril because he allowed government workers to strike
If Cfrdenas had been the communist-type dictator his op
ponents accused him of being* he would not have allowed
this situation to develop to the possible detriment of the
state.

He also would have hesitated to give private en

terprise the guarantees of protection* a promise he kept.
In fact* although Cardenas favored labor in his policies*
he made labor see that he would not allow labor groups

9Ibid., April 13, 1935. Sect. II, p. 2.
10P£rez-Verdia, C&rdenas apoatol. p. 70.
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wantonly to destroy the Mexican economy at the expense
of private enterprise.

Cardenas made it clear that his

Labor Doctrine delivered at Monterrey indicated that the
State would serve as arbiter in disputes between labor
and management, but that neither segment would be favor
ed to the extent that the nation would be in jeopardy.11
Cardenas was sometimes accused of breaking this pledge,
but in light of how the Mexican economy was actually giv
en a boost under Cardenas, this accusation holds little
value.
In another pledge that many people claimed Cardenas
broke, he assured the nation that communist agitators
would not succeed in influencing his regime. 12 Not only
was he accused of allowing the communists to influence
his policy, but of opening up the national treasury to
further communist propaganda. 13J Part of the basis of
such arguments was the fact that the CPM had direct rela
tions with the COmintem, and in turn was allowed freedom
of expression under Cardenas.

The false premise which

followed was that C&rdenas must have been influenced by
the Comintern and the Soviet Union.
It is not hard to imagine that the CFM had direct

11C<rdenas, Ideario politico, pp. 189-90.
12Excelsior, February 8, 1939* p. 1.
^Correa, B1 balance del Cardenismo. p. 5^0,
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contact with the Comintern, especially since the party
openly admitted it.

But the idea that Cardenas used

the national treasury to aid communist propaganda does
not seem to be very logical in the face of two facts.
First, the financial problems brought on by the oil ex
propriations and the demands of the United States and
Great Britain for payment of the revolutionary debt
created a situation whereby the government would have
been hard-pressed to come up with additional funds to
support activities which would have made the problems
with democratic governments even more difficult.

Carde

nas had enough troubles with foreign newsmen accusing his
government of being communistic without allowing wide
spread communist propaganda to add fuel to the fire.
A second consideration was that such propaganda
activities as were carried on by the CFM were always in
financial danger.

An example of this was the financial

plight of La Vos, the official Communist party organ
which had an extremely short publishing history because
of the lack of funds.
Yet a third consideration for rejecting the idea that
the government supported the propaganda activities of the
CFM is found in the very poverty of the country which
CArdenas was governing.

His treasury was almost empty,

but he recognised the poverty that existed in Mexico and
attempted to correct the problem.
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More than twenty years after he left office, he
showed he was still concerned about the problem of pov
erty in his country.

In a speech before a group of high

school graduates, C&rdenas reminded the Mexican people
that in spite of the economic progress made by the country
and the political maturity to which Mexico had grown,
there could be no pride in these accomplishments while
a large segment of the Mexican population still lived
in ignorance and poverty.

I k

Not long after Cirdenas had taken office, he had
expressed his concern about the same problems, especial
ly the ignorance and poverty of the country.

In talk

ing with U.S. ambassador Josephus Daniels, C&rdenas in
dicated that he felt the three most serious problems of
Mexico in order were educational, economic and relig
ious.1^ Probably no one would have argued with him over
these problems, although others might have re-arranged
the order.

But the problem arose in the way Cardenas

attacked each issue.
The religious issue was more a result of the 1917
constitution than of any new legislation by Cardenas,
but there is no doubt that he did use the anti-clerical
clauses in the constitution to further some of his goals.

^Cffrdenas, Ideario politico, p. 250.
1^FRUS, 1936, Vol. V, p. 716.
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His acts attracted the attention of the clergy in the
United StateSt thus leading to more bad publicity for
his government.

Again false premises were drawn( the

conclusion being that since his government had proved
to be anti-religioust then it must be communistic.
The economic portion of that three-part plan to
face Mexico's problems has already been discussed in de
tail in referring to the oil expropriations.

Although

this act hurt the economy for a time, it led to increas
ed revenues that went into the Mexican Treasury instead
of into the bank accounts of the companies.
But it was the third problem and the attempt to
solve it that probably received the most domestic criti
cism.

Even more than his labor policies, the education

al system drew the most criticism.

Apparently, most of

the opposition was related to the religious question as
CArdenas further took education out of the hands of the
church, an issue long debated in Mexico.

In making a

speech before the legislature of the State of Guerrero,
CArdenas defended his educational reforms.

In emphasis

ing emphatically that his was not a communistic govern
ment, CArdenas defended scientific socialism and the
sooialist form of education as being non-dogmatic, with
the only objective being the exposition of modem know
ledge.

It would also, according to CArdenas, orient

future generations of Mexicans toward a more social life

283

with social justice as a cornerstone of interaction among
people,1**
Others saw the educational reforms differently* and
one writer describes them as being designed by Cardenas
to transform Mexico into a leftist country.1? Those who
believed this felt that the new socialist education was
not only anti-religious and militant* but definitely com
munistic,

There seemed to be a sufficient number of

Mexicans who felt this way* because almost immediately
after Cardenas left office the amendment which his govern
ment had passed allowing for the change in the education
al system was repealed and Mexico's flirtation with
socialist education was ended.
The school system might have been socialist-oriented*
but a number of American writers who have taken an inter
est in the Cardenas years have decided that his was not
a communist regime.

Robert Alexander* who has written

on communism in Latin America* points out that at times
democratic leaders have utilised the communists in their
programs.

He says that Cardenas was one of those leaders*

and that he allowed communists to occupy high positions
not only in the government, but in the labor unions too.
But Alexander goes on to point out that the communists

1^Excelsior. Pebruary 21* 19^0, p. 8.
1?Alvear Acevedo, Ldtsaro C&rdenas, p. 111,
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lost almost all they had gained under Cdrdenas during
the next administration.

18

Particular emphasis should be placed on Alexander's
use of the word "allowed" when speaking of the positions
communists occupied in the Cdrdenas government.

When he

speaks of the losses of the communists in the following
administration! the truth inherent In the emphasis he
places on Cardenas' allowing communists to occupy posi
tions in his government is implied.

Had the communists

been able to entrench themselves firmly during his term
of office (and to do this would have required his sup
port), they might not have lost so heavily during the
next administration.
There would be no sense in denying that probably
some of Cdrdenas' top advisers were communists, at least
in the Mexican sense of the word.

But Cardenas had set

up the government party so that each one of the four sect
ors would support the other in elections.

And since

traditionally in Mexico the party candidate for presi
dent is elected, there easily could have been an oppor
tunity for a "communist" president had the party so desir
ed.

It is more logical that Cdrdenas picked his top ad

visers, not so much in regard to their political leanings,
but in what they could do for his administration.
18

In so

Alexander, Communism in Latin America, p. 15*
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doing, Cardenas exhibited the same political agility
that he did in favoring labor, but keeping the support
of private enterprise also.
Even the U.S. ambassador to Mexico under C&rdenas,
Josephus Daniels, admitted the socialist nature of the
Cdrdenas regime, but added that, although he knew there
were communists in Mexico just as in any country, he did
not believe that Mexico had become communistic under Cirdenas. 19

A Mexican writer on the other hand, who actual

ly would accuse Cardenas of communism, says that the Cdrdenas administration was not a communist one only because
it failed in the attempt.

He claims that Cardenas and his

administrators attempted to force Mexicans to become cornmunists.

20

As was often the case with such accusations,

it was based largely on Cdrdenas' policy of taking away
church authority in education, and thus should be viewed
as being biased on that account rather than actual politi
cal ideology.
In analysing the attitude of Cardenas and his poli
cies, it is hard to accept this idea of a failure to ac
complish communist goals.

Certainly Cardenas had enough

support to accomplish almost any goal he set.

His various

policies which he carried through but which met with

^^Excelsior. February 15, 1936, p. 1.
20

Alvear Acevedo, Ldzaro CArdenas, pp. 277-78.
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criticism bear out this ability.

Even his educational

program, although opposed, became a reality during his
time in office, and it was not until he left office
that anyone dared change it.
In further denying the idea that CArdenas wanted
to have a communistic government but failed, one need on
ly look at Mexican relations with the Soviet Union.

When

CArdenas took office, diplomatic relations with the Sov
iet Union had bemn broken for five years.

Although there

was communication through trade between the two nations,

21

the communists and all those supporters who wrote CArdenas
asking him to renew relations could never convince him of
the necessity or the desirability of such action.

He was

willing to discuss renewal, but not on the terms of the
Soviet Union.

Had CArdenas desired a communist regime in

Mexico, he could have renewed relations and asked the
Soviets for aid his country desperately needed.
Perhaps even more importantly, CArdenas* attitude
toward political refugees should be considered.

He allow

ed refugees of widely-varying ideologies to enter Mexico.
Among these emigrAs were the political refugees from the
Spanish civil war.

In spite of a few isolated charges to

the contrary, CArdenas never set any political standard
for the refugees to meet.

21HSRB. 1934/35-1935/36. Tomo X. pp. 38?, 43?.
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At least part of the reasoning behind the accusa
tions that Cardenas and his government were communist
was that Mexico and the Soviet Union both supplied aid
to the Republican govemnent in Spain during the civil
war there.

But the Soviet Union was allied with Great

Britain and the United States during World War II without
anyone's accusing those two nations of being connunistic.
One of the best reasons of all for accepting the
Cardenas government as being completely independent and
out of the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union is the
case of the most famous of all the exiles to Mexico, Leon
Trotsky.

Extremely important in analysing Cardenas is the

admission of Trotsky against the violent opposition of
almost all communist, and many non-communist, groups in
Mexico.

Neither was he intimidated by protests from the

Soviet Union.
Labor was among the groups protesting the asylum
given to Trotsky, yet Cardenas managed to placate the
workers and stand firm on his decision at the same time.
There was no actual dictatorship of the proletariat und
er Cardenas, and although he favored labor in many dis
putes, most notably that with the oil companies, he was
not interested in a state controlled by one class,

vbardo
_ f2
?°S®rt
Toledano

(Chapel HilliUniversity of North
Carolina Press, 1966 ), p. 13^.

22

and

l0—
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he made sure that labor did not come to dominate his
administration.

He fulfilled his promises to private

enterprise to grant it full protection of his government
whenever it met legitimate labor demands.

By looking at

the major statutes and laws passed during his time of of
fice , one can see that Cardenas was interested in the
nation, not just one sector.
Some of those major statutes werei

the Law of

Nationalization of Property and the Regulatory Law of
1935* the decree establishing territorial limits of Mexi
can waters in 19351 the Law of Expropriation in 19361 and
the decree declaring that the oil companies' properties
had been expropriated in 1938.

In addition to these,

one should not forget that Cardenas gave away more land
to the Mexican peasant than any president before him.

Be

cause of these laws and actions which ultimately proved
to be of benefit to workers, farmers and the rest of the
nation, Cardenas became a very popular president.

He was

so popular that had he believed in totalitarian-style
communism, he probably could have remained in office in
spite of the no re-election clause in the constitution.
Not only did Cdrdenas feel that to remain in office
would negate popular sentiment and the ideals of the Mexi
can Revolution, but he even asked his congress to cancel
the normal presidential extraordinary powers because he
felt they endangered democracy and threatened the Republic
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with dictatorship.2-^
Whan the tine came to step downf CArdenas did not
even support his old friend Francisco Mugica for the
nomination* although it is possible that he might hare
selected Mtfgica as his own personal choice.

The Mexican

press pointed out that many members of the Left were sup
porting Mugica in the early days of the campaign* and
were hoping to win Cardenas to their side.

2k

That he

did not give his support, and instead supported the party
candidate* should be evidence that CArdenas did not seek
to perpetuate communism or socialism* but the party of
the Mexican Revolution.
Although involved in foreign affairs throughout
his period of president and in years later also* Carde
nas probably would have liked to have been remembered
for his domestic labor and his nationalistic spirit*
which directly affected Mexico's economic independence.
He often chastised those who liked to meddle in the af
fairs of other countries.

In 1965* just a few years before

his death, he took issue with something Richard M. Nixon
stated about Mexico's position regarding the Dominican
Republic.

Nixon stated that Mexico should take a more

active part in situations within Latin America such as

2^Kirk, Covering the Mexican Front* p.
2i|jExcelsior, January 30, 19^0, p. 3.

k2•
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In the case of the Dominican Republic.

Cardenas wanted

to know who gave Nixon the authority to give advice on
natters strictly Mexican.

J

The man who had stood up to the United States and
Great Britain in the case of the oil expropriations* had
refused to renew relations with the Soviet Union except
on his own terns, had given asylun to a man such as
Trotsky, had aided the Spanish Republicans when no one
else in Latin America would, and had denounced both the
United States and the Soviet Union for intervention in
Cuba, always kept in mind one principle, that of non
intervention of one government into the affairs of another.
CArdenas summed up his own life principles in a
speech to the first national congress of the CTM in 1938*
"respect of life, individual guarantees, political lib
erty, cancellation of privileges, and a better distribution of the public wealth."

26

No matter what labels

others pinned on him throughout life, he remained faith
ful to these principles and to the basis principles of
the traditional Mexican foreign policy.

^CArdenas, Ideario politico. P. 275.
26Ibid.. p. 76.
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